



ABRIDGED VERSION

A stronger defence

THE MILITARY ADVICE
OF THE CHIEF OF DEFENCE 2019


NORWEGIAN
ARMED FORCES

Norway's security situation has changed over the last couple of years and is more demanding and unpredictable than before.

In light of these developments, the Chief of Defence presents his Military Advice on how the Norwegian Armed Forces need strengthening to face the new security challenges in preparation for the Government's upcoming white paper for the defence sector.

The mandate from the Norwegian Government emphasises that the vulnerability of Norway increases as the security situation deteriorates and concludes that Norway must take a greater responsibility for its own security, combining it with an increased contribution to the overall deterrence and defence capabilities of NATO. The Government describes a requirement for more robust armed forces, with appropriate responsiveness, adequate sustainability, increased situational understanding, increased robustness and a better ability to combine international operations with territorial defence.

The following is an English translation of the Chief of Defence's abridged Military Advice, describing various alternatives for the future structure of the Norwegian Armed Forces based on different levels of ambition. The combined efforts of the services, supporting commands and the strategic leadership of the Norwegian Armed Forces, have been involved in the preparation of this Military Advice. A complete version of the Military Advice in Norwegian is available on www.forsvaret.no/fmr.





The requirement for a Military Advice

A NEW SECURITY SITUATION

The assumptions behind the current long-term plan have changed. The threats to both Norway and our allies are now more complex and rapidly changing. Regional instability and resurgence of interstate conflicts have again become a possibility in our part of the world. Major powers are competing for global and regional influence and the willingness to use military force has increased.

A common feature of today's security situation is that the threats are cross-sectoral; all sectors of society are vulnerable to the use of force and negative influence. Possible adversaries prioritise both the development of conventional military forces and a broader use of non-military means, such as cyber-attacks, manipulation, fake news and propaganda. In other words, both Norway and our allies are exposed to a range of military and non-military instruments from state and non-state actors making it difficult to define a conflict, determine who is behind it and take effective countermeasures.

Russia's continued modernisation and strengthening of its military capabilities and capacities has made its forces capable of attacking quickly and almost without warning. Early warning is reduced to hours and at best days. In addition, Russia has its main military strategic centre of gravity in the immediate proximity of Norway. Russia's position as a superpower, security policy and deterrence strategy are largely based on the freedom of operation for its strategic nuclear forces, including the strategic submarines operating from the Kola Peninsula and in the Barents Sea.

Russia's overall military capacity is the most significant security challenge for Norway and NATO. Combined with reduced early warning, this capacity places specific demands on the Armed Forces' situational understanding, responsiveness, sustainability and ability to protect. It is essential that NATO's interests are safeguarded in our immediate areas and that concerns can be monitored and addressed. Norway must take greater responsibility for its own security and the needs of our allies in order to ensure stability in the High North.

Through its Defence Planning Process, especially after 2014, NATO has asked nations to contribute more to the collective defence of the Alliance. During the summit in Brussels in 2018, NATO decided to further improve

its responsiveness, sustainability and combat power. This decision clearly shows that the Alliance considers the security situation to be more serious than before.

Solidarity, commitments and burden sharing are crucial for NATO, and Norway must be an active contributor. The credibility of the Alliance depends on the fact that the member states contribute with military forces. In exchange for collective security, NATO expects all member states to contribute more to its collective defence and deterrence. A reliable ally must not only support the needs of the Alliance, but also be able to defend its own territory.

"Russia's continued modernisation and strengthening of its military capabilities and capacities has made its forces capable of attacking quickly and almost without warning. Early warning is reduced to hours and at best days."

Traditionally, NATO has enjoyed technological superiority over most of its potential opponents. However, the widespread availability of new technology challenges our security and the West's military-technological advantage. This development represents a future threat to the Alliance and demands increased innovation and pace of change in the defence sector. The dependency on technology will create new vulnerabilities and challenges.

The changing security situation means that the operational requirements for effective national defence are increasing. The Armed Forces must be strengthened to ensure national sovereignty and freedom of action in the years to come.



Norwegian F-35 during Kjeller Airshow 2019.

US Marines participating in exercise "Thunder Reindeer" in Setermoen, Norway.



STATUS OF THE ARMED FORCES

The current long-term plan reversed a long-lasting trend of reductions and improved the capabilities of the Armed Forces. Increase of the defence budget combined with efficiency measures have made it possible to increase maintenance, replenish spare parts and increase manning as well as activity in operational units.

In addition, several significant investments have been made; F-35 fighter aircraft, NH90 maritime helicopters, a logistics vessel and artillery are being introduced to our Armed Forces. New offshore coastguard cutters and P-8 maritime patrol aircraft will be introduced during the next four-year period. New submarines, long-range air defence, new air surveillance radars, as well as new main battle tanks will be introduced from 2025.

The current security situation requires better availability of high-readiness forces for national operations and designated forces to NATO's collective defence than the adopted force structure can provide.

Reduced early warning means that the Armed Forces face a dilemma between increased national presence and contributions to NATO's rapid response forces. Continuous efficiency improvements and staff reductions over the last 20 years have had consequences. Operational units, staffs and school structures are staffed at a minimum.

NECESSARY STRENGTHENING

The current long-term plan builds on and further develops the Norwegian Government's defence policy priorities:

- strengthen the defence of Norway
- strengthen NATO's collective defence
- contribute to international operations
- further develop the total defence concept

Several issues have been identified during the current long-term plan period changing the cost estimates resulting in not all the targets being met. The shortfalls in maintenance, spare parts and stockpiles are larger than expected. The level of ambition regarding readiness and sustainability is more costly than expected and necessitates the increase of the estimates for some programmes. Based on the security situation and the current status of the Armed Forces, five factors have been identified that will guide the further development of the Armed Forces:

1. Increase the preparedness throughout the force structure

Strategic warning prior to a military attack is expected to be very short. The agility of response for the main units of the Armed Forces must be shorter than the early warning to prevent a potential adversary reaching their goals. The requirements for preparedness have therefore increased and will continue to increase.

2. Increase sustainability throughout the force structure

Military forces must be able to be on stand by and conduct operations over time in peace, crisis and war. Such an ambition requires the operational units are sufficiently staffed and have the ability to replenish supplies and personnel when needed.

3. Reduce the vulnerability of critical elements of the force structure

Protective measures are important to preserve Norwegian freedom of action and warfighting ability. Military forces and critical civilian and military infrastructure can be destroyed by high-precision missiles. The Armed Forces depend on both civilian and military infrastructure in the cyber domain, which is currently vulnerable to cyberattacks. These structures and functions must be protected to ensure and maintain the Armed Forces' capabilities.

4. Contribute to NATO's collective defence and international operations

With increased requirements for high readiness, forces that are part of national preparedness can only contribute to national operations. Participating in NATO's response forces must be done with forces not part of national daily operations. The ambition to participate in international operations requires an increased force structure.

5. Increase the range of capabilities and size of the force structure

The Armed Forces need a range of capabilities, size and quality in order to manage the current and future security situation. The force structure of today cannot simultaneously conduct daily operations, execute high-intensity combat operations over time, receive allied reinforcements while contributing to international operations. The Armed Forces also lack capabilities in the cyber domain, in the electromagnetic spectrum and in the protection against ballistic missile attacks.



Joint training between two F-35 fighters and the Norwegian frigate HNoMS Otto Sverdrup.



THE DILEMMA

Reduced early warning causes a challenge to the Armed Forces in maintaining high-readiness forces in Norway, receive allied forces and participate in operations abroad. Today's structure lacks the capacity to undertake these tasks simultaneously.

Chief of Defence's Analysed Alternatives

INTRODUCTION

The Chief of Defence has developed four different and comprehensive alternatives that strengthen the Armed Forces:

- A. An alternative appropriate for the security situation (Alternative A).
- B. An alternative strengthening selected domains (Alternative B).
- C. An alternative strengthening NATO's collective defence (Alternative C).
- D. An alternative focusing on national defence (Alternative D).

The Chief of Defence recommends Alternative A which is the highest level of ambition while Alternative D is the lowest.

The different alternatives build on each other and elements in one alternative can be found throughout the alternatives with a higher level of ambition. The various ambitions are reflected in size, combat power, sustainment and ability to protect. The four alternatives build on modern technology and strengthens the Armed Force's capabilities in space, cyber and electronic warfare. Improved responsiveness and operational availability in the Armed Forces are emphasised in all alternatives, while increased capacity to receive allied reinforcement varies between the alternatives. Interoperability and the ability to cooperate with allies and civilian partners is a fundamental principle for the four alternatives. The alternatives provide different, but tangible political ambitions for the defence of Norway.

CHOD'S RECOMMENDATION

The military strategic situation in Norway's immediate areas has deteriorated significantly since 2014. The range of challenges is increasing in both strength and scope, and we are being challenged in several domains. In order to protect Norwegian interests, we need a strong and credible Armed Forces, while at the same time working to strengthen NATO's role and position in the High North. The four alternatives will strengthen the operational capability of the Armed Forces compared to today's status. However, only Alternative A meets the security challenges in a satisfactory way. This alternative strengthens the Armed Forces both qualitatively and quantita-


tively and subsequently also strengthens the national requirement for presence and responsiveness in the immediate areas of Norway. Alternative A ensures a credible ability to receive and protect allied forces and is flexible in dealing with different types of threats in different parts of Norway quickly and efficiently. In addition, this alternative makes it possible for Norway to contribute to NATO's rapid response forces without significantly degrading our national readiness. Alternative A provides military forces with the necessary strength to provide stability in the High North and is the Chief of Defence's recommendation for the continued strengthening of the Armed Forces. The strengthening should be implemented as soon as possible as the security situation looks to continue to deteriorate rather than improve.

COST CALCULATIONS

The Chief of Defence recommends a structure that is financially sustainable in a long-term perspective, where there is a balance between tasks, force structure and resources, and where the defence specific inflation is taken into account. The four alternatives are based upon a gradual increase until 2024, which is NOK 12 billion higher than the 2020 budget. Alternative A requires a further increase until 2028, which is NOK 25 billion higher than the 2020 budget.

BUDGET INCREASE

Billions NOK





The coast guard helicopter NH90 training on board KV Senja.

Soldiers from Telemark Battalion during an exercise in the Altmark Training Area in Germany.

0-ALTERNATIVE

0 The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment has in its analyses and assessments of the current long-term plan estimated an additional requirement of NOK 75 billion over the next 20 years to fulfil the current long-term plan. The Chief of Defence shares this assessment. If the financing of the Armed Forces is increased accordingly, the result will be an operational capability in line with the current long-term plan. However, this "0-alternative" will not address the intended strengthening of the Armed Forces as set out in the Government's mandate. The Armed Forces will not have the forces available that NATO or our national defence plan requires, and the level of ambition must therefore be reduced. The responsiveness will not be improved without significant reprioritisation of the current long-term plan and cuts of one or more force structure elements, such as submarines. The remaining force structure will only maintain a minimum capacity, which will create gaps in the capabilities that an adversary will identify and exploit. Nor will the Armed Forces be able to take on greater responsibility in our immediate areas or contribute more to NATO's collective defence. The assessed 0-alternative will weaken our national defence capabilities and our traditional defence policy approach will need to be reassessed.







ALTERNATIVE D

"Focused national defence"

Alternative D ensures a national operational ability to solve the Armed Forces' main tasks on Norwegian territory in light of the new security situation. This alternative constitute the lowest level of ambition compared to Alternatives A-C. Alternative D is based on existing defence plans, but the structure will be increased to meet NATO and national plans. This alternative enhances the responsiveness and increases in manning will improve sustainability. However, the increase in numbers is limited and contributions to NATO's rapid response forces or other international operations will be at the expense of national readiness requirements.



(Compared to the 0-alternative)

- Improved responsiveness and preparedness of adopted force structure
- Addresses the force requirements in national defence plans
- Increased ability to delay an adversary in Northern Norway
- Increased ability for presence and to uphold sovereignty in the High North
- Increased ability to conduct air operations by increasing the ability for protection against cruise missiles and ballistic missiles
- Increased ability in the cyber domain
- Increased ability to receive allied reinforcements
- Increased ability to operate with a higher tempo and deliver effective fires at greater distances
- Increased robustness in the communications infrastructure
- Increased ability to provide medical treatment and evacuation



(Compared to Alternatives C, B and A)

- Limited capacity in all domains
- Limited sustainability, both in numbers of forces and support
- Not possible to contribute significantly to international operations without reducing the necessary levels of national preparedness
- Limited capability to establish situational understanding of airspace
- Limited ability to defend Norway
- Limited ability to protect critical military and civilian targets against long-range precision weapons
- Fulfills a limited number of NATO's capability targets



4

TACTICAL TRANSPORT
AIRCRAFT



5

MARITIME PATROL
AIRCRAFT




15

COAST GUARD
CUTTERS




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FIGHTER AIRCRAFT



3+3

AIR DEFENCE



6

FRIGATES




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MARITIME
HELICOPTERS




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TACTICAL
HELICOPTERS



3

MINE COUNTER-
MEASURES SYSTEMS




7

MANEUVER
BATTALLIONS



10

COMBAT SUPPORT
BATTALLIONS



4

SUBMARINES

19,5k
EMPLOYEES

12,5k
CONSCRIPTS



40k
HOME GUARD





ALTERNATIVE D "Focused national defence"



THE ARMY

Army Staff

Norwegian Land Operations Centre

Intelligence Battalion
Military Police Battalion
Combat Engineer Battalion
CBRN Company
Combat Logistics Battalion
Transportation Battalion


Brigade North (Mechanised)

Communications Battalion
Military Police Company
4 Mechanised Infantry Battalions
Artillery Battalion with Close Support
Air Defence
Long-Range Precision Fires Battery
Combat Engineer Battalion
Combat Service Support Battalion
Medical Battalion

Finnmark Land Command

The Border Guard
Cavalry Battalion
Support functions

His Majesty The King's Guard



THE NAVY

Navy Staff

Norwegian Naval Operations Centre
Tactical Command Afloat
Coast Guard Headquarters

The Coast Guard

4 offshore patrol cutters with helicopters
6 offshore patrol cutters
5 inner Coast Guard cutters

The Fleet

4 submarines
6 frigates
6 corvettes (to be decommissioned when new frigates are operational)
3 mine clearance units with remotely operated vehicles and mother vessels
HNoMS Maud logistics and support vessel
2 small logistics vessels
Coastal Ranger Command
Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Command

Naval Bases

2 naval bases
MARCSS/maritime logistics base



THE AIR FORCE

Air Staff

Norwegian Air Operations Centre
Control and Reporting Centre

Air bases, protection and allied reception

3 Air bases: 1 reduced manning and in addition 1 reserve base
Air surveillance
3 long-range surface-to-air batteries with tactical ballistic missile defence capability
3 NASAMS III batteries
3 Force Protection units, 1 with reduced manning

Combat Air and Force enablers

52 F-35 fighter aircraft
500 hrs annual multirole tanker transport
4 C-130J Tactical Transport Aircraft
5 P-8A Maritime Patrol Aircraft
14 NH90 Maritime Helicopters
18 helicopters for Special Forces and Army support
16 AW101 Search and Rescue helicopters

Participation in international force structures

NATO Air- and Ground Surveillance (NATO AWACS and AGS)
Strategic Airlift Capability (HAW)



THE HOME GUARD

Home Guard Staff

Norwegian Home Guard
Operations Centre

Organisation

11 Home Guard districts
37,000 soldiers in Home Guard
companies
3,000 special trained soldiers
organised in rapid reaction units



THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES CYBER DEFENCE

Cyber Security Centre

Ability to establish situational
understanding, protection and
freedom of movement in the
cyber domain

CIS Support

Enabling modern military operations,
CIS support and support to C2

Communications Infrastructure

Satellite communications
Tactical datalinks
Communications networks
Radio networks

Strategic cooperation



JOINT

The Norwegian Intelligence Service Norwegian Joint Headquarters Surveillance by satellites

The Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Medical Services

1 Role 2 Enhanced
3 Role 2 Basic
4 Role 2 Forward
4 Casualty Staging Units
1 Veterinarian Unit
2 Aeromedical Evacuation Units
2 Ground Evacuation Companies
Strategic Cooperation

Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation

Norwegian Logistics Operations Centre
4 Regional Logistics Groups
2 Battalions for Reception, Staging and
Onward Movement
Military Police Battalion
Combat Engineer Battalion (Heavy)
Host Nation Support Battalion
Joint Water Purification Capability
Strategic cooperation including
requisitioned ships and aircraft

Norwegian Special Operations Command

Norwegian Special Operations Centre
Norwegian Special Operations
Commando
Norwegian Naval Special
Operations Commando

*The table describes the force structure of
Alternative D.*





ALTERNATIVE C

"Strengthening NATO's collective defence"

Alternative C focuses on the ability to contribute in various types of international operations while maintaining our national readiness. The force structure in Alternative C builds on Alternative D and strengthens the ability to contribute to NATO's collective defence by establishing units that can regularly participate in rapid response forces.



(Compared to Alternative D)

- Increased ability to continuously provide requested forces to NATO operations without reducing the necessary national operational responsiveness



(Compared to Alternatives B and A)

- Limited capacity in all domains
- Limited sustainability both in numbers of forces and support
- Limited capability to establish situational understanding of airspace
- Limited ability to defend Norway
- Limited ability to protect critical military and civilian targets against both cruise missiles and ballistic missiles
- Fulfills a limited number of NATO's capability targets



+1

5


TACTICAL TRANSPORT
AIRCRAFT



+1


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MARITIME PATROL
AIRCRAFT



15

COAST GUARD
CUTTERS



52


FIGHTER AIRCRAFT



+1

3+4

AIR DEFENCE




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FRIGATES



14

MARITIME
HELICOPTERS



+3

21

TACTICAL
HELICOPTERS



+1

4


MINE COUNTER-
MEASURES SYSTEMS



+1


8

MANEUVER
BATTALIONS



10

COMBAT SUPPORT
BATTALIONS



4

SUBMARINES

20k
EMPLOYEES

13k
CONSCRIPTS



40k

HOME GUARD



Changes compared to Alternative D.



ALTERNATIVE C

"Strengthening NATO's collective defence"



THE ARMY

Army Staff

Norwegian Land Operations Centre

Intelligence Battalion
Military Police Battalion
Combat Engineer Battalion
CBRN Company
Combat Logistics Battalion
Transportation Battalion

Brigade North (Mechanised)


Communications Battalion
Military Police Company
4 Mechanised Infantry Battalions
Artillery Battalion with Close Support
Air Defence
Long-Range Precision Fires Battery
Combat Engineer Battalion
Combat Service Support Battalion
Medical Battalion

Independent Motorised Infantry Battalion

Finnmark Land Command

The Border Guard
Cavalry Battalion
Support functions

His Majesty The King's Guard



THE NAVY

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Norwegian Naval Operations Centre
Tactical Command Afloat
Coast Guard Headquarters

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4 offshore patrol cutters with helicopters
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The Fleet

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6 corvettes (to be decommissioned when new frigates are operational)
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HNoMS Maud logistics and support vessel
2 small logistics vessels
Coastal Ranger Command
Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Command

Naval Bases

MARCSS/Maritime Logistics Base
2 naval bases



THE AIR FORCE

Air Staff

Norwegian Air Operations Centre
Control and Reporting Centre

Air bases, protection and allied reception

3 Air bases: 1 reduced manning and in addition 1 reserve base
Air surveillance
3 long-range surface-to-air batteries with tactical ballistic missile defence capability
4 NASAMS III batteries
3 Force Protection units, 1 with reduced manning
2 Logistics Bases Air

Combat Air and Force enablers

52 F-35 fighter aircraft
1 Multirole Tanker Transport
5 C-130J Tactical Transport Aircraft
6 P-8A Maritime Patrol Aircraft
14 NH90 Maritime Helicopters
21 helicopters for Special Forces and Army support
16 AW101 Search and Rescue helicopters

Participation in international force structures

NATO Air- and Ground Surveillance (NATO AWACS and AGS)
Strategic Airlift Capability (HAW)



THE HOME GUARD

Home Guard Staff

Norwegian Home Guard
Operations Centre

Organisation

11 Home Guard districts
37,000 soldiers in Home
Guard companies
3,000 special trained soldiers
organised in rapid reaction units



THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES CYBER DEFENCE

Cyber Security Centre

Ability to establish situational
understanding, protection and
freedom of movement in the
cyber domain

CIS Support

Enabling modern military operations,
CIS support and support to C2

Communications Infrastructure

Satellite communications
Tactical datalinks
Communications networks
Radio networks

Strategic cooperation



JOINT

The Norwegian Intelligence Service Norwegian Joint Headquarters Surveillance by satellites

The Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Medical Services

1 Role 2 Enhanced
3 Role 2 Basic
4 Role 2 Forward
4 Casualty Staging Units
1 Veterinarian Unit
2 Aeromedical Evacuation Units
2 Ground Evacuation Companies
Strategic Cooperation

Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation

Norwegian Logistics Operations Centre
4 Regional Logistics Groups
2 Battalions for Reception, Staging and
Onward Movement
Military Police Battalion
Combat Engineer Battalion (Heavy)
Host Nation Support Battalion
Joint Water Purification Capability
Strategic cooperation including
requisitioned ships and aircraft

Norwegian Special Operations Command

Norwegian Special Operations Centre
Norwegian Special Operations
Commando
Norwegian Naval Special
Operations Commando.

*The table describes the force structure of
Alternative C.*



B

ALTERNATIVE B – LAND

"Strengthening of selected domains"

Alternative B strengthens the Armed Forces in selected capabilities.

Alternative B consists of two possible directions:

- strengthen warfighting ability on Norwegian territory
- strengthen warfighting ability in the sea domain

Alternative B – land further improves the ability to withstand a conventional attack in the northern parts of Norway. In addition, establishing a light infantry brigade in Southern Norway will contribute to counter threats all over Norway.



(Compared to Alternative C)

- Increased capacities and responsiveness in the land domain
- Increased sustainability throughout the force structure
- Increased tactical mobility for land forces
- Increased firepower and joint long-range precision fires
- Increased ability to delay an adversary because of increased firepower
- Increased ability to defend Norway
- Increased ability to receive allied reinforcements



(Compared to Alternative A)

- Limited capability to establish situational understanding of airspace
- Limited capacity in the sea domain
- Limited ability to protect critical military and civilian targets against cruise missiles and ballistic missiles
- Some gaps in the ability to meet NATO's capability targets

Changes compared to Alternative C.




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TACTICAL TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT



6

MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT



15

COAST GUARD CUTTERS




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FIGHTER AIRCRAFT



3+4

AIR DEFENCE




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FRIGATES



14

MARITIME HELICOPTERS




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TACTICAL HELICOPTERS




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MINE COUNTER-MEASURES SYSTEMS




11

MANEUVER BATTALIONS



16

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS



4

SUBMARINES

22,5k
EMPLOYEES

15k
CONSCRIPTS



42k
HOME GUARD





ALTERNATIVE B – LAND

"Strengthening of selected domains"



THE ARMY

Army Staff

Norwegian Land Operations Centre

Intelligence Battalion
Communications Battalion
Military Police Battalion
Artillery Regiment including 1 Long-Range Precision Fires Battalion and 1 Close Support Air Defence Battalion
Combat Engineer Battalion
CBRN Company
Combat Logistics Battalion
Transportation Battalion

Brigade North (Mechanised)

Communications Company
Military Police Company
4 Mechanised Infantry Battalions
Artillery Battalion
Combat Engineer Battalion
Combat Service Support Battalion
Medical Battalion


Brigade South (Motorised)

Communications Company
Military Police Company
Rangers Battalion
3 Motorised Infantry Battalions
Artillery Battalion
Combat Engineer Battalion
Combat Service Support Battalion
Medical Battalion

Finnmark Land Command

The Border Guard
Cavalry Battalion
Support functions

His Majesty The King's Guard



THE NAVY

Navy Staff

Norwegian Naval Operations Centre
Tactical Command Afloat
Coast Guard Headquarters

The Coast Guard

4 offshore patrol cutters with helicopters
6 offshore patrol cutters
5 inner Coast Guard cutters

The Fleet

4 submarines
6 frigates
6 corvettes (to be decommissioned when new frigates are operational)
4 mine clearance units with remotely operated vehicles and mother vessels
HNoMS Maud logistics and support vessel
2 small logistics vessels
Coastal Ranger Command
Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Command

Naval Bases

MARCSS/Maritime Logistics Base
2 naval bases



THE AIR FORCE

Air Staff

Norwegian Air Operations Centre
Control and Reporting Centre

Air bases, protection and allied reception

4 Air bases: 2 reduced manning and in addition 4 reserve bases
Air surveillance
3 long-range surface-to-air batteries with tactical ballistic missile defence capability
4 NASAMS III batteries
4 Force Protection units, 2 with reduced manning
2 Logistics Bases Air

Combat Air and Force enablers

52 F-35 fighter aircraft
1 Multirole Tanker Transport
6 C-130J Tactical Transport Aircraft
6 P-8A Maritime Patrol Aircraft
14 NH90 Maritime Helicopters
30 helicopters for Special Forces and Army support
4 AW101 Combat Search and Rescue helicopters
16 AW101 Search and Rescue helicopters

Participation in international force structures

NATO Air- and Ground Surveillance (NATO AWACS and AGS)
Strategic Airlift Capability (HAW)



THE HOME GUARD

Home Guard Staff

Norwegian Home Guard
Operations Centre

Organisation

11 Home Guard districts
38,000 soldiers in Home Guard
companies
4,000 special trained soldiers
organised in rapid reaction units



THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES CYBER DEFENCE

Cyber Security Centre

Ability to establish situational
understanding, protection and
freedom of movement in the
cyber domain

CIS Support

Enabling modern military operations,
CIS support and support to C2

Communications Infrastructure

Satellite communications
Tactical datalinks
Communications networks
Radio networks

Strategic cooperation



JOINT

The Norwegian Intelligence Service Norwegian Joint Headquarters Surveillance by satellites

The Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Medical Services

1 Role 2 Enhanced
3 Role 2 Basic
4 Role 2 Forward
4 Casualty Staging Units
1 Veterinarian Unit
2 Aeromedical Evacuation Units
2 Ground Evacuation Companies
Strategic Cooperation

Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation

Norwegian Logistics Operations Centre
4 Regional Logistics Groups
2 Battalions for Reception, Staging and
Onward Movement
Military Police Battalion
Combat Engineer Battalion (Heavy)
Host Nation Support Battalion
Joint Water Purification Capability
Strategic cooperation including
requisitioned ships and aircraft

Norwegian Special Operations Command

Norwegian Special Operations Centre
Norwegian Special Operations
Commando
Norwegian Naval Special Operations
Commando

*The table describes the force structure of
Alternative B-land.*



B

ALTERNATIVE B – SEA

"Strengthening of selected domains"

Alternative B strengthens the Armed Forces in selected capabilities.

Alternative B consists of two possible directions:

- strengthen warfighting ability on Norwegian territory
- strengthen warfighting ability in the sea domain

Alternative B – sea prioritises increased maritime presence in the High North in peace, crisis and war. In addition, the ability to secure maritime reinforcement to Norway is improved.



(Compared to Alternative C)

- Increased capacities and responsiveness in the sea domain
- Increased sustainability throughout the force structure, both in numbers and support
- Increased ability for presence and to uphold sovereignty in the High North
- Increased ability to receive allied reinforcements
- Increased ability for Anti-Submarine Warfare
- Increased ability to deliver joint long-range fires



(Compared to Alternative A)

- Limited capability to establish situational understanding of airspace
- Limited ability to defend Norway
- Limited ability to protect critical military and civilian targets against cruise missiles and ballistic missiles
- Some gaps in the ability to meet NATO's capability targets




5

TACTICAL TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT



6

MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT



+2

17

COAST GUARD CUTTERS



52


FIGHTER AIRCRAFT



+1

3+5

AIR DEFENCE



+2

8

FRIGATES



+10

24

MARITIME HELICOPTERS



21


TACTICAL HELICOPTERS



+1

5

MINE COUNTER-MEASURES SYSTEMS




8

MANEUVER BATTALIONS



10

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS



+1

5

SUBMARINES

21,5k
EMPLOYEES

13,5k
CONSCRIPTS



40k
HOME GUARD



Changes compared to Alternative C.



ALTERNATIVE B – SEA

"Strengthening of selected domains"



THE ARMY

Army Staff

Norwegian Land Operations Centre

Intelligence Battalion
Military Police Battalion
Combat Engineer Battalion
CBRN Company
Combat Logistics Battalion
Transportation Battalion

Brigade North (Mechanised)


Communications Battalion
Military Police Company
4 Mechanised Infantry Battalions
Artillery Battalion with Close Support
Air Defence
Long-Range Precision Fires Battery
Combat Engineer Battalion
Combat Service Support Battalion
Medical Battalion

Independent Motorised Infantry Battalion

Finnmark Land Command

The Border Guard
Cavalry Battalion
Support functions

His Majesty The King's Guard



THE NAVY

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Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Command
Unmanned sensors

Naval Bases

MARCSS/Maritime Logistics Base
2 naval bases



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5 C-130J Tactical Transport Aircraft
6 P-8A Maritime Patrol Aircraft
14 NH90 Maritime Helicopters (ASW)
10 New Maritime Helicopters
21 helicopters for Special Forces and Army support
16 AW101 Search and Rescue helicopters

Participation in international force structures

NATO Air- and Ground Surveillance (NATO AWACS and AGS)
Strategic Airlift Capability (HAW)



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Home Guard Staff

Norwegian Home Guard
Operations Centre

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3,000 special trained soldiers
organised in rapid reaction units



THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES CYBER DEFENCE

Cyber Security Centre

Ability to establish situational
understanding, protection and
freedom of movement in the
cyber domain

CIS Support

Enabling modern military operations,
CIS support and support to C2

Communications Infrastructure

Satellite communications
Tactical datalinks
Communications networks
Radio networks

Strategic cooperation



JOINT

The Norwegian Intelligence Service Norwegian Joint Headquarters Surveillance by satellites

The Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Medical Services

1 Role 2 Enhanced
3 Role 2 Basic
4 Role 2 Forward
4 Casualty Staging Units
1 Veterinarian Unit
2 Aeromedical Evacuation Units
2 Ground Evacuation Companies
Strategic Cooperation

Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation

Norwegian Logistics Operations Centre
4 Regional Logistics Groups
2 Battalions for Reception, Staging and
Onward Movement
Military Police Battalion
Combat Engineer Battalion (Heavy)
Host Nation Support Battalion
Joint Water Purification Capability
Strategic cooperation including
requisitioned ships and aircraft

Norwegian Special Operations Command

Norwegian Special Operations Centre
Norwegian Special Operations
Commando
Norwegian Naval Special Operations
Commando

*The table describes the force structure of
Alternative B-sea.*



A

ALTERNATIVE A

"Addresses the security situation"

Alternative A provides military forces that can address the current security challenges in Norway's immediate areas. The number of combat units are being increased in all services to strengthen military presence and sustainability in crisis. This alternative is without obvious weaknesses and has sufficient warfighting capacity to deter political pressure and discourage a potential adversary from using force both on Norwegian territory and in our maritime areas. The alternative addresses NATO capability targets for Norway and provides a force structure that can solve many of the Alliance's challenges in the High North, which in turn can reassure global superpowers and help maintain international stability.



(Compared to the other alternatives)

- Balanced force structure
- Sufficient capacity and responsiveness in all domains
- Sustainability in all domains
- Ability for situational understanding in all domains
- Firepower and ability to deliver joint fires across all domains
- Ability to protect critical military and civilian infrastructure
- Ability to defend all of Norway
- Ability for presence and to uphold sovereignty in the High North
- Ability to receive allied reinforcements
- Addresses NATO capability targets for Norway



(Limitations)

- Limited ability to defend against some categories of ballistic missiles



6

TACTICAL TRANSPORT
AIRCRAFT

6

MARITIME PATROL
AIRCRAFT

17

COAST GUARD
CUTTERS


52

FIGHTER AIRCRAFT



3+6

AIR DEFENCE



8

FRIGATES




24

MARITIME
HELICOPTERS

34

TACTICAL
HELICOPTERS


5

MINE COUNTER-
MEASURES SYSTEMS

11

MANEUVER
BATTALIONS

16

COMBAT SUPPORT
BATTALIONS

5

SUBMARINES

24k
EMPLOYEES
15,8k
CONSCRIPTS



42k
HOME GUARD





ALTERNATIVE A

"Addresses the security situation"



THE ARMY

Army Staff

Norwegian Land Operations Centre

Intelligence Battalion

Communications Battalion

Military Police Battalion

Artillery Regiment including 1 Long-Range Precision Fires Battalion and 1 Close Support Air Defence Battalion

Combat Engineer Battalion

CBRN Company

Combat Logistics Battalion

Transportation Battalion

Brigade North (Mechanised)

Communications Company

Military Police Company

4 Mechanised Infantry Battalions

Artillery Battalion

Combat Engineer Battalion

Combat Service Support Battalion

Medical Battalion

Brigade South (Motorised)

Communications Company

Military Police Company

Rangers Battalion

3 Motorised Infantry Battalions

Artillery Battalion

Combat Engineer Battalion

Combat Service Support Battalion

Medical Battalion


Finnmark Land Command

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Cavalry Battalion

Support functions

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4 Force Protection units, 1 with reduced manning

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Joint Water Purification Capability
Strategic cooperation including
requisitioned ships and aircraft

Norwegian Special Operations Command

Norwegian Special Operations Centre
Norwegian Special Operations
Commando
Norwegian Naval Special Operations
Commando

*The table describes the total force structure of
Alternative A.*

Location of bases

The Armed Forces' base structure is largely retained. Some bases are further developed and adapted depending on the force structure alternative. Terningmoen garrison is being further developed to become the main base for basic training for the Army and the Home Guard.



The Chief of Defence's Additional Recommendations

INTEGRATE THE USE OF SPACE ACTIVITY IN THE ARMED FORCES.

The Armed Forces rely on access to space capabilities for planning and conducting military operations. The ability to use these capabilities is limited today. The current long-term plan started a process to increase the Armed Forces' knowledge of and capabilities in space. These efforts must continue to ensure the Armed Forces will have the capability to monitor, communicate globally and exercise precision fires engagements. NATO is expected to establish "space" as a fifth operational domain by the end of 2019. The allied approach to space will affect the Armed Forces because of the necessity to strengthen the ability to use space as an operational domain.

FURTHER DEVELOP THE ARMED FORCE'S CAPABILITIES IN THE CYBER DOMAIN

The capability of the Armed Forces to conduct cyber operations to achieve effect, situational understanding and protection in the cyber domain is low. The civilian cyber infrastructure on which the Armed Forces depend on in crisis and war has critical vulnerabilities. The integration and interconnection of computers in everything from weapon platforms to office networks means that the cyber domain holds information and data that nation states can exploit. The knowledge of and expertise in cyber operations must be increased throughout the defence sector. Training for military and civilian specialists in cyber operations must be strengthened and must be included in the education in the Armed Forces.

CONTINUOUSLY APPLYING NEW AND EXISTING TECHNOLOGY

New technology can help solve tasks more cost-effectively and in new ways, with less risk for loss of life and increased performance. This demands a holistic approach where technological opportunities and vulnerabilities are assessed together with the development of doctrines, competencies and organisation. Although other actors will dominate technological innovation, the Armed Forces can match this by becoming the best at utilising technology. The ability and willingness to utilise new and existing technology and rapidly make the technology available to skilled users is crucial.

For Norway and NATO's defence capabilities, areas such as autonomy, decision support and management systems, machine learning and big data, cyber and electromagnetic exploitation are increasingly important. The Chief of Defence recommends establishing a fund that provides the flexibility to test and implement new technological solutions more quickly.

THE ALLIED DIMENSION

Allied presence, training and exercise

It is in the interest of Norway that nations that are part of bilateral and allied reinforcements of Norway have experiences in operating military forces in Norway. To achieve this, it is recommended to facilitate increased allied presence in Norway and in our surrounding areas, which will also increase our ability to receive allied reinforcements in crisis and war.

Allied reception, staging and onward movement

Receiving reinforcements while combat operations are ongoing in the North requires that Norway has established infrastructure, capacities and reception plans in peacetime. It will be of particular importance to secure access to airports, port facilities and fuel storage facilities. The ability to receive allied reinforcements is strengthened in all four alternatives, but the ability increases from Alternatives D to A. Based on the experiences from Exercise Trident Juncture in 2018, units in the Armed Forces with primary mission to ensure efficient reception, staging and onward movement are established.

Collaboration with close allies

The Armed Forces must improve the bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Priority should be given to increased cooperation with those nations that have forces planned to be part of the defence of Norway. It is recommended to enter into binding agreements with nations where the procurement, operation and further development of capabilities are fully integrated such as with the F-35 procurement.



Norwegian Leopard 2A4 main battle tank during Exercise Trident Juncture 2018.

FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL- MILITARY COOPERATION

The Armed Forces depend on the civil society functioning in the best possible way throughout peace, crisis and war. Civil protection and public security affect the Armed Forces' ability to safeguard state security. It will have a major impact on the operational capability of the Armed Forces if important civilian infrastructure such as hospitals, communications infrastructure or power supplies are threatened or lost. Strengthening the resilience of civil society is therefore of great importance for defence capabilities.

There has been significant progress in civil-military cooperation during the existing long-term plan period. The work has uncovered several challenges and

opportunities, and further measures are needed to strengthen, further develop and streamline civil-military cooperation. Strategic cooperation ensuring adequate access to, among other areas, communications, pharmaceuticals, fuel and other stores is critical to the Armed Forces.

The ability to manage hybrid warfare in a conflict situation is too low, and there is a need to enhance the skills in both the civilian and military sectors. The main challenges are to discover, understand and attribute the use of hybrid warfare and to assess the context and intention. There is a need to improve cross-sectoral situational understanding, information exchange and collaboration.





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NORWEGIAN
ARMED FORCES