

# PROGRAMME

**NATO in the NORDICS, Oslo, September 17–18, 2025**

Conference organized by the **Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies**  
(SJMS) & the **Norwegian Defence University College** (NDUC)

Updated September 15

Updated conference program:



Scandinavian  
Journal of  
Military  
Studies



Norwegian Defence  
University College

**If you have questions or comments, contact Ragnild Lome, Journal Manager, SJMS, at [ralo@fak.dk](mailto:ralo@fak.dk)**

For presenters: if you are planning to use a PowerPoint presentation, please e-mail it to [ralo@fak.dk](mailto:ralo@fak.dk) before **6:00 PM, September 15th** (unless your panel is part of a working group or roundtable marked **WG** – in which case, send the PowerPoint directly to your working group chair). For updates after this date, contact the chair of your panel directly. The chair will make sure all PowerPoint presentations are collected on the same computer.

### **Submission of articles to SJMS**

We encourage participants to submit their article to SJMS **after the conference**. Check out our conference page regarding deadlines for conference papers and special collections related to the conference theme: <https://sjms.nu/conference>

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# WEDNESDAY SEPTEMBER 17<sup>TH</sup>

08:15 – 09:00	<b>Registration</b>		
09:00 – 11:00	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Introduction</b> by Commander Senior Grade Vilhelm Holsting, PhD, Executive editor of SJMS, Royal Danish Defence College</li> <li>• <b>Welcome</b> by Major General Dag Rist Aamoth, Commanding Officer &amp; Principal, Norwegian Defence University College</li> <li>• <b>“Oslo Military Society – A Short Introduction”</b> by Lieutenant Colonel Harald Høiback, PhD</li> <li>• <b>Keynote One:</b> “What Order? Whose Rules? Globalization vs Regionalism; Strategy vs Geopolitics” by Professor Sir Hew Strachan</li> </ul>		
<b>Main Hall</b>			
11:00 – 11:15	<b>Coffee</b>		
11:15 – 12:30	<b>Parallel Session 1</b>		
<b>Main Hall</b>	<b>Bernadotte</b>	<b>Library</b>	<b>Lounge</b>
<b>1: How to Defend the Nordics? (Bowers)</b>	<b>2: Military Politics (Olsen)</b>	<b>3: Scandinavian Veterans and Society (Yttereng)</b>	<b>4: Military Logistics in the Nordics (Skoglund)</b>
Ankersen: The Future for the Nordics in a World Without NATO	Crosbie and Harig: The Convergence of Military-Political Competencies	Yttereng: Positioning the Panel Topic within the Veteran Research Field	Skoglund et al.: The Implications of NATO Membership for Critical Infrastructure Development in Finland and Sweden
Saxi: The Military-Strategic Debate in Norway Since 2014	Rønnfeldt: Small Powers’ Civil-Military Relations	Enstad: Veteran Experiences and the Limits of Language	Hellberg et al.: Logistics Adaptation to NATO
Lambert: The Changing Political Geography of the Arctic	Reilly: Military Politics in the New Operating Environment	Ekhaugen: Evolving Expectations and Societal Shifts	Birkemo: Resilient Nordic Supply Chains in Crisis and War
Theussen et al.: Why Nordic Defence Cooperation Still Falls Short		Christiansen: Exploring the Role of Rank in Veteran Life-Course	Takvam et al.: Reinforcing in the Nordics
		Hagen: Veteran Memoirs	
12-30 – 13:15	<b>Lunch</b>		
13:15 – 14:30	<b>Parallel Session 2</b>		
<b>Main Hall</b>	<b>Bernadotte</b>	<b>Library</b>	<b>Lounge</b>
<b>5: Improving Professional Military Education (Crosbie)</b>	<b>6: Total Defence Cooperation (Harig)</b>	<b>7: Military Organizational Learning (Sjøgren)</b>	<b>8. Roundtable: Leadership in a Military Context (Holten and Klitmøller)</b>
Mattson: How to Enhance a Better Understanding of MDO in Higher Officers’ Education and Amongst Higher Staff Officers in Sweden?	Slagnes: Enhancing Comprehensive Security through Leadership Insights	Danielsen and Valaker: Integration of Joint Processes	Erik Berntson
Laugen: How Consultancy Calculations Reshape Norway’s Military Education System	Bergaust: Cooperation for Countering Hybrid Warfare	Zijderveld et al.: Scalability as a Strategic Concept in the Netherlands	Øyvind Martinsen

Kirschbaum et al.: Innovation, Integration and Education in Defence Academies	Fjällhed et al.: Civil Society and the Paradox of an Organized Voluntary Defence	Conte: Debating the Operational Level of War	Peter Olsthoorn
14:30 – 14:45	<b>Coffee</b>		
14:45 – 16:00	<b>Parallel session 3</b>		
<b>Main Hall</b>	<b>Bernadotte</b>	<b>Library</b>	<b>Lounge</b>
<b>9: Detering Russia (Bowers)</b>	<b>10: Challenges of Multi-Domain Operations (Sjøgren)</b>	<b>11: The Politicization of the Military in Democracies (Harig)</b>	<b>12: Military Leadership (Klitmøller)</b>
Minzarari: NATO's Deterrence Posture	De Ruiter: Organizational Culture and MDO, the Missing Link	Smith and Crosbie: The "True Aspects" of British Military Politics	Säälik at al.: Reserve Platoon Leaders' Perceptions of Leader Competencies during the Role Acquisition Process
Bischoff: NATO in the Nordics: The View from the Red Side	Sjøgren and Obling: The Optimistic Collaborator	Ivey: Guarding the Guardians? Politicization of Mexico's Armed Forces	
Hoffmann: Targeting Russia: Nordic Long-Range Strike and the Future of Regional Deterrence	Mayer: Electromagnetic Warfare, Emerging Technologies, and the Future of Multidomain Operations in the Arctic	Harig: Complex Pathways to Politicization of the Military in Brazil	Brænder et al.: Military Leadership – Where To? A Comprehensive Literature Review
Podvorna: The War Against Ukraine and its Impact on Sweden's and Finland's Security Thinking		Bueno: Military Officers in Politics: Reassessing Spain's Civil-Military Relations	
		Coletta: The Functional Imperative of Civil-Military Relations and Strategic Stability in South Asia	Skomorovsky: The Roles of Leadership Perceptions and Morale in the Well-Being of Canadian Armed Forces Men and Women
16:00 – 16.15	<b>Coffee</b>		
16:15 – 17:30	<b>Parallel session 4</b>		
<b>Main Hall</b>	<b>Bernadotte</b>	<b>Lounge</b>	
<b>13: Deterrence and Nuclear Policy (Theussen)</b>	<b>14: Military Technology (Harig)</b>	<b>15: Military Ethics in Education and Practice (Pedersen and Vikan)</b>	
Frelin at al.: NATO's Forward Land Forces	Moskalenko at al.: Augmented Reality and Smart Maintenance <a href="#">(online)</a>	Hammershøj: Military Professional Bildung	
Pawlak: (Un-) Conventional Attacks at Europe's Nordic-Baltic Shores: Integrating Deterrence	Back at al.: Ukraine's Brave1 Market and the Gamification of Drone Warfare	Holsting: The Danish ethical Foundation for Military Professionalism and its Nordic Context	
Andersen: Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Escapism			
Liyanaage: Nuclear Sharing in NATO: Revisiting the Patron-Protégé Relationship	Skou: Legitimacy and Acceptance of Quantum Technologies among Potential Naval Users in the Danish Armed Forces	Vikan and Moldjord: Fostering Just Culture in the Armed Forces. Lessons from the Norwegian Air Force	
Yakymiak: NATO's Northern Flank: Security and Defence Challenges Based on the Experience of the War in the Black Sea 2022–2025 <a href="#">(online)</a>		Finholt: <i>Train as You Fight</i> – Ethics in the Norwegian Armed Forces	
17:30 – 19:00	<b>Free</b>		
19:00 – 21.00	<b>Conference Tapas Buffet (Main Hall)</b>		

# THURSDAY SEPTEMBER 18<sup>TH</sup>

<b>09:00 – 10:30</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Introduction by Professor Carsten F. Rønnfeldt, NDUC</li> <li>• Keynote Two by Lieutenant General Ingrid Margrethe Gjerde, Chief of the Norwegian Defence Staff: “Strengthened Nordic Defence - Challenges and Opportunities”</li> </ul>		
<b>Main Hall</b>			
<b>10:30 – 10:45</b>	<b>Coffee</b>		
<b>10:45 – 12:00</b>	<b>Parallel Session 5</b>		
<b>Main Hall</b>	<b>Bernadotte</b>	<b>Library</b>	<b>Lounge</b>
<b>16: Roundtable: Preparing for Multi-Domain Operations (Crosbie)</b>	<b>17: Poster Presentations: Professional Military Education (Rønnfeldt)</b>	<b>18: Civil-Military Cooperation (Tillberg)</b>	<b>19: The Societal Turn in Intelligence Studies (Vrist Rønn)</b>
Ian Bowers	Rønnfeldt at al.: Helping Cadets to Learn	Neumann: The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in the Nordic Countries	Røseth: Theories of Intelligence Warning for Scandinavian and Smaller High-Trust Societies
Kenneth Nymand Pedersen			
Thomas Danger	Gaupholm: Integrating Effective Learning Strategies in the Classroom – A SoTL-project		
	Sjursæther and Elvebakk: How can we Best Integrate the Library’s Teaching in the School’s Overall Teaching to Strengthen Cadet’s Academic Skills?	Karlsson at al.: From National to Regional Total Defence?	Rønn: Intelligence-Led Communication on Foreign Espionage in Denmark
Jeffrey M. Reilly			
Holger Lindhardtzen	Øfsteng: Enhancing Cadets Learning Outcomes in Military Skills Through a Six-Day Comprehensive Education Programme	Grunnan: Enhancing Civil-Military Cooperation	Ördén: Changing Conditions for Informal Actors in Intelligence Oversight? The Case of Swedish Journalists
	Sæbø: Click for Success: Motivating Students with Digital Multiple-Choice Tests		
William L. Mitchell	Lindvig: Teaching Military Intelligence to General Officers – Bridging the Gap		Hanna Lütke: Hybrid Threats in Northern Norway and How Local Communities Respond
	Ummaneni: Adoption and Reflection of Active Learning Methodologies in Professional Education		
	Sjøstedt and Willaume-Jantzen: The “Need for Speed” in Military Instruction and Learning		
<b>12:00 – 13:15</b>	<b>Lunch</b>		
<b>13:15 – 14:30</b>	<b>Parallel Session 6</b>		
<b>Main Hall</b>	<b>Bernadotte</b>	<b>Library</b>	
<b>20: Challenges and Capabilities in the High North (Saxi)</b>	<b>21: Public Opinion (Harig)</b>	<b>22: Recruitment and Retention (Tillberg)</b>	
Bayer: Espionage, Sabotage, and the Limits of International Law – Navigating Legal Grey Zones Below the Threshold of Armed Conflict	Steinbrecher: German Willingness to Defend One’s Country and its Correlates	Richter and Graf: Limiting Factors to Women’s Interest in Professional Military Service	
Bowers and Tunsjø: Defending Europe: The Nordics, Sea Lift and the Strategic Importance of Small States	Leuprecht: Officers and Civilians: A Civil-Military Gap and Canadian	Smaliukiene and Česnuitytė: Retention of Military Personnel in the Lithuanian Armed Forces: The Impact of Burnout at Service	
Lindvig: The Rise of the Arctic Rangers	National Security? Berndtsson: Swedish public Opinion on NATO		
<b>14:30 – 14:45</b>	<b>Coffee</b>		
	<b>Main Hall</b>		
<b>14:45 – 15:30</b>	<b>Closing remarks</b> by Dr Saira Basit (Dean, Norwegian Defence University College) and the editorial team of SJMS		

## PLENARY SPEAKERS

### PROFESSOR SIR HEW STRACHAN

Sir Hew Strachan is the Wardlaw Professor of International Relations at the University of St Andrews, a Life Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge and an Emeritus Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. His publications include *The First World War: To Arms* (2001); *The First World War: A New Illustrated History* (2003, based on his ten-part series for Channel 4); *Clausewitz's on War*, (2007); *The Direction of War* (2013). From 1992 to 2001 he was a Professor of Modern History at Glasgow University, and from 2002 to 2015, the Chichele Professor of the History of War at the University of Oxford. He was a member of the national committees for the centenary of the First World War of the United Kingdom, Scotland and France and a specialist adviser to the UK's Joint Parliamentary Committee on the National Security Strategy 2011–24. He served on the Strategic Advisory Panel of the UK Chief of Defence Staff, and was Visiting Professor at the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy (2000–24). His keynote at the conference is titled “What Order? Whose Rules? Globalization vs Regionalism; Strategy vs Geopolitics.”

### LIEUTENANT GENERAL INGRID MARGRETHE GJERDE

Lieutenant General Ingrid M. Gjerde is Chief of Defence Staff Norway (Vice Chief of Defence). She joined the army in 1987. After graduating from the Norwegian Army Military Academy as an infantry officer, she subsequently commanded platoons in Brigade North, a company in Telemark Battalion, His Majesty the King's Guard infantry battalion and the Norwegian Army Military Academy. Gjerde holds master's degrees in Military Art and Science and Military Strategy (from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College) and in Political Science (University of Oslo). On the staff, Gjerde was responsible for strategic planning and strategic communication within the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. She was Chief of Staff and Second in Command of the Norwegian Army and the Chief of Staff/Plans for the Norwegian Armed Forces. Gjerde's deployments to international operations include service as a platoon commander and assistant operations Officer in UNIFIL Lebanon, as company commander in SFOR Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as national contingent commander in ISAF, Afghanistan. From May 2021–July 2023 she was the Force Commander of United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Gjerde will give a keynote at the conference called “Strengthened Nordic Defence - Challenges and Opportunities.”

### MAJOR GENERAL DAG RIST AAMOTH

Major General Dag Rist Aamoth is Commandant of the Norwegian Defence University College (2022–). He started his career in the Royal Norwegian Airforce in 1989 within the air defence artillery, operating both the Norwegian-adapted HAWK and NASAMS, and serving at the Air Defence Artillery Weapons School. His joint career includes service both as Chief of Staff in the Norwegian PRT in Afghanistan and within the defence staff and Ministry of Defence, where his last position was as Spokesperson for the Chief of Defence. Leading up to his current assignment, he served as Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff Capabilities at Supreme Allied Command Transformation with a portfolio ranging from JISR, Air C2, to logistics. Aamoth was educated at a number of military schools including the Advanced Command and Staff Course (UK) and the USAF Air War College. He holds master's degrees from both King's College and USAF Air University. In the fall of 2024 he

attended the Generals, Flag Officers and Ambassadors Course at NATO Defence College in Rome. He will welcome the participants at the first day of the conference.

## LIEUTENANT COLONEL HARALD HØIBACK, PHD

Harald Høiback is a lieutenant colonel in the Air Force and is the Head of Research at the Armed Forces Museums. In addition to his military education, he holds a master's degree in history from the University of Glasgow and a PhD in philosophy from the University of Oslo. Høiback served as the military secretary in the Afghanistan committee that presented its report in 2016 and has been a guest researcher at the Defence Academy in Copenhagen. Høiback has lectured and published military philosophy and history for many years, and has published several non-fiction books including (in Norwegian) *The History of the Art of War – From 1500 to the Present* (2014), *A Brief Introduction to Carl von Clausewitz – The Philosopher of War* (2021), *Warfare – How Wars are Planned, Executed, and Won* (2023), and *The Road to Waterloo – Four Generals and Pne Battle* (2025). He is the editor of the *Norwegian Military Journal*. He will introduce the history of the venue on the first day of the conference.

## DR SAIRA BASIT

Dr Saira Basit is Dean of Norwegian Defence University College (NDUC) where she is responsible for the quality and development of all educational offerings and R&D affairs. She is also Deputy Chair of the board of the Norwegian Agency for Quality Assurance in Education (NOKUT) and of the Faculty of Technology, Art and Design at the Oslo Metropolitan University. In 2024 she attended the NDUC Senior Executive Course on Total Defence and Resilience. From 2021–2022 she was a member of a commission on the academic freedom of expression appointed by the Ministry of Education and Research. In 2019–2020 she attended the Universities Norway (UHR) leadership programme. Basit is on leave as Associate Professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS) and has held several positions in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She holds a PhD from the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo. At the conference, she will present a research paper and make the concluding remarks on the second day of the conference.

## DR CARSTEN F. RØNNFELDT

Carsten F. Rønnefeldt is Professor in International Relations at the NDUC's Norwegian Military Academy and NDUC's partner on the board of Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies (SJMS). His research interests include civil-military relations, strategic communication and scholarship in teaching and learning. He has published in several journals including *Armed Forces & Society*, *Parameters*, and *SJMS*. Rønnefeldt holds a doctorate from the London School of Economics. He will introduce to the second day of the conference, chair a poster session on PME and present a research paper at the conference.

## COMMANDER SENIOR GRADE VILHELM HOLSTING, PHD

Vilhelm Holsting is Commander Senior Grade (Navy). He is Director of the Institute for Leadership and Management at the Royal Danish Defence College and Executive Editor of *Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies* (SJMS). He holds a PhD in leadership and management from Copenhagen Business School and his research focus is on officership at both junior and senior levels. He will introduce the conference on the first day and present a research paper at the conference.

## ABOUT THE NORWEGIAN DEFENCE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE (NDUC)

The Norwegian Defence University College (NDUC) provides higher education and research on leadership and military power, as well as other military topics and fields. Its academic focus includes land power, sea power, air power, military power and leadership, joint operations, intelligence, defence and security policy. The NDUC is academically independent and offers bachelor's and master's level education to military professionals from all branches of the Norwegian Armed Forces and to partners and civilians. The organization comprises a board, an executive group, seven educational units, one institute, a Dean's Office and staff.

## ABOUT THE SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF MILITARY STUDIES (SJMS)

The *Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies* (SJMS) is an online, open-access journal publishing both high-quality research and valuable practice-oriented studies relevant to the military profession. The journal operates two distinct tracks: a practice-oriented track comprising articles predominantly authored by professionals, often offering practical advice or clear policy recommendations for the military profession; and a research track, open for original research within the broad remit of “military studies”. Articles in both tracks are subjected to double-blind peer review. SJMS aims to strengthen networks and the field of military studies within Scandinavia, but welcomes original research and practice-oriented studies from around the world addressing issues relevant to the military profession and the broader field of military studies. As an explicitly pluralistic journal, SJMS welcomes articles and proposals from all perspectives and methodological approaches. The journal is produced and published by a consortium involving the Norwegian Defence University College, the Swedish Defence University, the Centre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen, the Swedish Centre for Studies of Armed Forces and Society, and the Royal Danish Defence College. Scandinavian Military Studies also has a press subsidiary – Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies Press – which publishes monographs within the subfields of military operations, strategy, law of war, military management, military sociology and military history.

To know more about the scope and aim of the journal, read the editor's note: <https://sjms.nu/articles/10.31374/sjms.273>

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# ABSTRACTS WEDNESDAY

# 1: HOW TO DEFEND THE NORDICS?

**Wednesday September 17: 10:45 – 12:00.** Chair: Ian Bowers, senior researcher at NDUC, [ibowers@mil.no](mailto:ibowers@mil.no)

## CHRISTOPHER ANKERSEN: CHANGE THE FIELD, CHANGE THE GAME? THE FUTURE FOR NORDICS IN A WORLD WITHOUT NATO

For decades the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) represented a fixed feature of European defence. If countries were NATO members, they developed capabilities in line with its structures and procedures. If countries were Warsaw Pact members, they regarded NATO as the adversary, and developed capabilities to thwart it. Even neutral countries have regarded NATO as a benchmark: first striving for interoperability and then to membership itself. Nordic defence decisions, large and small, from doctrine to ammunition calibre, have been taken with reference to NATO. For several years, though, the stability, relevance—perhaps even the continued existence—of the Alliance has been in doubt. Is NATO braindead? (BBC News, November 7, 2019). Would a Trumpian America uphold Article 5 (Mao, 2023)? Was NATO responsible for the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Switzer, July 25, 2024)? The reference point, to say the least, appears to be unreliable. Now there are calls for European countries to ‘go it alone’ and create some kind of new defence arrangements (Noel, n.y). What will this mean for Nordic countries and their militaries? How can this be understood? There are some who see this as nothing more than a matter of ‘stepping up’, adding a few tenths of a percent of GDP to existing defence budgets (Kasapi & Santos, 2025). Others suggest that much more radical changes, such as new nuclear weapons arrangements on the continent (Ross, Kayali, Nöstlinger, February 1st, 2025). How can we make sense of this? One place to start is the work of Bourdieu and his concept of habitus. As the context (the field in Bourdieu’s formulation) changes, we can expect actors to adapt, to learn the changing rules of the game as they go. The resulting strategies and actions should become more appropriate, better suited to the changing environment. Habitus, defined by Bourdieu as “a subjective but not individual system of internalised structures, schemes of perception, conception, and action” becomes a vital ingredient in any understanding of adaptation and change (Bourdieu, 1997: 86). Is this what we shall see in terms of Nordic defence? Or will there be a persistence in ‘old ways of doing business’, hoping that incremental changes will suffice? The paper’s aim is to illustrate that there is a social process behind adaptation to changing circumstances. While ‘turning points’ are possible, so are attempts at ‘fine tuning’. This paper will use a Bourdieuan framework to examine Nordic rhetoric and action. It will draw on public pronouncements and interviews with key decision makers across the region.

**Christopher Ankersen** is professor of Global Affairs and Academic Director of Global Security, Conflict, and Cybercrime at New York University. His research focuses on civil-military relations and contemporary war.

## HÅKON LUNDE SAXI: HOW TO DEFEND NORWAY? THE MILITARY-STRATEGIC DEBATE IN NORWAY SINCE 2014

This article examines the debate within the Norwegian defence sector since 2014 about how Norway’s military forces should best be developed, structured, and employed to ensure that the Norwegian Armed Forces contributes to effective and credible deterrence and defence *vis-à-vis* Russia. The debate was amplified by Russian aggression against Ukraine in early 2014, which demonstrated a Russian willingness and capability to use military force against neighbouring states

to achieve Moscow's political objectives. Two schools of thought emerged within the Norwegian defence sector which argued in favour of different operational concepts for the Norwegian Armed Forces. Firstly, a more 'traditionalist' school of thought argued that the armed forces should aim for deterrence by denial by way of being able to maintain Norwegian territorial control in Northern Norway. To achieve this, the Norwegian Armed Forces should remain a balanced force consisting of land, air and sea forces. This requires strengthening the whole force, particularly Norway's mechanized land forces, and requires building up the presence of the Norwegian Army in the most exposed parts of Northern Norway. Many senior figures in the Norwegian Army belonged in this camp. Secondly, an alternative 'modernist' school of thought emerged in parts of the defence sector, particularly in the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). Its adherents argued that Norway did not possess the balanced military forces need to succeed with a territorial control concept. Instead, they argued that deterrence by denial should be achieved by way of 'operational denial' in Northern Norway. High value enemy targets should be located, engaged and destroyed using long-range precision strike weapons. The aim would be firstly to impose high costs on the adversary, nullifying the advantage of basing A2/AD capabilities on Norwegian territory, and secondly, to clearly demonstrate to allies that there was an active combat situation in Norway, encouraging allies to come to Norway's aid. The article will firstly examine which groups within the Norwegian defence sector supported which operational concept and outline their main arguments. Secondly, it will examine the impact on Norwegian defence policy and operational planning. Both questions will be examined using open and unclassified sources. The article will close by examining the new trajectory of the debate following Finland and Sweden's membership in NATO (in 2023 and 2024 respectively).

**Håkon Lunde Saxi PhD**, is a professor at the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College, part of the Norwegian Defence University College. His research interests lie primarily in Norwegian, Nordic, and Northern European defence policy, as well as in military strategy and military history. He has published widely on the defence policies of Norway, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and on Nordic defence cooperation. In addition to his research, he regularly teaches and supervises in these subject areas.

## ALEXANDRE LAMBERT: THE CHANGING POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE ARCTIC

The paper examines the geostrategic implications of the decision made by Sweden and Finland to join NATO on the political geography of the Arctic region. The main research question is whether this most recent 'arctic' expansion of NATO is a direct response to the war in Ukraine, or whether it is also an attempt by the Euro-Atlantic community to push back and rebalance a new Eurasian continental bloc triggered by the ever-deepening comprehensive strategic partnership of China and the Russian Federation. In a broader horizon, the paper explores the implications of Moscow's exclusion from the G8, Western unilateral sanctions on Russia, the new energy game over natural gas in Europe, China's Belt- and Road Initiative (BRI), and especially its arctic extension via the Polar Silk Route, and the significance of the recent rhetoric deployed by the Trump Administration threatening to annex Canada and Greenland. The paper uses the geopolitical method of analysis, considering pertinent factors like physical geography, the dichotomy of naval vs. continental powers, geo-economics, connectivity infrastructure, strategy and politico-military considerations of relevant Nordic and major Arctic nations, as well as non-Arctic powers, including NATO, the USA, the Russian Federation, and China.

**Alexandre Lambert** is Academic Director of the SIT Study Abroad Programme on Global Health and Development Policy in Switzerland and Associate Professor at the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations (GSD). He holds a PhD from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva where he was lead researcher on the OSCE. He also served as civil servant at the Swiss Federal Department of Defense, has been founding fellow of the Geneva Centre of Security Sector Governance, and is an expert on the OSCE Code of Conduct.

## THEUSSEN AT AL.: WHY NORDIC DEFENCE COOPERATION STILL FALLS SHORT

The NATO-membership of Finland and Sweden resolves one of the fundamental problems that previously hindered effective and in-depth Nordic defence cooperation (see e.g. Theussen, 2018). For the first time, all Nordic states are members of the same collective defence alliance. Hailed as a new era for Nordic defence cooperation (Poulsen et al., 2024), the Finnish and Swedish NATO membership created optimism and enthusiasm that the time had arrived for a substantial deepening of security and defence cooperation across the region (Friis, 2024). However, despite a number of initiatives on the strategic (Poulsen et al., 2024), operational (Forsvarskommandoen, 2023), and tactical level (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2024; DR, 2025), the prevailing impression is that Nordic defence cooperation thus far has not reached its new potential and includes significant risks that will have to be mitigated (see e.g. Friis, 2024). This paper investigates why, despite the unique window of opportunity with Finnish and Swedish NATO membership, Nordic defence cooperation still falls short of its potential. To answer the research question, the paper draws on the strategic diplomacy framework developed by Prantl and Goh (2022). Devised to address the contemporary international order best characterized as complex adaptive system, strategic diplomacy is “the process by which state [...] actors socially construct and frame their view of the world; set their agendas; and communicate, contest and negotiate diverging core interests and goals” (Prantl & Goh, 2022, p. 451). Applying the strategic diplomacy framework as diagnostic tool revolves around two steps: first, *mapping the borders* of the system surrounding a policy issue. Here, key drivers, actors, flows and relationships, including feedback loops, are uncovered. Second, *framing issues*. This involves identifying strategic end-points, entry-points, as well as tipping points. The strategic diplomacy framework thus makes explicit problem representation, strategic purpose, and tactical pathways. In two inductive workshops with policy makers, strategists and high-level decision makers in the armed forces of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland, we apply this framework to uncover diverging mental models of Nordic defence cooperation as well as different problem-sets, which explain why Nordic Defence Cooperation thus far has fallen short of its potential. Based on the findings, the paper suggests how the policy environment can be shaped to maximize the policy space for Nordic defence cooperation. The paper thus contributes not only to the literature on Nordic defence cooperation, but also further develops the application of the strategic diplomacy framework. It also has concrete policy relevance in outlining divisions and fault lines in the Nordic states’ approaches to defence cooperation, and suggestions for how the potential of Nordic defence cooperation can be achieved.

**Amelie Theussen** is an associate professor at the Royal Danish Defense College. Her interdisciplinary research focuses on Arctic and Baltic Sea security, as well as Danish and German defence and security policy. Additionally, she writes about the effects of changes to war and warfare on international legal and political norms regulating the use of force. She also designs and conducts award winning simulation games and exercises for universities and military institutions.

**Troels Henningsen (not presenting)** is an associate professor at the Royal Danish Defence College.

## 2: MILITARY POLITICS IN A DEGRADING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT (WG)

**Wednesday September 17: 10:45 – 12:00.** Chair: Helene Olsen, assistant professor at RDDC, heol@fak.dk

### **THOMAS CROSBIE AND CHRISTOPH HARIG: THE CONVERGENCE OF MILITARY-POLITICAL COMPETENCIES: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT**

Theories of future war almost universally stress the importance of improved alignment and coordination between civilian and military entities, whether conceived as improved inter-governmental affairs, increased public-private partnerships, or a renewed commitment to the so-called “comprehensive approach”. In one sense, this builds on the strengths of the organizational changes that occurred through the long years of the expeditionary era, particularly through the warfighting function of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). However, in another sense the future use of CIMIC differs dramatically from its development over the past decades, and in key respects CIMIC remains an underutilized, often neglected, aspect of military command and organization. Furthermore, the difficult work linking military leaders to their own country’s civilian leadership (civil-military relations or CMR) is generally viewed as more challenging today than ever. This presentation explores the professional competencies that underlie both CMR and CIMIC, arguing that a new approach to both fields, one building from the development of basic competencies, is needed for the militaries of democratic states to meet the anticipated challenges of the future battlefield.

**Thomas Crosbie** is a sociologist and associate professor of military operations at the Royal Danish Defence College. He is the author of *The Political Army: How the U.S. Military Learned to Manage the Media and Public Opinion* (Columbia, 2025), series editor of the Military Politics series with Berghahn Books, and co-editor of the *Oxford Handbook of Professional Military Education* (Oxford, under contract).

**Christoph Harig** is Associate Professor at the Centre for Joint Operations - Institute for Military Operations, Royal Danish Defence College in Copenhagen. He holds a PhD in Security Studies from King's College London and is a Chief Editor of the *Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies*. Christoph's research interests include civil-military relations, military sociology, public security, and international organisations. His work has appeared in journals such as *International Affairs*, *Review of International Studies*, *European Journal of International Security*, and *International Peacekeeping*.

### **CARSTEN RØNNFELDT: SMALL POWERS’ CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: TWO SMOKING GUNS**

Those concerned with strategic effectiveness, understood as the armed forces’ ability to achieve ends of policy, should welcome revitalized efforts to move beyond Samuel Huntington’s seminal guidance for civil-military relations. Risa Brooks calls for a new normative framework to improve the US’ strategic effectiveness without putting in jeopardy liberal democracies’ fundamental values. In the

same spirit, Thomas Crosbie gathered civil-military relations scholars in 2021 to challenge dominant theory. This debate is largely US-dominated, although non-superpower perspectives are increasingly engaging with it. The present article contributes with a small power perspective by focusing on military professional norms that have affected Norway's strategic effectiveness in military operations abroad. The argument is explorative and conceptual and draws from Norway's military contingents to Libya in 2011 and to Latvia in 2014; this in order to set the scene, illustrate ideas and provide smoking-gun evidence for further debate. The two cases suggest Huntington's theoretical outlook has influenced civil-military relations in Norway with a negative impact on its military forces' strategic effectiveness. The main finding is that small powers are ill-served by uncritically adopting civil-military relations norms tailored to the superpower. I propose small powers facilitate collaborative political-military strategy dialogues at all levels of command, enable strategic control of tactical activities, and add a political dimension to military professionalism.

**Carsten F. Rønnfeldt** is a professor in international relations at the NDUC's Norwegian Military Academy. His research interests include civil-military relations, strategic communication and scholarship of teaching and learning. He has published in several journals among others *Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies*, *Armed Forces & Society* and *Parameters*. He holds a doctorate from the London School of Economics.

## JEFFREY M. REILLY: MILITARY POLITICS IN THE NEW OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

There has always been an undeniable link between the sharing of military intelligence and political outcomes. However, open-source intelligence (OSINT) and the constantly evolving digital ecosystem are compressing existing political level planning, decision, and execution (PDE) cycles. In addition to this, there are seismic shifts in once stable political alliances. During the recent past, the United States, the United Kingdom, and several other European nations made some great strides to share intelligence. This is exemplified in the period between late 2021 and early 2022 when nations began an intelligence sharing initiative to expose Russia's intent to invade the Ukraine. The aggregated release of intelligence during this timeframe was one the most extensive release of sensitive intelligence since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. In spite of the success of this recent initiative, a number of significant challenges remain. Among those are conflicting national interests, emerging strategic political alignments, policies, processes, and regulations. It is also important to highlight, many of today's existing relevant policies and processes were developed in the pre-digital age and are inadequate for addressing decisions on contemporary global security challenges. This analysis examines the impact of OSINT, the speed of data sharing, and new forms of commercially off the shelf intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) that will impact intelligence and political decision making.

**Jeffrey M. Reilly** (PhD) has been at the forefront of multidomain operations since 2006. He has held numerous US Army, joint and combined positions including being a theater level plans division chief and member of the Secretary of Defense's Two Major Theater War plans team. Additionally, he has received numerous professional military education awards for innovation at the Air University, Air Education and Training Command, and Secretary of the Air Force levels. He currently serves as the Director of the US Air Force Joint All Domain Strategist program.

## 3: SCANDINAVIAN VETERANS AND SOCIETY: SHAPING AND RECEIVING WAR EXPERIENCES (WG)

**Wednesday September 17: 10:45 – 12:00.** Chair: Vilde Opdan Yttereng [vyttereng@mil.no](mailto:vyttereng@mil.no), coordinator for the working group with the same title: Lene Ekhaugen, [lekhaugen@mil.no](mailto:lekhaugen@mil.no)

Bringing together scholars from diverse social science and humanities disciplines, this panel explores interactions between Scandinavian veterans and the societies to which they return after deployment. It explores how societies shape veterans' experiences of war, and conversely, how veterans shape and respond to Scandinavian societies' perceptions of war and conflict. The panel begins by situating the panel topic within the broader field of veteran research. From there, the discussion shifts to exploring how veterans' extreme experiences may run up against the limits of knowledge transfer from military to civilian contexts, before exploring how expectations of care and support have evolved among soldiers and veterans. The panel then examines how deployment shape veterans' life courses. Finally, it explores how veterans' experiences are transformed into narratives that circulate in society, shaping public perceptions of war and conflict. By weaving together these diverse perspectives, the panel offers new insights how veterans shape Scandinavian societies' understandings of war. In doing so, it fosters a broader discussion on the evolving relationship between veterans and society in the Scandinavian context.

### VILDE OPDAN YTTERENG: POSITIONING THE PANEL TOPIC WITHIN THE VETERAN RESEARCH FIELD

Research on veterans is evolving into a broad and interdisciplinary scholarly field. While it has traditionally been dominated by medical and psychological research, there is a growing interest from disciplines within the social sciences and humanities. Drawing on diverse methodological approaches, these disciplines have explored a wide range of topics including veteran policies, military operations from a societal perspective and veterans' own experiences. This introduction seeks to clarify conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of the panel by addressing key questions: How is "war experiences" defined and understood? What dynamics characterise the relationship between veterans and the societies to which they return? By engaging with these questions, the introduction aims to situate the panel within the broader veteran research field and offer reflections to inform the discussions that follow.

**Vilde Opdan Yttereng** is a historian and researcher at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS), currently working on her PhD project with the working title 'Norwegian Women in International Military Operations, 1947–2021'. Affiliated with the research programme on veterans and veteran policies at IFS since 2021, she has previously researched Scandinavian veteran policies as well as the meaning assigned to the Afghanistan war in Scandinavian public debates and among Norwegian veterans.

### KJETIL ENSTAD: VETERAN EXPERIENCES AND THE LIMITS OF LANGUAGE – A CHALLENGE FOR PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

According to David Hume, sense experience is the source of all knowledge. Human beings are, furthermore, born without any innate concepts. Our ideas, our language, and our conceptions of the world are all borne from sensory data. By implication, the lived experiences of war veterans constitute knowledge from a special and out-of-the-ordinary domain of human existence. Yet, veterans often report difficulties when it comes to articulating and communicating war experiences. One qualitative study of veteran-family communication during and after Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom states that a “recurrent theme was the difficulty that veterans had communicating the challenges of service in a war zone. The risk, the stress, the mundane daily life, and the depth of their emotions toward fighting in a war did not always translate across distances” (Hinojosa et al., 2012, p. 194). This problem of communicating traumatic and/or extreme experiences is a much-discussed topic in trauma studies (Leys, 2000, pp. 266–270). However, not only traumatic experiences are out-of-the-ordinary events in military life and consequently prone to breakdown in communication. Much of what happens behind the barbed wires around garrisons, on deployment somewhere, or what is kept under a veil of secrecy is far removed from the everyday experience of civilian life. In this paper I start from insights from the philosophy of language into the limits of what can be linguistically communicated. These points will be illustrated by examples from literary representations of war. I then proceed to argue that the overwhelmingly rational-analytical proclivity in military parlance and professional military education compound the problems of dealing with and communicating about war experiences.

**Kjetil Enstad** is an associate professor at the Norwegian Military Academy, part of the Norwegian Defence University College. His research interests lie in theoretical and philosophical foundations for the professions and the role of language and culture as determining factors for professional practices.

## **LENE EKHAUGEN: EVOLVING EXPECTATIONS AND SOCIETAL SHIFTS: NORWEGIAN VETERANS' EXPECTATIONS OF CARE AND SUPPORT**

Drawing on a diverse range of sources, including memoirs, archival records, official reports, and interviews, this paper explores how expectations of care and support among Norwegian soldiers and veterans have evolved from 1947 through to the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. These expectations are analysed as reflections of broader shifts in military-society relations, shaped by changes in the Norwegian welfare state, the professionalisation of the Armed Forces, and shifting public attitudes. The analysis is framed through the lens of Yagil Levy's (Levy et al., 2007) concept of “contractual militarism”, which highlights how military service is increasingly viewed as a negotiated exchange between individual and the state. In the Norwegian context, this framework helps illuminate how veterans' claims to care and support have become more conditional and rights based. By tracing these developments, the paper contributes to a deeper understanding of how military institutions and society may co-evolve.

**Lene Ekhaugen** is an associate professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS), part of the Norwegian Defence University College. She heads the research programme on veterans and veteran policies (IFS' Veteran programme). Her main research interests include veterans, international military operations, and civil-military relations.

## **NICKLAS HJORTGAARD CHRISTIANSEN: EXPLORING THE ROLE OF RANK IN VETERAN LIFE-COURSES**

This paper presents preliminary findings from my Ph.D. project examining how deployment to Afghanistan contributes to shaping the life-course of Danish and Norwegian veterans. Utilizing a sociological life-course approach, the project analyses biographical interviews with 50 Danish and

Norwegian veterans, male and female, examining themes such as relationships, family life, health, education, and labour-market participation. Focusing on military rank and contractual relation to the military, this paper demonstrates how variations in these, contributes to patterned differences in both the circumstances of veteran life-courses and the ways deployments interact with other life-domains. Examples are differences in the ‘content’ of deployments and the transitions into and out of the military. Further, these differences seem to vary according to national and historical context. An important finding is that to some of the veterans interviewed, the deployments seemed to have little importance in shaping the life-course, whereas the military service itself played an important, if not defining role in the life-course. This indicates the importance of paying attention to the military service itself as an element in veteran life-courses and considering how it interacts with deployments, for example ameliorating or deepening detrimental experiences, or facilitating transitions out of the military. Further, asking interviewees questions regarding the time prior to military service, indicates the potential for understanding connections between pre-service circumstances, in-service experiences, and post-deployment life. Such an approach allows for setting up analytical ideal-types of veteran life-course trajectories which might add to the understanding of how military service and deployment in international operations contributes to shaping life-courses.

**Nicklas Hjortgaard Christiansen** is a sociologist and currently a Ph.D. student at the Department of Sociology at the University of Bergen, working on the Ph.D. project examining how deployment to Afghanistan contributes to shaping the life-course of Danish and Norwegian veterans. Nicklas was himself deployed for one tour as a private to Afghanistan with the Danish Army.

## **ANNE MARIE HAGEN: VETERAN MEMOIRS: NARRATIVE POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS FOR COMMUNICATING WAR EXPERIENCES**

According to Gillian Whitlock, autobiography can be a political and ethical act (2007, p. 74). Starting from this insight, this paper examines the military memoir as a site for intervention in the public sphere and for negotiating and understanding civil-military relationships and identities. The military memoir plays a significant role in shaping public understanding of war, military professionals, and specific conflicts (Bourke 2000; Woodward & Jenkins 2018), making it imperative to understand how this impact is achieved. For all its popularity as a medium for communicating experiences of war, the genre rests on an apparent paradox: it invokes the authority of “the flesh witness” (Harari 2009), a particular form of knowledge gained from participation in war that is not transferable to others, and is further associated with a politics of knowledge that asserts the unknowability and incommunicability of war experiences (Caddick 2021). While scholars are attuned to the complexities of the relationship between embodied experience and narrative communication of this experience (e.g. Dyvik 2016; Caddick 2021), I argue that closer textual attention to how narrative stimulates interpretation in both author and reader, the extent to which they open “spaces of possibility” for reflection (Meretoja 2018), is necessary. In this paper, I use a narrative hermeneutics approach to analyse three Norwegian Afghanistan veteran memoirs, published between 2011 and 2013. The paper also scrutinizes the memoirs’ reception through published reviews and reader responses in online forums. Studying how military memoirs position and structure both authors and readers adds to our understanding of the genre’s impact on public discourse about the military and, in turn, the military memoir as a form of knowledge.

**Anne Marie Hagen** is an associate professor at the Norwegian Military Academy, part of the Norwegian Defence University College. She heads the research group Military Humanities, which is a new field of inquiry that demonstrates the utility of the humanities for critical understanding of the military and its practices and as a tool for developing these practices. Her research interests include the use of fiction in military education, reading sociology, and civil-military relations.

## 4: MILITARY LOGISTICS (WG)

**Wednesday September 17: 10:45 – 12:00.** Chair and coordinator of the SJMS working group: Per Skoglund, associate professor at SEDU, per.skoglund@fhs.se

### **PER SKOGLUND, GYÖNGYI KOVÁCS AND AINO RUGGIERO: THE IMPLICATIONS OF NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN FINLAND AND SWEDEN**

Modern societies are complex, comprising integrated and interdependent sectors of society and vital services. Both a functioning critical infrastructure and a secure flow of goods and services are vital for society. However, the world has changed dramatically in the last decade. A recent pandemic, flaring up international tensions, crises and wars, and changes in the geopolitical landscape have impacted on supply chains and considerations of security of supply, resilient supply chains, societal resilience, as well as critical infrastructure. The changing geopolitical landscape including the war in Ukraine has resulted in Finland and Sweden now being NATO members. Both the changes in the geopolitical environment and the response to such changes, in this case NATO membership, alter how we see and develop critical infrastructure, and how supply chains are reorientated. The main purpose of this paper is to better understand the implications of the NATO membership on critical infrastructure development in Finland and Sweden. A reorientation of critical infrastructure would better reflect the new geopolitical landscape and support a Nordic integration not just across defence but also crisis preparedness and civil protection. Thus, we posit the following research questions: “What are the implications of NATO membership for critical infrastructure development in Finland and Sweden?” And: “Which critical events impact on the prioritisation of a Nordic integration of critical infrastructure?” Various events influence changes in considerations and adaptations of critical infrastructure, NATO membership being one of them. Specific events, such as cutting of undersea cables also require new considerations and prioritisations to support societal resilience in the Nordics. This paper analyses critical events, decisions and patterns that support, or alter the prioritisation of critical infrastructure development. We employ the method of critical event analysis since it can provide a parsimonious explanation of a puzzling outcome. Prior to NATO membership, both Finland and Sweden exhibited an internal focus in critical infrastructure development. In spite of joint Nordic exercises, preparedness and response considerations, the connectivity of infrastructure, joint infrastructure etc. were less in focus. Since joining NATO, various infrastructure projects have been in the limelight that should enable better connectivity across the Nordic countries, including transport and energy infrastructures across Finland and Sweden, but also communication infrastructure, e.g. the protection of undersea cables under a NATO umbrella. In conclusion, current events heavily impact the prioritisation of different types of critical infrastructure. Applying critical event analysis advances our understanding of prioritisation mechanisms also in light of an effective support of societal resilience.

**Per Skoglund** (PhD/Lt Col) is senior researcher at the Swedish Defence University. He currently holds the position as coordinator for military logistics and supply chain management. The position comprises the academic responsibility for the division's logistics education and research. He also has a part time employment as Associate Professor at The Norwegian Defence University College, (2013-present). Per has his PhD in Business administration from Jönköping International Business School.

**Gyöngyi Kovács** is the Erkkö Professor in Humanitarian Logistics, and the Dean of Research at the Hanken School of Economics. She is a founding Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management and on the editorial board of several other journals. She was the first Director of the Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Research Institute (HUMLOG Institute) and has published extensively in humanitarian logistics and sustainable supply chain management. She was awarded humanitarian logistics researcher of the year 2020 by the American Logistics Aid Network ALAN.

**Aino Ruggiero (not presenting)** is a postdoctoral researcher at LUT University's Disinformation, Propaganda & Soft Power Research Lab (DPS-Lab) in Lappeenranta, Finland, and an associate researcher at the Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Research Institute, Department of Marketing, at the Hanken School of Economics in Helsinki, Finland. Her research interests include crisis preparedness, comprehensive security, societal resilience, supply chain disruption, crisis communication, and governmental communication.

## **ROLAND HELLBERG, IMO H ANTAI AND THOMAS EKSTRÖM: LOGISTICS ADAPTATION TO NATO: THE SWEDISH PERSPECTIVE**

NATO's expansion into the Nordic region represents a significant strategic shift with profound logistical implications. The integration of Sweden and Finland introduces new geographical, infrastructural, and operational challenges, necessitating a reassessment of NATO's supply chains, force mobility, and sustainment strategies in the High North. Logistical interoperability is critical for joint NATO operations and for enhancing the alliance's overall operational effectiveness. Member states must continuously develop and sustain both national and collective logistics capabilities in accordance with NATO's Article 5 (NATO, 2025). NATO logistics planning operates through two key processes: the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and the Operations Planning Process (OPP). The NDPP focuses on mid- to long-term planning, ensuring that capabilities, stockpiles, and resources meet operational readiness and sustainability requirements through a whole-of-government approach. The OPP addresses short-term operational planning, aligning logistics requirements with national, multinational, or contractual solutions. The North Atlantic Council's approval of the *Logistics Action Plan* in 2024 established a strategic framework to enhance deterrence, defense, and crisis management through innovation and collaboration (NATO, 2025). Given the complexity of NATO operations, which require the coordination of resources and transportation across multiple member states, Sweden must align its logistics framework with NATO's standardized procedures. However, there is currently limited knowledge on the logistical adaptation process. This paper explores Sweden's transition to NATO logistics, analysing the evolution of its capabilities and infrastructure to meet alliance standards while preserving national operational autonomy. This study is based on qualitative interviews with senior logistics officers from the Swedish Armed Forces, complemented by a literature review on NATO's logistical adaptation. Sweden's logistics adaptation depends on varying scenarios, whether acting independently or as part of NATO's operational planning. A key requirement is the ability to facilitate troop movements in multiple directions, both independently and in coordination with allied forces. Ensuring an uninterrupted supply system under all conditions remains a fundamental priority. Key aspects of Sweden's integration into NATO's logistics framework include host nation support, transportation planning, pre-positioned stockpiles, enhanced interoperability, and joint exercises. A primary challenge in aligning with NATO logistics standards is the diversity of national logistics systems (Pecina & Dufek, 2016), along with securing access to fuel supplies (Dowd et al., 2023). A structured approach to planning, utilizing enterprise architecture and operational logic, ensures that logistical components are systematically developed to align with NATO standards while remaining adaptable to Sweden's national operational environment. The adaptation of Swedish logistics to NATO standards is essential for achieving interoperability, operational efficiency, and strategic readiness. However, integration is challenged by national disparities, interoperability constraints, and technological gaps, which must be addressed

to ensure seamless cooperation within the alliance. Despite these obstacles, NATO's strategic initiatives provide a structured framework to facilitate logistical alignment and capability development. As Sweden continues to integrate its logistics infrastructure with NATO requirements, key priorities include enhancing force mobility, ensuring seamless interoperability, fostering multinational cooperation, and strengthening fuel resilience. Given the dynamic and evolving nature of NATO's security landscape, the continuous adaptation of logistics systems is crucial for enabling rapid deployment and sustainment in high-intensity conflicts. This research contributes to the limited knowledge on the logistical adaptation process, providing updated insights that may benefit other nations undergoing similar transitions within NATO's framework.

**Roland Hellberg** (PhD) is a senior lecturer in War Studies at the Swedish Defence University in Stockholm. His research focuses on defence logistics, with particular interest in security of supply, defence industry supply chains, the logistical implications of military expansion, and Host Nation Support. He has published extensively in these areas, contributing to the academic and policy discourse on military logistics and national defence readiness.

**Imoh Antai** is a senior lecturer in War Science at the Department of War Studies and Military History, Swedish Defence University. Antai has previously worked at Jönköping International Business School and studied at Hanken School of Economics in Helsinki and KTH in Stockholm. In addition to defense logistics, Antai is, among other things, interested in supply chain management as a competitive factor, project management, digital transformation, humanitarian and emergency relief chains. Antai has professional experience from USA and Sweden and has published several scientific articles within the logistics area.

**Thomas Ekström (not presenting, PhD)** is a consultant with a research background from Swedish Defence University.

## **GUNN ALICE BIRKEMO: RESILIENT NORDIC SUPPLY CHAINS IN CRISIS AND WAR - THE ROLE OF COMMERCIAL ACTORS**

The Norwegian total defense concept is based on the principle of mutual civil-military support and cooperation across the entire crisis spectrum from peace through security-political crisis to armed conflict. A worsening security policy development, climate change and the pandemic have led to global value chains being challenged, which also has consequences for the national security of supply. The complex security policy situation has also led to more cross-sectoral threats, so that vulnerabilities along the supply chains are exploited more precisely by threat actors than before. Still, the important role of commercial actors and their own perspectives on how to obtain resilient supply chains to support both civil and military requirements in a national and Nordic context, remains to be studied. The purpose of this Work in Progress is to assess opportunities and limitations for the commercial actors to fulfill its crucial role in developing resilient supply chains that withstand crises and war challenges and requirements. The study will go in-depth on the following perspectives: 1) coordination and information sharing, 2) Resource access and concurrency requirements, 3) Personnel and competence, and 4) Legal conditions. The four perspectives will be assessed through a document and literature review, interviews and a workshop with subject matter experts representing commercial, public and military actors. The study will provide valuable knowledge on the critical role of the private sector in national and Nordic supply chain resilience. Preliminary findings will be presented and discussed.

**Gunn Alice Birkemo** (PhD) is a principal scientist at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). As an operations analyst her area of research cover strategic defence planning, national preparedness, civil military cooperation and security of supply. She holds a PhD in chemistry.

## TORSTEIN TAKVAM, STEIN WALLACE AND FALKO MÜLLER: REINFORCING IN THE NORDICS

The expansions of NATO in the Nordics are changing the requirements of the military logistical distribution network needed to defend the region. The purpose of this paper is to provide insight to strategic decision-makers that are planning the Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM) process for reinforcements arriving in the Nordics. We introduce a Stochastic Network Design Problem with Arc Disruptions, within the context of a larger Military Theater Distribution Problem (TDP) in the Nordic Theatre. The decision-maker selects Seaports of Debarkation (SPODs), convoy support centres (CSCs), Railhead Points of Embarkation/Debarkation (RPOE/RPOD) transition locations (Road / Rail and vice versa) and assigns ships of arriving forces. The network arcs can be disrupted due to weather conditions and unforeseen events. Once disruptions are revealed, the decision-maker schedules flow between the SPODs and the respective Final Destinations through the remaining network using rail, road and ferry transportation, in order to satisfy the Cargo Movement Requirements (CMRs) of arriving forces. Historical road and rail data from the transportation network in the region is used for generating disruption scenarios. We expect to observe a trade-off between the benefit of volume while using rail, versus the disruption vulnerability compared to road transport. Moreover, optimal facility locations (SPOD, CSC and RPOE/RPOD) are expected to change between a deterministic case, and when disruptions are considered. We also expect our model to consider the combined set of different facilities more important than the specific location of each of them. In other words, the model will help identify optimal bundles of SPODs, CSCs and RPOE/RPODs rather than optimal location of each individual facility. This work offers an analytical tool to improve the military distribution network in the region, providing managerial insights into how to prepare and improve the network for RSOM processes. This paper can support decision-makers currently evaluating and planning military distribution operations in the Nordics, potentially improving efficiency, readiness, and supply chain resilience. Our problem formulation includes multiple aspects that are common in network design literature, but less common in combination. These aspects include location-routing with intermediate facilities and stops, multimodality, transshipment and stochastic disruptions. The model also incorporates practical constraints in the transport operations, such as avoiding shared roads for different units. The problem is relevant to, and has not been considered, in the context of the recent additions to NATO in the Nordics.

**Torstein Takvam** has a background as a logistics officer in the Norwegian Army. He is MSc in Economics and Business Administration from Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) and currently a PhD candidate at NHH while teaching military logistics at the Norwegian Defence University College (NDUC). He has an expertise in applied operations research/management and machine learning, and his primary research related to the logistical implications of NATO's expansion in the Nordics.

**Falko Müller** is an associate professor in military logistics at Norwegian Defense College/Naval Academy. His main research interests are within transport network analysis, economic impact assessment of transport infrastructure (CBA) and air transport economics. His main teaching activities include theories and concepts in supply chain management, military logistics and complex network theory.

**Stein Wallace (not presenting)** is a professor of Operational Research and leader of the Centre for Shipping and Logistics at Norwegian School of Economics (NHH).

## 5: IMPROVING PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

**Wednesday September 17: 13:00 – 14:15.** Chair: Thomas Crosbie, associate professor at RDDC, thcr@fak.dk

### **PETER A. MATTSSON: HOW TO ENHANCE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF MULTIDOMAIN OPERATIONS IN HIGHER OFFICERS' EDUCATION AND AMONGST HIGHER STAFF OFFICERS IN SWEDEN?**

This study looks at how multi-domain operations are understood in higher officers' education and staff officer training in Sweden. At the end of the last century, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui published *Unrestricted Warfare* (1999), a seminal work on military strategy. At the same time, global scientific and technological development was accelerating rapidly, leading to the emergence of technologies that integrated and unified the physical, digital and biological domains. This shift was dubbed the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Schwab, 2018). The Chinese military has developed in a progressive way, considering capabilities and vulnerabilities. This coincided with a technological revolution, laying the groundwork for a shift in military operations (Lee, 2024). Threats to critical societal functions and the potential for military operations to adapt to an expanded operational environment was key to developing a new perspective on military operations. Integration of air, land and sea domains, supported by space and cyberspace perspectives, has led to an expansion of joint military operations (Brown, 2025). However, the US Army's concept of military operations (US Army 2018), in which multiple domains are interwoven and conventional warfare plays a dominant role, has emerged as the dominant warfighting method and capability. NATO has more fully embraced this role (NATO 2022a, NATO 2022b, NATO 2022c). Multi-domain operations are now part of NATO's strategic guidance and are a key part of the AJP-01 doctrine, as well as other functional doctrines (NATO AJP-01). This paper contributes to the discussion on the implementation and application of MDO and MDC (NATO) in Sweden, especially in the training of senior officers in the Swedish Armed Forces. The research method is multidisciplinary and includes military theory, current NATO strategic guidance and operational doctrine. The research is supported by interviews with students and teachers at the Swedish National Defence University, and the study includes a strategic sample of Swedish senior officers. The paper covers the MDO concepts of orchestration, synchronisation and convergence, and the MDC model's three impact dimensions. Operations are discussed in terms of spatial and temporal expansion, with cyber and space in multi-domain operations (Meigs, 2025). Second, how to coordinate and synchronise military and non-military capabilities in multi-domain operations (NATO 2023). Thirdly, the effect dimensions in MDO are addressed in terms of virtual, cognitive and physical realms (NATO 2024a). The discussion culminates in recommendations for understanding MDO in the context of officer education and senior staff officer training in Sweden and the Nordics. The MDO concept is widely discussed in NATO, but its use in officer training and in the profession itself is rarely studied. This study aims to contribute to our understanding of the MDO concept and its current use in the military.

**Peter A. Mattsson** (PhD) is a senior lecturer, Joint Operations Section, Department of Military Science, Swedish Defence University. He is a research representative FHS/IKV/OPA: 'NATO Multi-Domain Operations 2023–2025', and his areas of expertise are contemporary Warfare; China, Israel, and Russia 2011–2025, and NATO 2024–2025.

## FRANK TORE LAUGEN: WHEN THE CONSULTANTS LEAVE: HOW CONSULTANCY CALCULATIONS RESHAPE NORWAY'S MILITARY EDUCATION SYSTEM

This paper investigates how external consultants' efficiency doctrines. Since the late 1980s, New Public Management has normalised outsourcing of analysis to private consultancies, allowing "independent" cost-benefit models to legitimise public-sector change. Norway's 2015–18 military education reform offers a rare longitudinal window on what happens after the consultants depart. Drawing on Actor-Network Theory and a three-year case study with McKinsey, Sopra Steria and Deloitte reports commissioned by the Ministry of Defence and Defence Staff, the article traces four translation moments—problematisation, interessement, enrolment and mobilisation—in which economic calculations progressively displaced operational considerations. We show how consultancy artefacts (spreadsheets, slide decks, KPIs) became obligatory passage points that redefined officer training as a cost problem, secured parliamentary approval and persisted as governing devices long after external advisers withdrew. Yet, once dedicated project resources dissolved, the practice benefits that the models promised stalled, while the vocabulary and budget lines they introduced continued to structure decision-making—fuelled by recurrent demand for new consultancy updates. The study extends Sturdy's call to "examine what happens when consultants leave" by documenting (i) purification of accounting language that mutes dissent, (ii) demand-inflation for further consultancy, and (iii) erosion of tacit military pedagogical expertise (iv) possible overflow and reframing.

**Commander s.g. Frank Tore Laugen** is Head Lecturer in Defence Resource Management at the Norwegian Naval Academy and a PhD candidate at University of Inland Norway. Combining 30+ years' operational service across the Norwegian Armed Forces with dual MSc degrees in Business Administration and Public Administration, his research examines the performative power of accounting and economic calculations in defence reforms. His current project follows consultancy reports through Norway's military education reform to reveal how financial logics translate, mobilise and endure in defence innovation and capability development.

## KARL-ERIK KIRSCHBAUM AND ÜLLE SÄÄLIK: INNOVATION, INTEGRATION AND EDUCATION IN DEFENCE ACADEMIES

Recent advancements in emerging disruptive technologies, coupled with a discernible rise in the cognitive dimensions of warfare, have given rise to suggestions about a presumed revolution in military affairs. While the validity of these claims is questionable, it underscores the evolving character of warfare, a transformation that may be expedited by the progress made in the field of artificial intelligence. Moreover, the Russo-Ukrainian war has exemplified the swift progression of micro-innovations on the battlefield, including novel ways of using legacy systems. This is indicative of a cycle that is shifting the advantage and disadvantage in the relatively short timeframe (Fox, 2024), which in Ukraine can be only a matter of weeks. Rapid technological innovation is also driving the need for faster peace-time adaptability and faster procurement in NATO and the EU (Herzog, 2024). Direct awarding of contracts to defence companies can shorten the process, but simultaneously underscores the necessity for collaboration with the industry and importance of education and training to ensure the effective use of new systems (Danish Ministry of Defence), highlighting the role of education in the integration process for capability development. In comparison, Professional Military Education is grounded in tradition and institutional inertia, which attest to the need for preparing for war in general not only for the lessons learned in the last conflict (Roberts, 2024). This leads to question if there is also a need for expedited educational design and changes in curricula to better

cope with the adaptations in warfare? The present study sets out to explore the junior officer's educational and training programmes in Nordics and Baltic Sea Region<sup>1</sup> with a focus on developing the perceived core competencies for operating in current and future battlefield. The research will firstly identify central considerations for defence capability development for small states regarding the challenges in contemporary security environments and emerging technologies. This informs about the potential competencies for conducting military operations in the near-future. Thereafter, an analysis of curricula of junior officer education from various countries will be conducted, followed by semi-structured interviews with respective curriculum designers. The results will be presented in a non-attributive way to stress the key findings and possible best practices. In this way, the study aims to contribute to the wider discussion on the current outlook of educational design.

**Major Karl-Erik Kirschbaum** is a lecturer in the Chair of Tactics at the Estonian Military Academy. His research interests include evolving (infantry) tactics, military history, specifically the development of military thought as well as instructional design. He is currently involved in the NATO DEEP project which aims to revise the generic reference curriculum for junior officers.

**Ülle Säälk** (PhD) is an associate professor and field lead of pedagogy at the Estonian Military Academy. With the background of Educational Sciences, she is also active as a researcher and involved in the development activities of the academy. Her research interests include leader development and leader competencies, studies about leadership, morale, personality, identity and role.

## 6: TOTAL DEFENCE COOPERATION

**Wednesday September 17: 13:00 – 14:15.** Chair: Christoph Harig, Chief editor of SJMS, [chha@fak.dk](mailto:chha@fak.dk)

### **BETINA SLAGNES: PROMETHEAN APPROACH TO JOINT PUBLIC-PRIVATE EMERGENCY-SERVICE DELIVERY: ENHANCING COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY THROUGH LEADERSHIP INSIGHTS**

In an era of security threats that are both complex and ever-changing, there is a large need for comprehensive societal resilience. This study investigates crisis management capacity in future extreme crises. Through a case study of Norway's total defense, the study examines challenges in contracting processes and cross-sectoral communication forums, and sheds light on the strategic importance of civil-military cooperation for comprehensive security and security management. The article addresses two main questions: How do key challenges in managing extreme crises within public-private collaborations under total defense policies arise, and what policy measures can be implemented to address these challenges? Using a thematic analysis of 37 semi-structured interviews with leaders from public, private and trade union organizations, as well as the Norwegian Armed Forces, this study introduces the distinctive "Promethean approach" to crisis management, inspired by the mythological figure Prometheus. This approach advocates proactive strategies that reduce shortcomings in crisis management. The findings provide important insights into how to improve transparency, accountability, and democratic control in public-private emergency response collaborations. The approach also emphasizes the practical challenges and solutions related to, among other things, contract processes and cross-sector communication, and provides concrete recommendations for resilient crisis management. Ultimately, this study contributes a unique

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<sup>1</sup> Countries and institutions are subject to availability.

perspective on public governance and national resilience, providing a critical understanding of governance network dynamics within total defense policies.

**Betina Slagnes** is a PhD candidate at the University of Oslo and affiliated with the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). She leads the Total Defence Study 2025, a national mixed-method project on emergency-service workers' will to defend in extreme crises. The survey, fielded in June 2025 to approx. 1% of Norway's adult population, includes items on role clarity, inter-organizational cooperation, and preparedness for crisis and war. The project also includes qualitative interviews and a factorial survey experiment on willingness to perform tasks in extreme scenarios.

## JULIE BERGAUST: COOPERATION FOR COUNTERING HYBRID WARFARE

Covert conduct by hostile states is increasing. Russia is one of the states that targets Western states, such as cutting undersea cables in the Baltic Sea or spreading disinformation on social media and undertaking cyber-attacks. Many Western state actors now label these new threats as “hybrid warfare”, “hybrid threats” or grey zone conflict, and NATO has also embraced the “hybrid” label. The widespread use of the term also lays bare hybrid war's conceptual ambiguity. Despite the criticism, it seems valuable to add our understanding of the contemporary security environment by analyzing how states utilize the term hybrid war in official documents and processes. Previous research has examined how states such as Croatia, the United Kingdom, Finland, the Netherlands, and Germany have implemented countermeasures. However, the Nordic nations are particularly interesting to analyze due to their geographical placement and the increased actions against them. While military cooperation for a potential armed conflict has increased between these Nordic nations, the question remains how they deal with, and cooperate, to counter hybrid warfare in the present. Furthermore, with NATO's “hybrid warfare” strategy in the pipelines, it is timely and important to study the Nordics' countermeasures against hybrid warfare. This article addresses the following two questions: How are the Nordic states countering ‘hybrid threats’, and to what extent are these states cooperating to do so? This is a qualitative analysis of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. While there are differences between these countries that must be acknowledged, their shared socioeconomic and political characteristics, such as democratic governance and social trust-levels, and now NATO-membership, makes them ideal for comparison. The article relies on a content analysis, utilizing deductive qualitative data analysis techniques in the computer software NVIVO. The data is publicly available doctrines, policy documents and security strategies. Through this technique, the article maps states' efforts to counter hybrid threats, illustrates the Nordic states' main concerns and how, if at all, the states seek to cooperate. This study is a steppingstone that first provides the understanding of what states intend to do (policies), which can be used to analyze what states do (practices) and if these practices are effective. This contribution to security and military studies is important, because it empirically identifies countermeasures and cooperation, and thus clarifies some of the ambiguity the hybrid warfare literature has been accused of to date. This knowledge is of utmost importance for states' ability to counter foreign interference and uphold democracy in a progressively more difficult security environment.

**Julie Bergaust** is a researcher at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment and a PhD candidate at the University of Oslo. She holds a BSc (Hons) in Politics and International Relations from the University of Bath and an MA (Cum Laude) from Sciences Po Paris. Her work has been published in *European Security*, and she contributed to the Norwegian Defence Commission on issues of hybrid threats. In 2024, she received NATO STO's Early Career Scientist Award from the Human Factors and Medicine Panel.

## ALICIA FJÄLLHED AT AL.: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE PARADOX OF AN ORGANISED VOLUNTARY DEFENCE

Since Russia's initial aggressions against Ukraine in 2014, Sweden has been rebuilding its total defence (compare for example Estonia's comprehensive defence (Juurvee & Arold, 2021)),

comprising a military and a civil defence in collaboration (Tillberg, Berndtsson & Tillberg, 2025). Conceptually, the civil defence denotes Sweden's collective societal resistance to war, encompassing actors such as public organisations, private companies, and even individual citizens (Swedish Government, n.d.). At the heart of this idea is the notion of *försvarsvilja*, translating to willingness to defend, by taking up arms, keep going to work in a critical sector or engaging voluntarily in actions organized by civil society. At the same time, civil society presents a sphere of activity distinct and independent from state and market. It is highlighted as crucial "for the defence of human rights and an open democratic society" (UNA Sweden, 2023, translation from Swedish), constituting the foundation of the societal structure democracies aim to defend from antagonist attacks. Imposing restrictions on civil society's independence in an attempt to mobilise it for defence purposes could thus undermine the very system we seek to protect, giving rise to a paradox that guides the research question of this paper: How can civil defence be organized in order to mobilise and make use of civil society engagement as part of the state-led defence efforts, while still protecting civil society's independence from the state? Academic discussions on civil-military relations traditionally focus on topics such as democratic or civilian control over the armed forces (Shopina, Koberts & Tarasov, 2021; Latawski, 2005; Bellamy, 2006; Burk, 2002). This paper adds a new perspective on the less discussed roles of civil society organisations (CSOs) at war (for exceptions, see Dembinski & Joachim, 2024). Studies from Ukraine emphasize civil society as crucial for the defence of the country, but it also highlights the need to recognize cultural disparities between different civil societies in different countries in order to understand their potential for civil defence (Zarembo & Martin, 2024). Taking Swedish civil defence as an example, this paper aims to explore the relation between state and CSOs to understand how voluntary actions can be organised either within planned state structures or independently as civil society initiatives. As a neglected perspective in the research on CSO's role in the construction of civil defence, this paper seeks to explore CSO's own view on their role. Ultimately, the paper reflects on the alignment of those perceptions with the view of the Swedish state as expressed in plans and policy. This allows for the exploration of both risks and opportunities with different policy approaches from the state in relation to civil society actions as part of the total defence.

**Alicia Fjällhed** (PhD) is a researcher at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). She studies communicative dimensions of war and crises, with a focus on ethics and morals, either communication as the threat (such as in cognitive warfare) or as part of a nation's defence (such as in psychological defence).

**Kristina Hellström, Jonas Herkevall & Linn Rabe (not presenting)** are researchers at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).

## 7: MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING

**Wednesday September 17: 13:00 – 14:15.** Chair: Søren Sjøgren, Chief editor of SJMS, [sosj@fak.dk](mailto:sosj@fak.dk)

### STONE DANIELSEN AND SIMGUND VALAKER: INTEGRATION OF JOINT PROCESSES: A ROUTINE INTEGRATION PERSPECTIVE

Joint processes are aimed at prioritizing and synchronizing tactical activities to achieve operational and strategic effects across domains. It is integral to how for example SOF resources can be utilized in effective ways (Mattingsdal et al, 2024). While there are large volumes of written NATO doctrines and tactics techniques and procedures (TTPs) on joint processes, the enactment of the processes and the knowledge of the processes are seldom the same as the written description of the processes. NATO descriptions do not always capture what is relevant in specific contexts, and are not always well-

known at all command levels. This lack of coherence can lead to a lack of prioritization as well as coordination failures among the various military entities. In this article we take a deeper look at a case which exemplify these challenges in the Norwegian armed forces. Specifically, we take a look at the joint targeting (JT) process and how it is integrated with tactical targeting processes and joint intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (JISR). In this paper we pose the question: How are joint targeting integrated with tactical targeting (execution) and with JISR in a small-state military organization? We draw on the research of organizational routines defined as repeated and recognizable patterns of actions carried out by multiple actors (Feldman and Pentland, 2003). Both JT and JISR consist of various actions that are recognized (e.g., in doctrines, and in TTPs) and repeated (e.g., in exercises and operations). Integrating routines can be done in multiple ways, e.g., through changing the routines, adapting routines to serve multiple purposes, building new action patterns as well as through the close cooperation among participants performing different routines (Deken et al., 2016; Zheng & Yang, 2015). However, whether these ways of forming integrated routines suggested in the research literature are relevant in a military context, and if so how, is in need of further examination. We employed a method of fieldwork and interviews as well as active engagement in the integration efforts to form insights on the specific ways of integrating JT and JISR as well as tactical targeting processes. The most important ways of integrating the processes were to develop joint experience and practice through the interplay of various arenas (in particular: education, exercises, and seminars), and more detailed in exercises by providing information about the processes, making explicitly sure other processes (e.g., JT) is taken into account in other routines (e.g., JISR), as well as good integration within the different processes. The most important aspects that hampered integration were: confusion regarding the content of the different processes such as their purpose and at what command level they are performed, one process not providing timely input to other processes, and communication and terminology difficulties. Our findings expand the understanding of routine integration by highlighting the actors understanding of various routines and how such understanding evolves in practice. This knowledge is particularly relevant to develop and strengthen the joint processes that aim to coordinate among various domains.

**Tone Danielsen** is Associate Professor at the Defence University College. She is an experienced social anthropologist who has done ground-breaking research on organisational culture, leadership, and social changes. She has worked 20 years in the defence sector; Defence University College, Ministry of Defence, and Defence Research Establishment. She has done extensive fieldwork in all services, at all levels, and a decade with special operations forces. Danielsen has also done fieldwork in the Norwegian Oil Fund, the health sector and in Syria in the 1990s.

**Sigmund Valaker** is a chief scientist at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. He studies coordination situation awareness and sensemaking among military services.

## HUIB ZIJDERVELD ET AL.: SCALABILITY AS A STRATEGIC CONCEPT IN THE NETHERLANDS

In the wake of the Russian attack on Ukraine, the Netherlands Armed Forces was forced to transform its specialized expeditionary army, primarily designed for peacekeeping, peace support, and humanitarian operations, to a larger, heavily armed force intended to provide credible deterrence and, when necessary, defend NATO's borders. The importance of this transformation was further underscored by the adoption of the "America First" policy in the United States, which disrupted NATO's solidarity with Ukraine and raised questions about the United States' commitment to European security. To realize this transformation, the Netherlands Ministry of Defence adopted scalability as a strategic concept in 2024. However, lacking a clear conceptual framework, key questions revolved around how to define, organize, and implement scalability within the armed forces. To address this gap, the Netherlands Defence Academy invited military scholars to contribute to its Annual Review of Military Studies (NL ARMS) This call for papers resulted in 22 contributions encompassing historical, operational, organizational, and technological perspectives (access to the

book via this link: <https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/102210>). We defined scalability as: ‘the capability of a system, network, or organization to flexibly adjust the size of its routines, structures, operations, and network connections—either expanding or contracting its capacity. These adjustments aim to enhance overall performance, resource efficiency, and innovation capacity in order to meet both current and future demands in rapidly changing and ambiguous environments. The rationale behind scalability is straightforward: organizations that can adapt and adjust their size in response to environmental changes are more likely to survive. This adaptability requires strategic reorientation, innovation, and the capacity to form alliances. Adopting a process perspective, scalability begins with a complex process of sensemaking and dialogue among societal, military, and political actors regarding existential threats to free societies and their implications. Secondly, systems must adapt to evolving threats, a process that entails more than merely increasing operations or adding military units. It requires a fundamental mental shift from austerity to investment and the adoption of alternative modes of governance. Moreover, military upscaling necessitates adjustments to equipment and machines in accordance with emerging threats. Some scholars advocate for ‘economies of scale’ in this context, arguing that centralized production or procurement by multiple countries can enhance product quality and supply security. Additionally, scalable human resource management within Europe’s aging labor market presents significant challenges. Scholars also highlight the role of innovation and collaboration with civilian companies—such as through crowdsourcing and upstream innovation—in this process. Lastly, scalability is essential for sustaining armed forces over time; scaling is not static or fully controllable but rather represents a continuous process of learning, practice, feedback, and formalization. Based on this project, several new questions and dilemmas have emerged. For example: How does upscaling support deterrence, and when does it lead to a financially draining arms race? In an ambiguous environment with an uncertain future, how can indicators for upscaling and downscaling be determined? Although the conclusions are drawn primarily from the Netherlands context, they also have broader implications for other European countries, many of which are similarly seeking to scale their armed forces. Our goal is to deepen the academic debate on scalability while providing practitioners with new perspectives and ideas to address scalability challenges within their own organizations.

**Huib Zijderfeld** is a PhD researcher in Resilience and Innovation at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. His dissertation investigates the evolving domestic role of armed forces from an organizational perspective, analysing how civil–military networks function and adapt during crises. To bridge his scholarship and military career, he also serves as a research fellow at the Netherlands Defence Academy. His research focuses on the adaptability of the armed forces, inter-organizational collaboration, and resilience from a civil–military perspective.

**Annelies van Vark, Floribert Baudet, René Moelker, Edwin Dado and Ronald Vuijk (not presenting).**

## SEBASTIAN CONTE: DEBATING THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR: ONE LEVEL TOO MANY?

It is common to claim that there are three levels of war: the strategic level, the operational level, and the tactical level. At the strategic level, political aims are formulated. At the tactical level, military actions are executed. The operational level, according to this framework, is the level that bridges these two other levels. That is, it is the level that is supposed to translate political aims into military actions. The levels of war framework, then, plays a crucial role in facilitating civil-military relations and securing the democratic legitimacy of military actions. However, the level of war framework so construed, and in particular the idea of an operational level, has been submitted to substantial criticism. Some have questioned the very existence of the operational level while others have questioned the usefulness of it. Moreover, the operational level itself is a contested concept and there are various explications of it. This raises the worry that the debate about the operational level may, at least in part, be merely verbal (contrary to substantive). This paper assesses to what extent the debate about the operational level is verbal. It does so by surveying and categorizing the claims made in the

debate. This will help determine whether the claims made about the operational level really are conflicting claims. Moreover, drawing on earlier work that has collected and compared the various definitions of the operational level, this paper assesses whether (conflicting) arguments target the same conceptualizations of the operational level. If conflicting arguments target different accounts of the operational level, then the dispute may only appear to be substantive when the interlocutors are in fact talking past each other. An extensive literature search is conducted to collect the arguments from academic articles engaging in the debate about the usefulness or existence of the operational level. Six databases are searched using the key word “operational level of war.” Articles which titles or abstract suggested they engaged in the debate were included in the sample. If it was unclear from the title and abstract whether the article was relevant, excerpts from the article or, in many cases, the whole article was read. The search was extended by considering other work from the authors whose articles were included in the sample and the work cited in the articles included in the sample. In this extended search, other types of literature than articles were considered as well. The articles in the sample were analyzed and the arguments extracted. The arguments were then categorized using the following categories: epistemic, conceptual, descriptive, casual, and predictive. It is argued that there is reason to believe that at least some of the debate surrounding the operational level is verbal.

**Sebastian J. Conte** is a senior researcher at the Staff and Officer College, Norwegian Defence University College. He has a background in political science and is currently part of the project Making Sense of Military Operations. The project explores issues in the philosophy of science and their application to the study of military operations. Conte’s other interests are moral and political philosophy, moral epistemology, and methodology. His research has appeared in the *Journal of Political Philosophy* and the *Journal of Value Inquiry*.

## 8: ROUNDTABLE: LEADERSHIP IN A MILITARY CONTEXT (WG)

**Wednesday September 17: 13:00 – 14:15.** Chair and coordinator of the SJMS working group: Anders Klitmøller and Ann-Louise Holten, [alho@fak.dk](mailto:alho@fak.dk).

In light of the current geopolitical changes and global security situation the role of the military has been called to the fore – and with it discussions over leadership in a military context. Indeed, some argue that future leadership capabilities need to be different from the present, as anticipated already by Loughlin and Arnold (2007): “...soldiers rising to positions of leadership in the military of the future will require a distinctly different skill set than those of the past.” Yet despite leadership in the military being central to the military profession, the academic field studying leadership in the military context is both small and fragmented. Indeed, there has been a scarcity of research on leadership in the military (Nazri & Rudi, 2019). In their seminal review article Wong et al. (2003), draws on Hunt to provide a useful distinction between two types of studies in military leadership; studies being based on either a ‘context-free’ or ‘context-specific’ orientation. While the former relies on military samples to make more general claims about leadership, the latter approach is occupied with the distinctiveness of the military context and how this informs leadership.

### ROUNDTABLE PARTICIPANTS

**Ann-Louise Holten** is Associate Professor at the Department of Leadership and Organization, Royal Danish Defence College. Holten received her PhD from the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. Holten's overall research interests include leadership, leadership development, organizational change, and intervention studies. More specifically, she is interested in the nature of leadership and military leadership, how it is developed and applied and with which implications. Holten serves as associate editor for the *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* (JABS) and extended editorial board member of the *Scandinavian Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology* (SJWOP).

**Anders Klitmøller** is Associate Professor at the Department for Leadership and Organization, The Royal Danish Defence College. His current research draws on leadership studies, sociology and philosophy. Research interests include command, complexity thinking, and different aspects of leadership.

**Erik Berntson** is Professor in Leadership and command & control since 2021. Berntson received his PhD from Stockholm University, at the Department of Psychology, where he worked as a senior lecturer until 2021. He is full professor in leadership and command & control at the Swedish Defence College. Berntson's research interest includes how to better understand effective leadership in crisis situations, but also how to prepare individuals and organizations to cope with demanding situations. Gaining knowledge and understanding of such leadership involves studying organizations that operate under extreme conditions such as the Armed Forces and civil contingency agencies. However, the spread of the Coronavirus in 2020, has also emphasized the importance of investigating leadership in operations critical to our society such as health care, elderly care, education and transportation. Gaining understanding of this field also involves the knowledge of related aspects such as work life stress and work environment issues. In his research, focus has been on an interactionist perspective, i.e. how to combine the effects of individual characteristics and the contexts where individuals operate.

**Øyvind Lund Martinsen** is professor in organizational psychology at BI-Norwegian Business School in Oslo, Norway with a PhD in psychology from the University of Bergen in 1995. Martinsen came to BI as associate professor in 1999, but was for a short period employed as chair of the Norwegian Defence University College's department for leadership research in 2007. Later, he became adjunct professor 2011-2018 at the same institution. At BI he was head of department at Department of Leadership and Organizational Behavior 2015-2023 and before that he was associate dean for the executive master of management programme. He has been editor in chief for the Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research since 2008 and his current research projects are aimed at creative personality, personality testing in selection settings, military leadership, 360-degree leadership evaluations, self-leadership and empowerment, and large language models and assessment.

**Peter Olsthoorn** is Associate Professor of Military Leadership and Ethics. He teaches in the fields of ethics, leadership, civil-military relations and media. His research so far has focused on military ethics, military virtues, just war, drones, military medical ethics, leadership and border security.

## 9: DETERRING RUSSIA

**Wednesday September 17: 14:30 – 15:45.** Chair: Ian Bowers, Senior researcher at NDUC, [ibowers@mil.no](mailto:ibowers@mil.no)

### DUMITRU MINZARARI: NATO'S DETERRENCE POSTURE

How credible is NATO's deterrence posture in the Baltic Sea region? The Russian military aggression against Ukraine has renewed the interest of most NATO member states in a more effective deterrence at its eastern flank. The effectiveness of this deterrence posture hinges on the credibility of NATO's commitment to fight against military aggression in the East. Typically, this credibility is assessed in terms of having sufficient capabilities for defence and convincingly signalling the will to fight. The proposed paper explores the weakening of NATO deterrence credibility under the assumption of limited war objectives and identifies three factors driving this reduced credibility.

**Dumitru Minzarari** is a lecturer in security studies in the Department of Political and Strategic Studies at the Baltic Defence College. His research interests focus on modern warfare, determinants of military strategy, interstate conflict below the threshold of conventional war, Russian foreign and security policies, and NATO deterrence on its eastern flank. He received his PhD in political science from the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor and his MA in international affairs from Columbia University in New York.

### JAN A. BISCHOFF: NATO IN THE NORDICS: THE VIEW FROM THE RED SIDE

With Finland and Sweden two very capable militaries have joined NATO. With a length of 1,309 km, the border between Finland and Russia is the longest land border between an EU/NATO-country and Russia. Finland and Sweden have access to the Baltic Sea and could potentially close sea-lines of communication for the Russian Baltic Fleet. Saint Petersburg – home port of Baltic Fleet and Russia's 2<sup>nd</sup> largest city – is now facing NATO countries not only from the south-western direction, but also from a north-western direction. And finally, the entire western border of the Kola peninsula – where

Russia's strategic nuclear facilities are located – is now a NATO border. This did not go unnoticed by Russian side: Allegedly as a reaction to the NATO enlargement and the perceived threat, President Putin announced the dissolution of the Western Military District (WMD) and the reconstitution of the Leningrad Military District (LMD) and the Moscow Military District as of March 1, 2024. The previous Northern Fleet Military District (NFMD) lost its status as military district and became part of the LMD. While previously the responsibility was split up between the NFMD and WMD, now a single joint command is responsible for the Russia's north-western strategic direction – from the Barents Sea to Latvia. The land formations in the LMD are supposed to be reinforced: the 14<sup>th</sup> Army Corps (Murmansk) is supposed to become a full-fledged army, the 6<sup>th</sup> Combined Arms Army (St. Petersburg area) will be reinforced, and the 44<sup>th</sup> Army Corps (Petrozavodsk) has been newly created. Since Finland's and Sweden's accession to NATO, deep-sea cables in the Baltic Sea have been attacked. Likewise, widespread PNT-jamming has occurred. In this paper I propose to take a closer look at potential future options and scenarios, based on the aforementioned developments. What could be the Russian political objectives in the Nordics? How do they translate into military strategic options? What potential lies within the newly envisaged force structure? Under which circumstances is it more likely that would Russia resort to the use of military means – considering the Russian miscalculation in its attack on Ukraine in 2022, but also a potential Russian threat perception? To which degree can Russia achieve its aims by “manoeuvring in the grey-zone”, exploiting (in particular in the information space) existing conflicts about the use of the sea, legal ambiguities, migration, or ethnical Russian minorities. I intend to come up with three concrete scenarios (one rather aggressive, one that is aggressive, but tries to avoid the use of force, and one with a rather defensive posture). I will argue that Russia will flexibly seek to exploit western weakness, but consider the use of force only where it sees an opportunity, in particular when the unity of the Alliance is already disturbed.

**Jan Asmus Bischoff** (PhD, LTC (OF-4, DEU-A)) is currently serving at the NATO Joint Warfare Centre, Stavanger. He is part of JWC's OPFOR Branch and has served as Chief OPFOR for NATO's exercises Steadfast Duel 24 and Steadfast Dagger 24. He studied law at the University of Hamburg, worked for four years as a researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, Hamburg and received the LL.M. degree as Hauser Scholar from New York University, School of Law. From 2011 to 2018, Jan A. Bischoff worked as inhouse legal counsel at a privately-owned bank, as well as attorney in the field of investment arbitration and shipping law. Previously a reserve officer, he joined active service in 2019. From 2019 to 2022, he was a teacher for land tactics at the German Army Officer School at Dresden, Germany, before being posted to JWC.

## **FABIAN HOFFMANN: TARGETING RUSSIA – NORDIC LONG-RANGE STRIKE AND THE FUTURE OF REGIONAL DETERRENCE**

This article examines how small and medium-sized European states can leverage conventional long-range strike weapons to shape regional deterrence dynamics vis-à-vis Russia. While traditionally constrained in their options, small states can now credibly threaten adversary targets at operational and strategic depths, including sub-strategic and strategic nuclear assets. To assess the implications, the article introduces a two-by-two matrix structured around two key variables: whether weapons are used independently or jointly, and whether they are aimed at shaping outcomes and/or perceptions in the conventional warfighting domain or in the nuclear domain. This yields four core mission types – ranging from SEAD/DEAD and deep interdiction to counterforce and countervalue/damage limitation missions – that capture the diverse warfighting and escalation management roles small and medium-state long-range strike arsenals can fulfil. Applying the framework to the Nordic states, the article highlights how these states, despite constraints in ISR and targeting capabilities, are acquiring increasingly sophisticated long-range strike systems. The findings suggest that Nordic arsenals, although originally procured for conventional missions, could support NATO's nuclear deterrence mission by complicating Russian planning, especially at the sub-strategic nuclear level.

**Fabian Hoffmann** is a Doctoral Research Fellow at the Oslo Nuclear Project (ONP), University of Oslo, focusing on missile technology, nuclear strategy, and defense policy. His PhD research explores the strategic-level effects of conventional long-range strike weapons, analyzing their implications for conventional and nuclear deterrence. He has published widely on these topics, including in academic journals, scientific reports, and op-eds for newspapers and magazines. Fabian Hoffmann is also a Non-Resident Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis.

## **OLENA PODVORNA: THE WAR AGAINST UKRAINE AND ITS IMPACT ON SWEDEN'S AND FINLAND'S SECURITY THINKING**

The war against Ukraine has severely affected security thinking and planning of the countries neighbouring Russia, or being located in a close proximity. The war echoed also in the Arctic, where Russia is the biggest state, and has heavily invested in a military build-up in recent years, but also in Northern Europe, including the Baltic Sea region. Sweden and Finland have closely cooperated with the Baltic Sea countries since 2014, and have intensified the cooperation after 2022. This cooperation is security and defense, on bilateral and multilateral levels, got additional meaning after Moscow renewed its Leningrad Military district in 2024. Considering the options to address the rising threat of the Russian Federation, Finland and Sweden have taken the decision to join NATO, which should have given Moscow a clear signal. In its turn NATO has adopted a new Strategy in 2022, which defines Russia as the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO officials recognize that the new more fragile security environment with Russia is the new normal. With the new Trump administration and recent decisions about the US commitments, the security situation in the region is getting more complex and fragile. The proposed presentation is based on the going research project "A new role for NATO role in the High North?" The proposed study analyzes security and foreign policy of European Arctic states (Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, Finland) since 2014 to track the change and continuity vis-à-vis Russia as well as NATO. The paper asks, what is the effect of Russia's war against Ukraine on the European Arctic security and what is the role of NATO in the High North? The methodology is based on a Hoogensen Gjørsv's framework that asks five questions to identify each country's security imaginary (about securitizers, referent objects, values to be secured, prioritized, practices of securing values, understanding of the existential threat). Further, on the basis of answers to these questions, the study asks about security dilemma associated with Russia, and ways how to address it, and about prospective NATO's role in the region. The research seeks to investigate the transformation of European Arctic states (in particular, Sweden and Finland) politics by studying the order of the security in the Arctic and Northern Europe after 2014.

**Dr Olena Podvorna** is an associate Professor at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (Germany). She is leading the research project funded by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG): "A New Role for NATO in the High North? The European Arctic and Russia's War Against Ukraine" focusing on NATO's strategic shift in the Arctic, change in security understanding and practices in European Arctic countries due to two Russian invasions of Ukraine. Research interests include international relations, international security, security processes in the Arctic, transatlantic relationships, Russia, Ukraine.

# 10: CHALLENGES OF MULTI-DOMAIN OPERATIONS

**Wednesday September 17: 14:30 – 15:45.** Chair: Søren Sjøgren, Chief Editor of SJMS, [sosj@fak.dk](mailto:sosj@fak.dk).

## ROY DE RUITER: ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND MDO, THE MISSING LINK

The differences between fighting and surviving on land, at sea, or in the air – we can add cyber and space to the quotation for that matter – are fundamentally distinct, requiring different ways of thinking and functioning. For a soldier, sailor, or airman, these rules are not only essential but often taken for granted. This explains why communication between a soldier and a sailor can sometimes be like cat and dog. Moreover, the unique characteristics of each domain are often tacit, making them difficult to discern. (Mansoor and Murray, 2019). These differences can significantly impact joint operations and even result in intense Rivalries (see for example Kagan, 2006). This is even more challenging in Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) because it requires a seamless integration across all domains. (Perkins & James, 2018). To move from cooperation to integration a profound understanding and appreciation of all domains is pivotal (Spears, 2019). Unfortunately, understanding the characteristics of services has proved to be challenging. Although, many scholars recognise the influence of organisational culture, few have delved into identifying the underlying basis assumptions of an organisational culture (Farrell, 1998). Even organisations themselves struggle to define their identity, let alone write it down. In response to the need for a deeper understanding of the underlying cultural dynamics organizational theorist Edgar Schein introduced the concept of organizational culture. (Schein, 2010). In this tradition, Defence specialist Carl Builder described the underlying assumptions of the organizational culture of the United States Army, Navy and Air Force (Builder, 1989). While this provides a starting point for many studies, it focuses solely on the American armed forces, which of course is a league at its own (Zimmerman et al, 2019; Nielsen, 2003; Kier, 1997). Recognising these gaps, this study aims to deepen our understanding of organizational culture within armed forces of smaller nations, taking the Netherlands as a case study. The Netherlands is an interesting case because it considers MDO as the guiding principle for the armed forces and its history of relatively independent services, which also influences professional military education (PME) and limited attention paid to joint and multi-domain operations (Ministerie van Defensie, 2020; Honig, 1993; de Ruiter, 2018; de Wijk & Osinga, 2010).<sup>2</sup> This paper first reviews the challenges in understanding military domain differences and service characteristics. It then updates Builder's model using a mixed-methods approach, combining a literature review and a survey among students of the Netherlands Joint Staff College. The outcome is a model better suited to help understand the organisational culture of the armed forces of smaller nations, incorporating factors such as the influence of allies. This model can also serve as an instrument to enhance domain knowledge at all levels of PME to better prepare future military leaders for MDO. Finally, the insights provided by this paper can benefit international cooperation by offering a better understanding of the differences.

**Commander Roy de Ruiter** is Associate Professor in Naval Strategy at the Faculty of Military Science and Lector of the Netherlands Defence College. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Amsterdam. The focus of his research is sea power, defence policy, the transformation of military organizations and military education.

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<sup>2</sup> Ironically, the services do provide domain specific land, sea and air power courses, however those are primarily aimed at their own servicemembers (Pieter B. Soldaat and Gijs P. Tuinman, "Officieren weer leren vechten," Militaire spectator 192, no. 3 (2023), 118)

## MICHAEL MAYER: ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE, EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, AND THE FUTURE OF MULTIDOMAIN OPERATIONS IN THE ARCTIC

Technological developments have improved battlefield situational awareness, including sensor proliferation on satellites and unmanned systems with reduced size, weight and energy requirements enabling data processing on the tactical edge and leveraging artificial intelligence applications for data processing and analysis. In Ukraine, small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) with data links to artillery or long-range precision strike capabilities have resulted in an increasingly compressed cycle of find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA). The competition between seekers and hidiers will continue to intensify, particularly in the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) where emissions more easily reveal a unit's position and expose it to attack. This development alone has significant tactical and operational implications. The implementing of Multi-domain Operations (MDO) as a warfighting concept throughout NATO emphasizes coordination and synchronization of effects across warfighting domains. This is likely to increase the importance of data-sharing and robust communication links amid intensifying competition within the EMS. Electromagnetic warfare (EW) is therefore projected to become even more relevant. EW includes *electromagnetic support* (detecting and exploiting adversary emissions), *electromagnetic attack* (deceiving, disrupting, degrading and destroying adversary EM capabilities), and *electromagnetic defense* of one's own electromagnetic operations. Emerging and potentially disruptive technologies (EDTs) such as artificial intelligence, autonomy, quantum sensors, and materials science will influence various aspects of this competition in the spectrum. New technologies and tactics will improve the ability to detect emissions and disrupt communications, requiring novel ways for forces to hide, move and communicate while managing, limiting, hiding or obscuring their electromagnetic signatures. The Arctic is a region that has attracted considerable attention due to its perceived geostrategic role, driven in large part by expectations regarding increased access to transport routes from the likely effects of climate change such as receding sea ice. Military operations in the Arctic are particularly challenging due to its harsh and austere environment. Technologies that function well in other environments are often ineffective in the Arctic. Furthermore, the region has some unique properties that are particularly relevant for EW, including limited civilian infrastructure and a relatively quiet electromagnetic environment, combined with the ionospheric disturbance related to the aurora borealis. How might emerging and potentially disruptive technologies (EDT) influence the systems and techniques related to electromagnetic warfare (EW) and what consequences might this have for future military operations in the Arctic? This research includes a review existing literature, interviews with practitioners and researchers, as well as foresight techniques such as horizon scanning to identify a number of emerging technologies that are particularly relevant for EW, discuss the growing importance of EW for MDO, and explore how these technologically enhanced EW capabilities may be relevant in Arctic multidomain operations. One main finding is that some technologies are maturing so rapidly that militaries have yet to leverage the range of existing possibilities, let alone consider the potential of tomorrow's technology.

**Michael Mayer** (PhD) is a senior researcher at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), specializing in strategic foresight and the effects of emerging technologies on future military operations. Mayer has published several books and numerous articles on the strategic and operational implications of military technology, including topics such as ballistic missile defense, drone warfare, additive manufacturing, and machine intelligence in weapons systems. He lectures frequently at the Norwegian Defence University College.

## ANNE OBLING AND SØREN SJØGREN: THE OPTIMISTIC COLLABORATOR

Warfighting concepts come with the ambition of winning wars. NATO's recent concept about multiple domain operations (MDO) aims to address challenges on the battlefield in an increasingly uncertain and interconnected world. On paper, the essence of NATO's MDO concept is to *orchestrate* what the military controls and, through collaboration with an ever-broadening range of stakeholders, *synchronize* activities and capabilities of other actors that can help the military achieve its objectives. This is a far more expansive definition than the traditional notion of command and control in the form of exercising authority to direct and coordinate assigned units. MDO creates new expectations and challenges for military leadership, which have not been adequately addressed despite the recent interest in this area. An emerging optimistic picture of a holistic, empowered, cross-domain leader-facilitator-collaborator fails to reflect the reality of senior military commanders. We explore this point in an interview study with former and current senior military commanders in NATO and the UN (n=45). Inspired by Parker Follett's insights on executive leadership, the analysis reveals how external adjustments and horizontal coordination work is based on personal relations and trust relationships. It also illustrates how higher command necessitates strategic acumen and a readiness to incorporate and trust non-military stakeholders, sometimes even marginalising the military component in the overall plan. However, synchronising with non-military actors and orchestrating rather than commanding also entails relinquishing control. This flatter, faster, and loosely coupled approach challenges the military staff organisation and traditional notions of civil-military relations. Consequently, the military organisation often reverts to conventional command and control, a subset of orchestration, failing to recognise the potential benefits it could uncover beyond traditional methods. This indicates that the conventional military command structure may not be adequate for MDO.

**Anne Roelsgaard Obling** is associate professor at Department for Leadership and Organization, The Royal Danish Defense College (RDDC). Her main research interests are in public organizations, notably military organizations, and the impact of social change on professional roles, work arrangements, people and management.

**Søren Sjøgren** holds a PhD in philosophy and is an active duty infantry officer currently serving as Head of Research at the Institute for Military Operations, Royal Danish Defence College. His research focuses on military operations, command, decision-making, doctrine, and planning. He is also one of the editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies.

## 11: THE POLITICIZATION OF THE MILITARY IN DEMOCRACIES

**Wednesday September 17: 14:30 – 15:45.** Chair: Christoph Harig, Chief Editor of SJMS, [chha@fak.dk](mailto:chha@fak.dk).

Description of the panel: In many democracies, we see the growing influence of the military in internal and electoral politics as well as role expansion into tasks typically undertaken by civilian state institutions—a phenomenon we term 'politicization of the military'. This might in some cases be driven by military initiative, but very often derives from politicians' efforts of pulling the military into contentious domestic partisan politics. These dynamics raise important questions about the health and well-being of democracies, including about the robustness of civilian control, erosion of norms of civil-military relations, and displacement of civilian functions and growing military influence in state institutions. This panel uses case studies from Europe and Latin America in order to unpack how

the process of ‘politicization’ actually unfolds. It identifies pathways that can potentially lead to politicization, discuss how politicization occurs or not, and finally discusses consequences for civil-military relations as well as for the state of democracy.

## SIMON J. SMITH AND THOMAS CROSBIE: THE “TRUE ASPECTS” OF BRITISH MILITARY POLITICS – POLITICIZATION AND THE BRITISH ARMED FORCES

In 2021, Andrew Dorman argued that an ‘increasing politicization’ has been evident in the senior end of the British officer corps. This chapter takes this claim as a baseline to further examine the current state of military politicization in the United Kingdom. We aim to understand the degree to which this politicization is still evident, and to what degree (if any) it is deepening. First, we provide a theoretical foundation for our analysis and a brief summary of British civil-military relations dynamics from 1945 to 2016, which serve as the background for our analysis. In Part 2, we analyse media coverage of the three Chiefs of the Defence Staff (CDSs) from 2016 to the present, namely Sir Stuart Peach, Sir Nick Carter, and Sir Tony Radakin. Our goal with that analysis is to understand how Britain’s most senior officers were framed and interpolated (differently from one another) by an increasingly fractious media over the time period, indicating both the degree to which the British Armed Forces were pulled into domestic politics, and the political mind-sets of the officers themselves as they responded to a long series of crises. Ultimately, we seek to determine if patent politicizing acts have led to a reconfiguration of UK domestic politics in a way that would suggest a further intensification of the politicization of the officer corp.

**Simon J. Smith** is currently Associate Professor of Security and International Relations at the Royal Danish Defence College and ‘Scholar in Residence’ at the Center for War and Society at San Diego State University. He is also Editor-in-Chief of *Defence Studies*, Visiting Professor at the College of Europe, and a Fellow of the Higher Education Academy.

**Thomas Crosbie** is a sociologist and associate professor of military operations at the Royal Danish Defence College. He is the author of *The Political Army: How the U.S. Military Learned to Manage the Media and Public Opinion* (Columbia, 2025), series editor of the Military Politics series with Berghahn Books, and co-editor of the *Oxford Handbook of Professional Military Education* (Oxford, under contract).

## ANDREW IVEY: GUARDING THE GUARDIANS? POLITICIZATION OF MEXICO’S ARMED FORCES

Mexico is in many ways, a paradoxical case. Though the majority of Latin American nations experienced a prolonged period of military dictatorship during the Cold War, Mexico’s military never seized political power for itself. However, the current Mexican Armed Forces remain one of the most autonomous militaries in the Americas. Troublingly, the political aloofness which has formed the basis of a civil military “pact” in Mexico has been increasingly violated and disregarded. Mexico’s former president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018-2024) has dragged the military into partisan politics. This paper uses process tracing, textual analysis, and publicly available data from the armed forces to show Obrador’s successful politicizing acts in undermining the partisan neutrality of Mexico’s military. He has done so by giving the military institutional control over infrastructure projects to safeguard his political legacy, ranging from the management of railways to luxury hotels. He has also ensured that law enforcement and internal security will remain a long-term mission for the armed forces through the creation of a nominally civilian though functionally military “National Guard” staffed and operated by active-duty military personnel. Finally, he has tied the military to his

own partisan agenda, using the symbolism of the armed forces to legitimize his so-called “fourth transformation” of Mexican politics.

**Andrew Ivey** is currently a Visiting Assistant Professor at Bentley University’s Department of Global Studies. His research branches civil-military relations, police reform, and democratic backsliding. He has published in *Armed Forces & Society*, *Democratization*, *Democracy & Security*, *Defense & Security Studies* as well as several prestigious scholarly edited volumes.

## **CHRISTOPH HARIG: COMPLEX PATHWAYS TO POLITICIZATION OF THE MILITARY IN BRAZIL**

The military has historically played an outsized role in Brazilian politics. Against the background of these already highly politically involved armed forces, the last decade has brought a level of politicization that was unprecedented in democratic Brazil. Most visibly, several off-duty and in some cases even active-duty military officers joined the government of Jair Bolsonaro (2018-2022). How can we then understand the military leadership’s efforts to present themselves as ‘adults in the room’ in a government led by a maverick president? Analysing media reports, interviews and media contributions by military officers, this paper will highlight methodological challenges of assessing the politicization of the military. Although the military leadership successfully spun a media narrative of officers having reluctantly joined the government or even of trying to stop the president’s most damaging policies, it is clear that backing Bolsonaro was a conscious choice. The unprecedented politicization in the Bolsonaro government was the result of a combined effort of the Brazilian military’s upper echelons to support a president who was and is an ideologically very close ally of the armed forces’ political aims. In the end, high-ranking military leaders even supported a coup plot – and yet the military succeeded in maintaining the narrative that not the institution, but only rogue individuals had backed the coup plot.

**Christoph Harig** is Associate Professor at the Centre for Joint Operations - Institute for Military Operations, Royal Danish Defence College in Copenhagen. He holds a PhD in Security Studies from King’s College London and is a Chief Editor of the *Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies*. Christoph’s research interests include civil-military relations, military sociology, public security, and international organisations. His work has appeared in journals such as *International Affairs*, *Review of International Studies*, *European Journal of International Security*, and *International Peacekeeping*.

## **ALBERTO BUENO: MILITARY OFFICERS IN POLITICS: REASSESSING SPAIN’S CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS**

The success of the Spanish military reform is attributed to the establishment of robust civilian control over the armed forces, in line with Huntingtonian principles (Serra, 2008). Since then, Spanish military professionalism has been characterised by the strengthening of an apolitical ethos. Over the past decade, however, this principle has been increasingly challenged by the political engagement of retired and reserve military officers, who have entered political parties and assumed parliamentary or other political positions. This study adopts an exploratory approach to investigate this phenomenon, guided by the following research questions: How many retired and reserve Spanish military officers have entered politics? What are their profiles and what political activities have they engaged in? The paper starts from a key premise in civil-military relations studies: whether the armed forces are pluralistic and/or reflect the pluralism of Spanish society. By engaging with broader debates on military professionalism (Brooks, 2020; Feaver, 1996; Janowitz, 1960), retired officers’ endorsements and participation in party politics (Huntington, 1957; Desch, 1999), and the politicisation of armed forces (Finer, 1962; Cawood & McDonough, 2019), this paper provides new empirical insights into civil-military dynamics. The methodology employs a mixed qualitative approach, consisting primarily of desk research on military figures within Spanish political

institutions, particularly the bicameral Spanish parliament. To address the premise, I draw on a survey conducted among political, military, and business elites in Spain, as part of a previous research project in which I was a member of the research team. The findings contribute to both Spanish and international scholarship by reassessing the assumed stability of Spain's military professionalism and examining the evolving patterns of military involvement in democratic politics.

**Alberto Bueno** is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Administration at the University of Granada and a member of its Institute of Peace and Conflict. He is an adjunct professor at the University of Leipzig (Germany) and a Non-Resident Fellow at UTSYN – Centre for Security and Total Defence (Norway). His research focuses on defense and national security policy, strategic culture, and civil-military relations. He is currently the principal researcher of the project "Military Operations", funded by the Spanish Army's Training and Doctrine Command.

## **DAMON COLETTA: SLOW DIFFUSION: THE FUNCTIONAL IMPERATIVE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA**

Pakistan faces enormous security challenges. Its greatest threat is a rising neighbour that may soon bid for regional hegemony regardless of Pakistan's nuclear deterrent. From the spectrum of available disruptive technologies, space capabilities could level the conventional battlefield against India and restore military balance in South Asia. Yet, Pakistan, without warning, slips further behind in space innovation. Pakistan possesses financial and scientific capital to absorb lessons from the West, but the troubled democracy internally takes national security decisions under what civ-mil scholar Peter Feaver terms "professional supremacist" relations. Professional supremacy in decision making predisposes Pakistan to stick with a shopworn concept of aerospace force, more palatable to professional military pilots who came of age during the 1990 First Gulf War. The case of Pakistan demonstrates how, even under intense external security threat, suboptimal civil-military relations can thwart diffusion of military innovation in ways that destabilize the international balance of power. Liberal democracy in Scandinavia is far stronger than in Pakistan. Even so, if suboptimal civil-military relations can constrict technological diffusion in the South Asian case, a similar mechanism could constrain defense technology transfer between the United States and NATO Allies in Europe. While there is no expectation that relations between the United States and longtime allies in Scandinavia will deteriorate as sharply compared to the volatility in U.S.-Pakistan cooperation, transatlantic relations are being tested after three years of Russia waging war in Ukraine. Should European Allies accept greater responsibility for security in Ukraine, urgency for defense innovation in Scandinavia may climb just as technological diffusion from the United States becomes more sensitive to the condition of civil-military relations in Scandinavian receiving countries. It may be in the national interest, for example, if military-military cooperation with the United States continues, possibly advances, even when transatlantic political commitments are receding. While Scandinavian democracies are less susceptible to professional-supremacist civil-military relations, as Samuel Huntington emphasized in *Soldier in the State*, there is significant potential for societies steeped in liberalism to force a form of politicization of the military. Senior officers continue to acquire professional skills as they ascend toward the nexus of civil-military decision making, but once they are providing military expertise as direct input on national security policy for civilian authority, the advice, imperceptibly at first, becomes shaded toward what one civilian faction or other most wants to hear. Such politicization, or deviation from the standard of objective control, is not as obvious as professional supremacy in Pakistan and other countries seeking rapid development. Politicization of civil-military relations under democracy can nevertheless slow the diffusion of military technology and hamper the nation's ability to fulfil its functional imperative. Even though the two cases of Pakistan and Scandinavia are different on the surface, the operative civil-military mechanism is quite

general. Subjective civilian control can slow technological diffusion, which compromises national security whenever the external threat grows and the functional imperative becomes more urgent.

**Note:** The paper will be presented by Thomas Crosbie and Christoph Harig. **Damon Coletta** is Professor of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy. He edits the Eisenhower Center peer-reviewed journal, *Space & Defense*, and, with several articles and book chapters, authored a monograph on technology and international security, *Courting Science: Securing the Foundation for a Second American Century* (Stanford University Press, 2016). He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Duke University; a Master's in Public Policy (S&T) from the Harvard Kennedy School; and a Master's and Bachelor's in Electrical Engineering from Stanford University.

## 12: THE FUTURE OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP

**Wednesday September 17: 14:30 – 15:45**

Chair: Anders Klitmøller, associate professor at RDDC, [ankl@fak.dk](mailto:ankl@fak.dk)

### **ÜLLE SÄÄLIK, ANTEK KASEMAA AND TIIA-TRIIN TRUUSA: “TODAY A FOLLOWER, TOMORROW A LEADER?”: RESERVE PLATOON LEADERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF LEADER COMPETENCIES DURING THE ROLE ACQUISITION PROCESS**

Military leaders’ perception of their role affects their work performance and their subordinates’ commitment and work satisfaction (e.g. Karakowsky et al., 2012; Mallick et al., 2016). Leaders play a significant role in nurturing the ties between the individual and the organisation as the research shows that satisfaction with the organisation results in higher productivity and positive work-related attitudes (van Dick et al., 2005). To take on a role in an organisation, the norms and expected behaviour (as competencies) that best serve this organisation need to be introduced, especially in the military, and training is a good place for doing so (Grojean & Thomas, 2006). However, what if the people in training to be leaders come from amongst the soldiers, the followers, as in armies employing conscription and reserve-based defence models – how do they see the role of a military leader, and what kind of difficulties they experience when going through the role acquisition process? The study focuses on reserve platoon leaders’ (RPL) perception of the role of military leaders, expressed through pre- and post-course self-analyses written during reserve platoon leader’s training. The results of the qualitative content analysis based on the leader competency model (Säälik et al., 2020) revealed the relative importance of a leader's interpersonal and management competencies in pre-course perceptions and a sharp rise in the critical importance of intrapersonal competencies in the end of the course. The course participants discussed self-related issues such as self-confidence versus insecurity, individual strong and weak suits, coping with emotional self-regulation and behavioural reactions. Additionally, RPLs were concerned about the relationship with former peers after adopting the role of a leader. The results indicate that RPL courses, in addition to teaching tactical skills, need to address human-related and intrapersonal competencies to support the adoption and execution of the role of RPL.

**Ülle Säälük** is an associate professor and field lead of pedagogy at the Estonian Military Academy. With the background of Educational Sciences, she is also active as a researcher and involved in the development activities of the academy. Her research interests include leader development and leader competencies, studies about leadership, morale, personality, identity and role.

**Antek Kasemaa (not presenting)** is a lecturer at the Baltic Defence College.

**Tiia-Triin Truusa (not presenting)** works at the Baltic Defence College and is a research fellow at the University of Tartu.

## MORTEN BRÆNDER AT AL.: MILITARY LEADERSHIP – WHERE TO? A COMPREHENSIVE LITERATURE REVIEW

In 2003, Wong, Bliese, & McGurk conducted what they termed a “context-specific review” of the literature on military leadership, distinguishing between “System-level”, “Organisational level” and “Direct leadership-level” contributions. In this study, we present a similar but updated initiative to mapping military leadership research. In one way our scope is broader. With our approach, we yield a significantly higher number of observations, not only because we have 20 more years of research to draw on, but also because the machine-learning tools in use are able to cover a much broader span of journals. On the other, our focus is narrower, as we deliberately centre on challenges identified by military personnel and decision makers. With this updated, comprehensive and focused review, we aim not only to demonstrate the main trends in current military leadership studies but also to identify important gaps and thus point to the most fruitful ways forward in this field of research.

**Morten Brænder** is associate Professor, Ph.d. and member of the direction at the King Frederik Center for Public Leadership at Aarhus University (Denmark). He currently serves as Head of the Section in Political Sociology at the Department of Political Science and has contributed to research in military sociology and leadership by studying soldier motivation and officer values. He is the former President and current secretary of the European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS). He also sits on the Programme Committee of the Inter-University Seminar of Armed Forces and Society (IUSAFS).

**Florian Keppeler (not presenting)** is associate Professor at the King Frederik Center for Public Leadership, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University. His research profile is comprised of three primary research areas: (1) public policy and administration issues related to recruitment, selection, and retention of the public workforce, (2) the role of artificial intelligence (AI) in public policy and administration, (3) field experiments in behavioral public policy and administration, understanding how to motivate citizens to contribute to public goods.

**Rune Godske-Bachman (not presenting)** is a research assistant and responsible for communications at the King Frederik Center for Public Leadership, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University. Rune has published on job attractiveness in the Public Sector, conducted research with the Danish Home Guard, and studied anti-harassment initiatives in the Danish Armed Forces.

## ALLA SKOMOROVSKY: THE ROLES OF LEADERSHIP PERCEPTIONS AND MORALE IN THE WELL-BEING OF CANADIAN ARMED FORCES MEN AND WOMEN

Psychological well-being is vital to the success of military operations and the overall health and fitness of service members. Negative attitudes about leadership and low morale have been linked to increased psychological distress among military members, which can be an indicator of poor mental health. However, when military personnel report distress, a supportive response helps alleviate emotional strain and enhances morale, fostering a more positive work environment (Bell et al., 2014). Despite the challenges related to military life that can affect well-being, boosting morale is crucial as morale emerges as a pivotal element in individual and organizational outcomes (Ivey, 2014). Positive attitudes about leadership were found to play an important role in boosting morale (Michaud et al.,

2024). While the importance of effective leadership is well recognized, it is less clear if morale explains the relationship between attitudes about leadership and psychological distress. Moreover, some evidence suggests that the links between perceptions of leadership and well-being depend on gender (Collins et al., 2014; Faizan et al., 2018); specifically, transformational leadership had a greater effect on reducing psychological distress among women compared to men. However, it is unclear if gender remains a key factor in explaining psychological distress when morale is taken into account. Therefore, this study examined the roles of morale and attitudes about leadership in psychological distress among Regular Force Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) men and women. The “Your Say Matters: Defence Team Well-Being Survey” was administered to assess well-being factors among Regular Force CAF members ( $N=4,483$ ). Mediation analyses were conducted to examine the role of morale in the relationships between three measures of leadership—satisfaction with organizational leadership, confidence in organizational leadership, and supervisors’ transformational leadership behaviours—and psychological distress among CAF men and women. Greater satisfaction with organizational leadership, confidence in organizational leadership, and transformational leadership were related to greater morale, which, in turn, was related to reduced psychological distress. There were no gender differences in satisfaction with organizational leadership and confidence in organizational leadership; morale consistently served as a partial mediator in both models. However, some gender differences emerged in the effects of transformational leadership: while it remained a predictor of psychological distress among men even when morale was taken into account, it was no longer significant among women, suggesting that morale fully mediated this relationship among CAF women. These findings underscore the impact of both morale and attitudes about leadership on psychological distress. This study adds to the military well-being research by providing evidence on the differential impact of transformational leadership on military men and women and highlights the need for tailored best practices to better support military members in the domains of well-being and organizational culture. By gaining a deeper understanding of the relationships between morale, leadership attitudes, as well as their roles in psychological distress, organizational improvements can be implemented to foster positive leadership styles with the ultimate goal of maintaining and improving the well-being of military members.

**Alla Skomorovsky** has a PhD in experimental social psychology from Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. Since 2005, she has been working as a defence scientist at Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis (DGMPPRA), Department of National Defence, in Ottawa, Canada. Currently, she is a section head in DGMPPRA. She conducts quantitative and qualitative research in the areas of organizational health and well-being, as well stress and resilience of military families.

## 13: DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR POLICY

**Wednesday September 17: 16.00 – 17:15.** Chair: Amalie Theussen, associate professor, RDDC, amth@fak.dk

### JAN FRELIN ET AL.: NATOS FORWARD LAND FORCES

In the early morning of 18 January 2025, a ship carrying 600 Swedish soldiers and materiel arrived in the port of Riga, ready to participate in NATO’s Multinational Brigade in Latvia. Although this is Sweden’s first contribution to an ally since it became a NATO member in 2024, Sweden has a long history of contributing to international military operations. Therefore, this study explores in what way NATO’s Forward Land Forces in Latvia is a new type of international military operation for the Swedish Armed Forces. What similarities and differences are there between this operation, and

previous out-of-area operations? There is currently a debate in the peacekeeping literature on whether peacekeeping operations are founded on deterrence as a key component, or if they contribute to peace processes in other ways. This study contributes to the literature in two ways: by exploring the similarities and differences between previous peacekeeping operations and NATO deterrence and defense operations, as well as by researching a case that is understudied in the literature, NATO's Forward Land Forces. This study explores the research questions by conducting 12 semi-structured interviews from December 2024 to April 2025. Interviews are conducted with representatives from various military units related to the Forward Land Forces Latvia, such as the host nation Latvia, the framework nation Canada, one of the contributing nations (Sweden), and the Multinational Division North. Interviews are also conducted with government officials and academic researchers. The preliminary findings of the study suggest that Sweden's contribution to the Forward Land Forces includes characteristics that are distinctly different from previous out-of-area operations, but that the different types of operations also share several traits. The contribution appears new in following ways: 1) it is the first contribution on allied territory (as opposed to out-of-area), 2) the host nation in this case is a friendly democracy, 3) the host nation's threat overlaps with Sweden's threat perception, and 4) the potential end-game of the operation (i.e. to *defend* allied territory). However, in other ways the contribution to NATO's Forward Land Forces appears similar to previous international operations: 1) it is a military operation outside of Sweden's borders, 2) the logistical challenges of moving personnel and materiel abroad, and 3) the related legal aspects. In previous international operations, deterrence and defense was mentioned explicitly in KFOR's mission statement from NATO. The debate on deterrence in the peacekeeping literature indicates there may have been implicit deterrence mandates in other operations as well. Thus, it seems the main difference between this operation and previous international operations is not the stated mission as such, but the context: deploying in a mission to a friendly ally, but with the potential of facing a peer adversary.

**Jan Frelin** is a Deputy Research Director at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). His focus areas include international military missions, counterinsurgency operations, military doctrine issues, evaluation and monitoring of military operations, evaluation of conflict prevention and peace-building activities, scenario planning and current conflict.

**Anna Lövström Svedin (not presenting)** is an analyst at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). Her research focuses on international military missions, specifically studying the implications of Sweden's NATO membership for the Swedish Armed Forces. Additionally, she researches civil-military medical cooperation, wargaming, and research ethics when studying Russia's war against Ukraine. Her background is in peace and conflict studies from Uppsala University.

**Elin Jakobsson (not presenting)** is a researcher at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).

## JULIAN PAWLAK: (UN-) CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS AT EUROPE'S NORDIC-BALTIC SHORES: INTEGRATING DETERRENCE

European nations in and outside NATO must respond to numerous strategic challenges, related to Russia, the maritime domain, and beyond. The Nordic-Baltic region remains a linchpin: next to the issue of fostering collective defense to deter any kind of armed conflict initiated by Russia, the increasing grey-zone challenge is omnipresent. In that regard, incidents in the maritime domain, particularly against critical underwater infrastructure (CUI), are unique. Those actions complicate the attribution process, hindering traditional deterrence strategies. Next to the frequent deniability, an overly aggressive response may prompt Russia to suggesting a need to react and even escalate. Inaction, on the contrary, risks signalling acquiescence and potentially encouraging further attacks (Gricius, 2025). NATO and Europe must acknowledge it as part of a multi-layered campaign to stress vulnerabilities, test Western reaction, surge distrust, and eventually level the field for a potential conflict (Watling, 2024). As some analysts suggest, a deterrence vacuum is opening (Nielsen, 2025).

And in fact, today the European challenge more than ever is about deterrence. This article focusses on the conceptual and policy approach to deal with the multi-layered attacks Russia is waging against the West. In such, conventional deterrence and collective defense cannot be separated from sub-threshold activities in the grey-zone. Focusing on the maritime domain, it highlights the need to adapt deterrence by denial, punishment, and detection questioning existing ideas of integrated deterrence. The methodological, conceptual approach follows a combination of traditional deterrence efforts, considers the influence of hybrid warfare literature, and adds modern approaches of integrated deterrence whilst considering its core idea of NATO's flexible response strategy. The article's findings suggest that while advancements and increasing dependencies on CUI create vulnerabilities, they also present opportunities for deterrence that must be addressed through multilateral cooperation and multidomain action. The suggested approach picks up elements of the concept of integrated deterrence to offer ways forward by highlighting conceptual and policy actions for a potential deterrence conglomerate. It speaks on the one hand to the existing deterrence literature, on the other addresses the yet limited discussion of maritime critical infrastructure and its relevance for deterrence itself.

**Julian Pawlak** is a researcher at the University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg and the German Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies (GIDS). His research focusses on questions pertaining to strategy, security, and defense in the maritime domain and NATO's Northern and Eastern Flank in particular. Julian has been Visiting Fellow at the Swedish Defence University's Department for War Studies and Military History in 2023 and is also NextGen Associate Fellow at the NATO Defense College since 2024.

## **ADELINA TROLLE ANDERSEN: WHY UMBRELLA STATES OPPOSE THEIR NUCLEAR PATRON: THE CASE OF NORWAY'S PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE IN THE NORDIC REGION**

Why do small states in asymmetric alliances oppose their nuclear security guarantor? We expect small states in security alliances to be compliant with their patron's, the state that extends their nuclear deterrence, desires. Umbrella states, i.e., states that do not have nuclear weapons themselves but are protected by a nuclear state, tend to fear being abandoned by their patron. The patron on the other hand tends to fear being entrapped in conflicts over interests they do not share. In the alliance literature, this is known as a dilemma between abandonment and entrapment (Snyder, 1997). Based on this assumption, it is rational by umbrella states to be loyal to their nuclear patron. Yet, in 1981, Alexander Haig, US Secretary of State, threatened to withdraw Norway's security guarantee. Norway, also a founding member of NATO, had proposed to establish a Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NNWFZ), a regional ban (through agreement) on deployment, development, and transport of nuclear weapons. The Norwegian proposal pushed the limits of US acceptance. How Norway proposes a policy that face this threat from its' principal security guarantor, is puzzling. In this article, I will therefore analyze the decision-making process behind Norway's proposal to establish a NNWFZ in 1981. The analysis of the Norwegian decision-making process will be based on archival material from the Norwegian National Archived and the Norwegian Labour Movement's Archives, governmental documents, and memoirs. The ambition of this article is threefold: to critically examine existing theories of state behaviour in asymmetrical alliances, to increase our knowledge on umbrella states in general (through theory development), and, through primary sources, the Norwegian case in particular. This shows that three arguments were invoked during the process: i) opponents feared abandonment, ii) proponents desired instrumental autonomy, and iii) proponents desired expressionistic autonomy. Thus, the alliance dilemma for umbrella states is better framed as one between concern of abandonment and desire for autonomy. Intra-alliance opposition by umbrella

states was in this case explained by a desire for autonomy rather than by fears of entrapment. Importantly, an examination of the decision-making process itself also illustrates the challenges of judging specific policy's rationality. The strategic implications of the policy resulted from management of the conflict between strategic considerations and domestic programmes. While Norway was accused of nuclear free-riding, I instead argue that the policy was not a result of utility maximizing behavior, but an unintended side-effect of solving domestic disregard for alliance policy, instead of intentional exploitation by patron states.

**Adelina Trolle Andersen** is a doctoral research fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS), Defence University College. For her dissertation she studies Norwegian nuclear policy. Andersen has been part of the research programme Norwegian security policy in strategic perspective since January 2021. Her first project in this programme focused on changes in U.S. nuclear policy and implications in the High North.

## HASINI LIYANAGE: NUCLEAR SHARING IN NATO: REVISITING THE PATRON-PROTÉGÉ RELATIONSHIP

This article revisits NATO's nuclear-sharing diplomacy through the lens of the patron-protégé dilemma, asking how the United States managed two strategically vital yet domestically recalcitrant allies—Denmark and Norway—during the Alliance's formative decades. Drawing on archival material, the study pairs two junctures when Washington sought Nordic cooperation on atomic deployments: the initial basing negotiations of 1949-1953 and the intensified sharing debates of 1960-1963. Process tracing shows that U.S. tactics hinged on a shifting calculus of leverage defined by four conditions: (1) the density of veto players and anti-nuclear norms in Oslo and Copenhagen; (2) the maturation of NATO's consultative machinery, which raised reputational costs for overt coercion; (3) crisis-driven perceptions of Soviet threat; and (4) the differing geostrategic redundancy of Norwegian versus Danish territory. When leverage appeared high, Washington employed inducements and, briefly, deadlines; when low, it relied on procedural ambiguity, allowing contingency access while respecting public bans. The comparison reveals why Norway's "base-policy-without-bases" endured with minimal pressure, whereas Denmark faced sharper linkage over Greenland's early-warning role. By clarifying how great powers adjust incentives, ambiguity, and coercion, the article refines theories of nuclear patronage and offers historical guidance for today's Arctic deterrence debates.

**Hasini Liyanage** is a Doctoral Research Fellow at the Oslo Nuclear Project of the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo. Her research focuses on extended nuclear deterrence and alliance dynamics and nuclear non-proliferation. She also works on international criminal law and laws of war.

## STEPAN YAKYMIK: NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK: SECURITY AND DEFENCE CHALLENGES BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE WAR IN THE BLACK SEA 2022- 2025 (ONLINE)

The effective integration of new states into military-political alliances, in particular Sweden and Finland - into NATO, depends not only on the success of adaptation to the functioning of the alliance, but also on the degree of readiness to respond to modern security and defense challenges. The experience of Russia's war against Ukraine on the Black Sea testified to the loss of effectiveness of the security mechanisms created to prevent threats. Also, in the course of hostilities, there was a need to respond to a defensive challenge, which consisted in the significant superiority of Russia's capabilities at sea and required finding ways to respond. Lessons from the experience of Russia's war against Ukraine at sea in the context of security and defense issues; identification of security and

defense challenges that may lead to the start of war, as well as arise in the conditions of its peaceful settlement; factors affecting the effectiveness of security and maritime defense by the new states of the alliance; recommendations for responding to security and defense challenges at sea. The method of analyzing military operations at the operational and strategic level and synthesis of lessons from war experience; a method of analyzing the effectiveness of responding to security and defense challenges; synthesis method in determining recommendations for ways to respond to security and defense challenges. The main conclusions are: 1. Traditional mechanisms for ensuring the security of states at sea, including countries that are members of a military-political alliance, are ineffective due to the failure to take into account hybrid methods of influence. Using the norms of international maritime law, the aggressor state in a hybrid way destabilizes the situation and uses weak points to reduce readiness for resistance. 2. Security mechanisms (initiatives, operations) at sea are ineffective due to the fact that one of the states participating in the initiative turns out to be an aggressor. Under such conditions, this initiative cannot be used to prevent or stop aggression. This requires early creation of an international initiative (operation), which should not involve a potential aggressor state. One of the biggest defense challenges can be a significant advantage of the aggressor state in military capabilities. However, in the case of using asymmetric methods and the latest technologies, this advantage can be neutralized. Before the start of the aggression, it is necessary to work out and implement the methods of asymmetric floating and promising technological innovations. Research contribution to current scientific discussions: determination of requirements for the security mechanisms being created (initiatives, operations) that will ensure their viability in the event of armed aggression at sea; determining the requirements for the defense capabilities of the alliance states in the event of an expected aggression from a more powerful state, namely regarding the formation of asymmetric methods of action and getting ahead of the enemy in the introduction of the latest technologies.

**Stepan Yakymiak** is a retired captain in the Ukrainian Navy, and holds a PhD in military science. He is an expert of military programmes of the Razumkov Centre and Centre for Defence Strategies (Ukraine), and was an adviser of Commander of Maritime Task Force of Defense Forces of Ukraine (2022, February, 24 – May, 30). Previously, he has worked as the Chief of Department for Combat Experience and Training, HQ of Antiterrorist Operation, 2015-2016) and Head of Naval Forces Department, National Defense University of Ukraine (2014-2024).

## 14: MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

**Wednesday September 17: 16:00 – 17:15**

Chair: Christoph Harig, assistant professor at RDDC, [chha@fak.dk](mailto:chha@fak.dk)

### **DENYS MOSKALENKO AT AL.: AUGMENTED REALITY AND SMART MAINTENANCE: MIL-TECH INNOVATIONS AS A FAST-TRACK SOLUTION FOR REPAIR AND RESTORATION OF ARTILLERY WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR (ONLINE)**

Today, during the Russian-Ukrainian war, Ukraine has become a technological testing ground for creating and testing technological solutions to achieve an advantage on the battlefield against an enemy that significantly exceeds it in terms of personnel, weapons, and economic resources. One of the large-scale challenges faced by the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) is the restoration of the combat capability of various types of weapons and military equipment (WME), especially artillery

weapons. The high intensity of combat operations leads to the rapid decommissioning of such weapons. Accordingly, special attention must be paid to maintenance measures and repair and restoration work. In addition, a large number of WME samples, both Soviet and Ukrainian production, and production of NATO member countries requires a sufficient number of highly qualified specialists and material and technical base for maintenance and repair and restoration work of artillery weapons samples. The above-mentioned factors require the implementation of innovative approaches to solving this problem. The purpose of the study is to analyze the problems of effective maintenance and repair of WME by repair units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and to propose a partial solution to the identified problems by implementing special software based on augmented reality technologies. The use of AR in repair and restoration processes and production processes increases the productivity of the specialist and allows the repair bodies of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to be staffed with specialists with an insufficient level of narrowly specialized qualifications. AR superimposes information in the form of step-by-step instructions on a physical sample of WME, during its maintenance and repair. The use of AR technologies makes it possible to reduce the number of errors made by an insufficiently qualified specialist or to avoid them altogether during the maintenance and repair of artillery weapons. In the opinion of the authors, the most successful practically-oriented implementation of AR technologies is the BYOD (Bring Your Own Device) principle, because it is fast, cheap and mass-solving solution. It allows military-technical specialists to use their own smartphones and tablets in the maintenance and repair and restoration processes of WME, downloading special software into them and using it directly for its intended purpose. One example of such software is the mobile AR application "QUADRANT" for the repair and maintenance of artillery weapons. The created application takes into account combat experience and the challenges faced by repair specialists on the battlefield. The application is constantly being improved in accordance with the requirements of military-technical specialists of the repair units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and is being studied by the authors. The authors substantiated the feasibility of implementing and using the above-mentioned application for step-by-step support of the technological process of servicing a sample of weapons and military equipment. The obtained research results provide easier performance of tasks for servicing and repairing WME, especially for military-technical specialists whose level of knowledge and skills may be minimal and for citizens who were drafted into the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during mobilization measures and are first exposed to weapons.

**Denys Moskalenko** is a Ph.D. student at Sumy State University and the CEO of Quadrant Research & Development, LLC. He specializes in 3D modeling, computer simulation, and AR/VR technologies. Denys leads innovative projects focused on adaptive learning, AR-based training, and smart maintenance and manufacturing solutions. He brings over 12 years of experience in applied research.

**Anatolii Derevjanchuk (not presenting)** is a professor at Sumy State University, specializing in defense equipment and ammunition research. His work focuses on the design and development of interactive simulators and virtual reality systems for training military specialists. **Iryna Baranova (not presenting)** is an associate professor of the Department of Information Technology, Sumy State University, Ukraine. Her research interest covers the fields 3D modelling, visualization, animation, software application for the development of systems of automated design, e-learning systems. **Andrii Vakal (not presenting)** is an assistant professor and Senior Research Fellow at Sumy State University. He specializes in battlefield maintenance research and his work focuses on maintenance and repair technologies for military equipment.

## TOBIAS BOELT BACK AND ANDREAS GRAA: “THIS IS NOT JUST A SYSTEM OF MOTIVATION; THIS IS A MECHANISM THAT CHANGES THE RULES OF WAR”: UKRAINE’S BRAVE1 MARKET AND THE GAMIFICATION OF DRONE WARFARE

In April 2025, Ukraine's Digital Transformation Ministry launched Brave1 Market, an online marketplace that gamifies military procurement through point systems, leaderboards, and feedback loops. The platform's 'Army of Drones bonus' programme awards 'ePoints' to Ukraine's special operation units for drone combat performance, ranging from six points for killing an enemy soldier up to 50 points for destroying a rocket system. These points can then be exchanged for military materiel including drones, electronic warfare systems, and ammunition via the Brave1 Market app. According to the Ukrainian government, the programme has already spurred a rise in the number of verified engagements and enemy casualties. Situating our analysis within James Der Derian's concept of the 'military-industrial-media-entertainment network' (2009), we draw on gamification and warfare motivation research to analyse how the Brave1 Market's game-like elements reshape military logistics and combat operations. Through examination of platform design and government communications, we explore the tensions arising when moral decision-making is reduced to quantitative rewards. We find that while gamification may enhance tactical effectiveness, it deeply transforms professional military conduct by commodifying professionalised violence and normalising game-like approaches to lethal force. By extension, we argue that operational efficiency gains should be weighed against broader implications for military ethics and the logic of contemporary warfare.

**Tobias Boelt Back** is an assistant professor at the Institute for Military Technology at the Royal Danish Defence College. His research centres on trust-in-technology in contemporary warfare, examining how emerging and disruptive technologies reshape military operations and effectiveness. He is author of publications on human-technology interaction and the transformation of military practice in operational environments. His most recent paper in [SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES](#) concerns the September 2024 'pager attacks' in Lebanon.

**Andreas I. Graae (not presenting)** is Assistant Professor and Head of Research at the Institute for Military Technology, Royal Danish Defence College. He holds a PhD in drone studies from University of Southern Denmark. His research focuses on emerging and disruptive technologies and the future(s) of warfare, in particular how artificial intelligence, drones, and autonomous systems change military organizations, cultures and battlefields. He is author of a number of publications on military technology and late modern warfare, including the book *Drone Imaginaries: The Power of Remote Vision* (Manchester University Press, 2021) as well as chapters and articles on big data surveillance, politics of drone warfare, swarming and the future of robotic warfare.

## MAGNUS RAVN SKOU: LEGITIMACY AND ACCEPTANCE OF QUANTUM TECHNOLOGIES AMONG POTENTIAL NAVAL USERS IN THE DANISH ARMED FORCES

In the Danish Armed Forces (DAF), and NATO in general, attention has recently turned towards the innovative and disruptive potential in introducing quantum technologies (QTs) to the organization. However, besides technical challenges, a successful implementation of QTs is a challenge in leadership as well. Consequently, it is important to explore how potential users perceive QTs now to enhance eventual relations between user and quantum technological application. In this paper, this

perspective is investigated with naval focus on Mine Counter Measures (MCM) Denmark through the research question: *How does potential users in MCM Denmark experience legitimacy and acceptance of QTs in the DAF?* The theoretical framework is based on two foundational theories regarding management of legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) and technology acceptance (Davis, 1985). Using a phenomenological approach, interviews are conducted with four former or current officers in MCM Denmark, representing potential users, and compared with the theoretical framework. Furthermore, an advisor at Centre for Cyber Security specialized in QT is interviewed to establish how the DAF currently work with these technologies. The analysis in this paper indicates that particularly pragmatic legitimacy is perceived to be important for the interviewees and strategies for gaining legitimacy are identified. Additionally, the analysis indicates that two factors, perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use, are connected to performance in operational settings and are important for increasing acceptance of QTs. Finally, certain strategies to create legitimacy are also found to influence and potentially improve the perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use of QTs as illustrated in a novel synthesis model. In conclusion, the legitimacy and acceptance of QTs are found to be significant for potential users in MCM Denmark and can be enhanced through aligning the application of these technologies with solving operational tasks. This paper thus contributes to the academic debate in the intersecting fields of military technology innovation and military leadership by shedding light on the challenge of implementing QTs in the DAF with relevant insights for similar, emerging technologies. However, it is only a small step in understanding this process and paves the way for further studies. Additional research may employ other theories or methodologies and can be conducted using the same user group to investigate new perspectives as well as across different potential user groups to identify trends and contrasts within the DAF.

**Magnus Ravn Skou** (First lieutenant and Ph.D.), works as Electronics Officer in the Royal Danish Navy, 2nd Squadron. He obtained a Ph.D. in experimental quantum physics from Aarhus University in 2021 and subsequently graduated as technical officer from the Royal Danish Naval Academy in 2024. While his research previously focused on novel aspects of ultracold quantum gases, his academic interests now include emerging technologies, both in technical and strategic contexts, as well as the perspectives of operational users.

## 15: MILITARY ETHICS IN EDUCATION AND PRACTICE (WG)

**Wednesday September 17: 16:00 – 17:15.** Chairs and coordinators of the SJMS working group: Thomas Randrup Pedersen and Cornelia Vikan, [cvikan@mil.no](mailto:cvikan@mil.no)

What does military professionalism in the Nordics entail in current and future wars and militaries? In this panel we turn to military ethics in search for an answer, acknowledging ethics not only as a professional restrictor, but also as a professional advancer. In recent years (alleged) incidents of professional misjudgment and misconduct, both in garrison and in theatre, have marred Nordic militaries. In response, counter-measures have been taken, such as demands for decency and leadership based on ethical values, policies on zero-tolerance to (sexual) harassment, and military manuals on obligations under international law. Add to this the tension between an increased emphasis on warrior qualities in the military profession and a growing civilianization of the very same profession, by for instance the academic accreditation of professional military education, and the official celebration of diversity, equity and inclusion across the ranks. At the same time, we see full-scale, conventional, existential ‘wars of necessity’, a gradual breakdown of international humanitarian law, an advance of drone combat, hybrid warfare, an escalation of weaponized AI, and a novel orientation to multi-domain operations. On top of that, liberal societies, like the Nordic ones, face societal currents, such as post-heroic tendencies, hyper-individualism, #MeToo transformed

gender relations, and the emergence of the ‘post-truth society’. These diverse developments thus form the background against which this panel explores the question of military ethics in the Nordics.

**Thomas Randrup Pedersen** is associate professor at the Institute for Leadership and Organization, Royal Danish Defence College. He is based at the Royal Danish Military Academy and teaches army cadets in subjects, such as military ethics and military violence. He has a PhD degree in Anthropology from the University of Copenhagen, and his dissertation explores soldiering as existential, moral, and social becomings. His research is based on fieldwork with Danish combat troops in contexts of international operations. His current research projects centre on military professional ethics, pleasures of war, and cultural interoperability.

**Cornelia Vikan** holds a position as associate professor at the Norwegian Defense University College/Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy with a PhD from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, NTNU (2019): *Military power and Ethics in the Grey Area of War – Afghanistan. A critical ethical-philosophical analysis of the core values of the Norwegian Armed Forces respect, responsibility and courage*. Her lecturing focuses on the ethics of war and the moral development of military leaders in a complex reality. She is currently co-editing an anthology on military ethics for the Norwegian Armed Forces.

## LARS GEER HAMMERSHØJ: MILITARY PROFESSIONAL BILDUNG

Two major tendencies affect the military profession and military education today. First, the scope and pace of change is widening and accelerating in military culture, organization, tasks, and technology. The war in Ukraine, for instance, have introduced drones as the dominating and most deadly type of weapon. Second, the societal individualization processes have questioned the traditional socialization of military attitudes and ethos. The concept of *Bildung* (*dannelse, danning, bildning*) is an educational concept that accommodate these tendencies. *Bildung* is not about transferring values and deeds but encouraging students to want to assume military attitudes of their own will and to integrate them in their own way of being a professional soldier or officer. A research project for The Danish Defense Academy aims at developing the concept of military professional *Bildung* based on empirical studies in educational programmes of the army, navy and air force. The findings suggest that military professional *Bildung* have four dimensions: *Will* to fight and to assume military attitudes; *judgement* in complex and unpredictable situations and in acting one’s role in the hierarchy; *co-creation* as the capacity of being creative and innovative with others beyond the hierarchy; *community-formation* as the capacity to form professional relationships and team-spirit.

**Lars Geer Hammershøj** is PhD and Associate Professor at Danish School of Education at Aarhus University. He is currently carrying out a project on Military Professional *Bildung* for the Royal Danish Defense College. He has published articles and books on subjects such as *Bildung* in the education system, creativity, innovation and diagnosis of the times. Together with film director Christina Rosendahl, he is also currently carrying out an artistic research project on co-creation in film production.

## VILHELM HOLSTING: THE DANISH ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND ITS NORDIC CONTEXT

Denmark, like its Nordic neighbours, builds its military professionalism on a foundation of democratic values, welfare-state principles, and a strong civil-military relationship as an integral part of core military values. As Denmark, like all other European countries, modernizes its armed forces in response to an evolving security situation, there is a growing need to define and implement clear professional ideals that guide professional ethical development within military education and leadership alongside the development of heavy military capabilities. This paper examines Denmark’s current approach to military professional ethics, analyzing how its recently defined professional ideals

shape the development of officers and soldiers. It explores how these ideals are to be integrated into military education and policies, ensuring that military personnel are not only technically proficient but also ethically grounded in a profession that must prepare for both high-intensity, existential warfare and the use of emerging technologies. The paper further recommends a broader comparative study of Nordic military ethics to strengthen cooperation in developing military systems that align with shared societal values. Given the structural similarities among the Nordic nations, an aligned approach to professional ethics could enhance interoperability and cohesion in future defense collaborations. By examining Denmark's framework as a case study, this research contributes to a deeper understanding of how ethical military professionalism can be institutionalized in democratic societies facing new security challenges.

**Vilhelm Holsting** is Commander Senior Grade (Navy) and director of the Institute for Leadership and Management at the Royal Danish Defense College and executive editor of *Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies*. He holds a PhD in leadership and management from Copenhagen Business School. His research focus on officership on junior and senior level.

## **CORNELIA VIKAN AND CHRISTIAN MOLDJORD: FOSTERING JUST CULTURE IN THE ARMED FORCES. LESSONS FROM THE NORWEGIAN AIR FORCE**

On March 11, 2020, during the NATO exercise Cold Response, two C-130J Hercules transport planes training under challenging conditions narrowly avoided crashing into a mountain called Mosken, located off the Lofoten Islands. The situation was mere seconds away from becoming a catastrophic accident for the Norwegian Armed Forces. The subsequent investigation revealed several critical instances of poor judgment that offer valuable lessons that could only be uncovered because the personnel involved were willing to share their experiences openly. The investigation highlighted a clear link between the performance culture and the safety culture, with a Just Culture enabling the learning process. We know about the Mosken incident because the pilot involved reported it, taking the risk of blame while simultaneously upholding the principles of Just Culture. Fostering a Just Culture begins with how we educate our officers and specialists. At the Air Force Academy, cadets and specialists are encouraged to share their own vulnerable experiences, facilitate debriefings, provide feedback, and create an environment of vulnerability trust and psychological safety within their teams and across formal ranks. Real incidents, such as the Mosken near-miss, are incorporated into the curriculum to reinforce and cultivate the culture upon which we rely.

**Cornelia Vikan** (PhD) is positioned at the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy (RNoAFA). Her lecturing focuses on the ethics of war and moral development of military leaders.

**Christian Moldjord** (PhD) (RNoAFA) has long experience in military leadership development. His publications cover topics in military psychology, leadership development and organizational learning.

## **HEGE CATHRINE FINHOLT: TRAIN AS YOU FIGHT – ETHICS IN THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES**

In the Norwegian armed forces, it is clearly expressed that every decision should be made with a high level of ethical integrity. To achieve this, it is pivotal that ethical consideration is integrated in the training, at every level. Yet, there is no systematic integration of ethics in the overall education. To succeed in implementing ethics in the training and making it possible for decision-makers to make good ethical decisions, I argue that this requires at least two things: First, teaching of ethical thinking, i.e. the soldiers should know what an ethical argument is, and second, helping the students to use this

knowledge in everything they do. This requires a systematic approach, it cannot be left to the soldiers alone to figure it out. In this presentation I will show why a good understanding of ethical thinking is necessary for the soldiers. In line with Aristotle, I show that ethical decisions are made by a good understanding of the surroundings, which means that one understands what is at stake ethically speaking. Also, as Aristotle said, to act ethically requires training as well as good role models. On this background, I will discuss different ways on how the armed forces can better succeed in making it possible for the decision-makers to make good ethical decisions.

**Hege Cath Finholt** holds a PhD in philosophy from Boston University (2012) She completed her postdoctoral fellowship at the Center for ethics at the University of Toronto. Her areas of specialty are political philosophy, ethics and international relations. After more than 20 years in higher education in Norway, the US, and Canada, she came to the Norwegian Armed Forces in 2024, where she writes and teaches about military ethics.

# ABSTRACTS THURSDAY

# 16: ROUNDTABLE - PREPARING FOR MULTI-DOMAIN OPERATIONS

**Thursday September 18: 10:45 – 12:00.** Chair: Thomas Crosbie, associate professor at RDDC, thcr@fak.dk

For the past several years, NATO has signaled its commitment to “Multi-Domain Operations”, a broad-based reform effort that focuses on preparing NATO states to counter near-peer adversaries across the full spectrum of conflict. Unfortunately, professional military education (PME) is unprepared to meet the magnitude of ambiguity and complexity involved in today’s rapidly evolving global operational environment. The exponential growth of this computing power has created a security environment where the pace of cyber, directed energy, nanotechnology, and hypersonics are eclipsing the normal capacity to predict their effects. This change in the strategic and operational environments is significantly affecting the ability to effectively synchronize manoeuvre in multiple domains through joint operations alone. This panel explores how far NATO states have moved along the path to being “multi-domain capable”, paying special attention to the ways in which this differs across national contexts. Panelists will discuss the key indicators guiding reform from joint to multi-domain operations.

## ROUNDTABLE PARTICIPANTS

**Ian Bowers** is a Senior Researcher at Centre for International Security at NDUC. His research focuses on sea power, the future operational environment, deterrence and the Korean Peninsula. He holds a PhD in War Studies from King’s College London. He has published a monograph on the South Korean Navy and has edited several volumes including his most recent on combined naval operations during the Korean War. His work has also appeared in journals such as *International Security*, the *Journal of Strategic Studies*, the *Naval War College Review* and the *Washington Quarterly*.

**William L. Mitchell** (Mitch) is an associate professor and currently the Director of Military Intelligence Education at the Language and Intelligence Academy within the Norwegian Defence University. He has had a distinguished military career spanning three decades, during which he participated in a dozen conflicts across four continents. Mitch has an extensive academic background, having developed and taught intelligence, security, and military operations courses at both civilian and military universities. His research focuses on intelligence, warfighting, and special operations.

**Holger Lindhardtzen** is a military analyst at the Institute for Military Operations at the Royal Danish Defence College. His research topics include Multidomain Operations, Special Operations, and Professional Military Education, to which he has contributed to multiple articles, conference papers, and book chapters. Currently he is a part of the “Educating Future Warfighters” project, which is about building competencies for future conflicts at the intermediate PME level, and a part of the MDO working group at the RDDC.

**Jeffrey M. Reilly** (PhD) has been at the forefront of multidomain operations since 2006. He has held numerous US Army, joint and combined positions including being a theater level plans division chief and member of the Secretary of Defense’s Two Major Theater War plans team. Additionally, he has received numerous professional military education awards for innovation at the Air University, Air Education and Training Command, and Secretary of the Air Force levels. He currently serves as the Director of the US Air Force Joint All Domain Strategist programme.

**Thomas Danger** is a professional wargamer at the Royal Danish Defence College. He holds a Master’s degree in War Studies from King’s College London, and since 2023, he has been developing educational wargames for the Danish Armed Forces. Thomas’ research focuses on establishing a rigorous methodology for wargaming, understanding the roles of skills in teaching Multi-Domain Operations through wargames, and improving the delivery of wargames for Professional Military Education (PME).

**Major (A) Kenneth Nymand Pedersen** is a researcher at Centre for Landwarfare Operations, Institute for Military Operations, Royal Danish Defence College in Copenhagen. He holds a master's degree in Public Governance from Copenhagen Business School, as well as the Danish Army's General Staff Course, along with the RDDC master's courses in military operations and strategy. Deployed on operational tour to Afghanistan, Iraq and more recently, Estonia. Kenneth's research focuses on military decision-making during military operations.

# 17: POSTER PRESENTATION: PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

**Thursday September 18: 10:45 – 12:00.** Chair: Carsten F. Rønnfeldt, professor at NDUC and partner in SJMS, [cronnfeldt@mil.no](mailto:cronnfeldt@mil.no)

Description of the session: Poster-presentations are common at conferences in the natural sciences. Scholars use posters as visual aids to convey their research findings and interests to each other. Conference participants walk around between a host of posters, take a closer look at posters of interests and talk to the author and others gathered around a poster. Compared to more traditional paper-presentations, posters are more suited to dialogue and seem useful to generate ideas and networks for future collaboration. At this SJMS-conference we want to learn whether poster-presentations may offer an additional avenue for creating research communities in the field of military studies.

## CARSTEN RØNNFELDT, ANJA MØGELVANG AND LINN-KRISTINE G. GAUPHOLM: HELPING CADETS TO LEARN: NDUC-SCHOLARS' RESEARCH ON THEIR TEACHING METHODS

NDUC's mission is to educate cadets to defend Norway in peace, crisis and war. To this end NDUC-scholars now direct some of their research to improve their teaching-strategies and to help cadets learn more. We use research-methods with which we are familiar and are informed by approaches from Military Scholarship of Teaching and Learning (MSoTL) and Norwegian higher educations' Centers of Educational Excellence. Examples of such studies on «our own classrooms» can be found among the posters in this session. The initiative to broaden NDUC-scholars' research attention to include our teaching tasks began in 2022. This project presents the background and lessons learned. It also unfolds our preliminary findings about what motivates NDUC-scholars to engage with this effort to improve professional military education.

**Carsten F. Rønnfeldt** is professor in international relations at the NDUC's Norwegian Military Academy. His research interests include civil-military relations, strategic communication and scholarship of teaching and learning. He has published in several journals among others Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies, Armed Forces & Society and Parameters. He holds a doctorate from the London School of Economics.

**Linn-Kristine G. Gaupholm** is an associate professor in physics at the Norwegian Defence University College (NDUC). She holds a master in science and mathematics from the integrated Teacher Programme (2013) and PhD in Space Physics from University of Bergen (2016). Her research interests include pedagogy and didactics and quality learning in light of cognitive psychology.

**Anja Møgelvang (not presenting)** is an associate professor at Western Norway University of Applied Sciences.

## LINN-KRISTINE G- GAUPHOLM: INTEGRATING EFFECTIVE LEARNING STRATEGIES IN THE CLASSROOM – A SOTL-PROJECT

Getting students to actively engage is crucial for them to learn but can be challenging to achieve (Freeman et al, 2014). Humans tend to choose the path of least resistance, we want to feel comfortable

and avoid pain. Learning is often painful, and most students don't realise that. My students often express their wish for me to give lectures for them to passively listen to, even though it is not the most efficient use of their time in the classroom. As a teacher, I strive to use my students' time so that they learn as much as they can. This is particularly important in PME, where we not only teach a subject, but also try to make cadets into leaders that can read and understand complex scenarios under high pressure, manage people and complex technology and machinery, and learn and adapt to situations quickly. The NDUC education is dense, and time is a valuable resource for all students. Time in class should be used for effective learning. In this project we will investigate how two learning strategies, proven to be effective in STEM-subjects, can work in a subject taught at NDUC (Dunlosky et al, 2013). The subject is Electromagnetism, and the learning strategies are retrieval practice and elaborative encoding (Gjerde et al, 2021; 2020). The two strategies will be integrated in classes, which normally are taught using a mix of lectures, problems solving, student discussions, quizzes, etc. Retrieval practice and elaborative encoding will be explained and performed in class, and students are encouraged to use the strategies for homework. We have developed a physics principles sheet containing the core principles to be learned as defined by the subject's curriculum. Throughout the eight-week period ("quarter") it is taught, the students will have to use retrieval practice and elaborative encoding to learn all the physics principles on the sheet. Three retrieval tests will be performed during the quarter. To pass, they must retrieve more than 75% of the principles. We collect data from three successive years. This includes scores on the mandatory retrieval tests, exam result, and student responses to a qualitative questionnaire. The data are analysed using a mixed method approach, where quantitative and qualitative data complement each other. The first data collection was done in the winter of 2024, and preliminary results are presented. They indicate that the students of 2024 did not really understand either of the learnings strategies, why or how they were used, or why they could be effective if used properly. In addition, some expressed that "it takes away time from learning the curriculum", which to the teacher seems a great contradiction, since all the principles on the sheet is the mathematical model of the complete curriculum. Other preliminary findings will be presented on the poster. An important part of the SoTL-method is to collect, analyse and reflect upon your project as it goes along. Considering the preliminary results, some improvements are suggested for the autumn 2025-class.

**Linn-Kristine G. Gaupholm** is an associate professor in physics at the Norwegian Defence University College (NDUC). She holds a master in science and mathematics from the integrated Teacher Programme (2013) and PhD in Space Physics from University of Bergen (2016). Her research interests include pedagogy and didactics and quality learning in light of cognitive psychology.

## **GINA HELENE SJURSÆTHER AND ELEN ELVEBAKK: HOW CAN WE BEST INTEGRATE THE LIBRARY'S TEACHING IN THE SCHOOL'S OVERALL TEACHING TO STRENGTHEN CADET'S ACADEMIC SKILLS?**

The cadets who enrol in the military academies at the Norwegian Defence University College (NDUC) diverse in academic backgrounds and skill levels. A common expectation for all cadets is that they must independently develop their academic competencies, alongside their subject-specific learning, to ultimately produce an academic work in the form of a bachelor's thesis by the end of their undergraduate studies (Norwegian Armed Forces, 2023). The libraries at the NDUC serves as a support service for cadets (as well as faculty and staff), providing expertise and resources related to academic skills such as literature searches, source criticism, referencing, and reference management tools. A key question arises: How can we most effectively equip cadets with the academic skills expected of them? The cadets follow a structured programme that includes both classroom instruction and external exercises, leaving limited time for independent study compared to many other

undergraduate programmes. Consequently, offering library courses and guidance at random times is not feasible, as cadets may not be available to attend. Therefore, library instruction should be as seamlessly integrated as possible into the planned academic curriculum. In 2024, the Knowledge Center at the Norwegian Defence University College organized a series of teaching conferences, seminars, and workshops, with the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning (SoTL) and research on teaching practices as the central themes (Felten, 2013; Kirschner et al., 2021; McClurg et al., 2019). The library participated in these events, focusing on the following research question: How can library instruction be best integrated into the broader curriculum to enhance cadets' academic skills? To explore this question, we conducted semi-structured interviews with a selection of military and civilian faculty members at the military academies (Tjora, 2021). Findings from these interviews have now undergone thematic analysis using NVivo (Braun & Clarke, 2022; Terry et al., 2017). We aim to present our key discoveries, insights gained, and the adjustments we plan to implement throughout the research process.

**Gina Helene Sjursæther** holds a bachelor's degree in Library and Information Science, Master of Environmental Management, Master of Tourism, Continuing education in Foundations of pedagogical development. She currently works as Special Librarian, func. Head Librarian at Norwegian Defence University College.

**Elen Elvebakk** is a special librarian at the Norwegian Defence University College and a Cand.Mag., Master of Educational Science.

## **SJUR FORTUN ØFSTENG: ENHANCING CADETS LEARNING OUTCOMES IN MILITARY SKILLS THROUGH A 6-DAY COMPREHENSIVE EDUCATION PROGRAMME**

Soldiers require a high level of military skills to meet battlefield demands and maintain operational readiness. To develop these skills, they undergo extensive training over weeks and months, focusing on various physiological capacities. However, incorporating theoretical knowledge, such as physical training strategies and techniques, may also enhance the effectiveness of their training. The aim of this project, conducted as a Blended *Intensive Program*, is to implement a comprehensive education program that alternates between theoretical and practical sessions on a daily basis. This approach seeks to motivate soldiers to apply theoretical knowledge to improve their basic military skills. These basic military skills are assessed during the Norwegian Championship in Military Pentathlon, which serves as the framework for the education program.

**Sjur Fortun Øfsteng** is associate professor at the Norwegian Defence University College. He is a lecturer and researcher at the Norwegian Defence Cyber Academy in Lillehammer and teach military skills. His teaching typically alternates between theoretical lessons and practical training sessions. He holds a PhD in exercise physiology and his research focuses on enhancing soldiers' physical fitness and performance, with the aim of sustaining military readiness over time. Other research topics include understanding molecular factors that predict inter-individual responses to physical training.

## **ARILD SÆBØ: CLICK FOR SUCCESS: MOTIVATING STUDENTS WITH DIGITAL MULTIPLE-CHOICE TESTS**

With the increasing adoption of digital learning platforms, assessment methods are evolving to enhance student engagement and learning outcomes. This study explores the impact of rapid feedback through digital multiple-choice tests in maritime electrical systems education. By leveraging the test tool in the LMS *Itslearning*, traditional paper-based assignments have been digitalized to encourage students to engage with the curriculum continuously throughout the semester. Digital multiple-choice tests are implemented before, during, and after lectures, increasing flexibility in the teaching process. The course material is primarily digitalized in *OneNote* and supplemented with video content. A

student survey conducted at the Norwegian Defence University College highlights that students perceive the level of feedback from academic staff as consistently insufficient. This raises the question: “How does the use of digital multiple-choice tests with rapid feedback affect students' perceived learning outcomes in technological subjects?” Previous research emphasizes that immediate feedback enhances learning by reinforcing concepts, improving motivation, and fostering self-regulated learning. Hattie and Timperley (2007) argue that feedback is one of the most significant factors influencing learning outcomes. Nicol and Macfarlane-Dick (2006) highlight that formative assessment and structured feedback contribute to self-regulated learning by enabling students to reflect on their progress and adjust their strategies. In the context of technology education, where conceptual understanding and problem-solving skills are critical, rapid feedback mechanisms play a crucial role in learning efficiency. Agrawal, Agrawal, and Walia (2019) found that formative assessment tools with automated feedback significantly improve student engagement and learning experiences in programming courses. Similarly, Butler and Roediger (2008) suggest that frequent testing with immediate feedback enhances long-term knowledge retention. This research project aims to examine how rapid feedback through multiple-choice tests influences students' perceived learning outcomes across different learning contexts. Specifically, the study investigates whether immediate feedback fosters deeper understanding, enhances motivation, and improves knowledge retention among higher education students. To explore these relationships, I plan to use a hybrid research design that integrates both quantitative and qualitative methods. This will include conducting surveys to measure students' perceptions of learning outcomes and motivation in response to rapid feedback on digital multiple-choice tests.

**Arild Sæbø** is Associate Professor at the Norwegian Defence University College, specializing in maritime electrical power systems. His research focuses on digital learning innovations, particularly using rapid feedback through digital multiple-choice tests to enhance student engagement and learning outcomes. The goal has been to motivate students to consistently engage with the curriculum and make teaching more flexible and accessible.

## **KYRRE TROMM LINDVIG: TEACHING MILITARY**

### **INTELLIGENCE TO GENERAL OFFICERS – BRIDGING THE GAP**

One of the most pressing topics in today's military development is the transparency of the tactical battlefield, which again leads to compressed time for making sound decisions based on incoming information and intelligence (Diesen et al. 2024). In order to win the battle(s) one should therefore attempt to close the time gap between receiving intelligence and making operational decisions to a minimum. This will require establishing a sound synchronization between the intelligence and the operations branch, which is clearly stated in NATO doctrine. (NATO, 2016). In traditional military officer education, a substantial amount of time is allocated to the basics of the military trade, leadership, planning and conduct of operations. However, the important field of intelligence is often neglected or downplayed. One reason for this might be that the military intelligence community teaches its own personnel in its own facilities. One example is how Norway has divided these fields into separate institution: The Military Academy teaches and forms the general officers (OF) for the army, while the Norwegian Defense Language and Intelligence Academy offer complete separate educations for people pursuing a career in intelligence. Any general officer in Norway would then need to apply for shorter intelligence courses later in his/her career, while personnel trained at the Intelligence Academy would be trained to be filling specialist positions in the Other Ranks (OR), making it is next to impossible to later convert to becoming a general officer. The result is a gap in discourse between two different military career systems. This poster presentation argues that this divide is a shortfall in our military educational system, as it does not prepare neither general officers nor intelligence specialist to be able to work closely together in complex operations. Doctrinally, however, many of the most important military operations require a very tight relationship between these two sections, evident both in the targeting cycles and in planning in general (NATO, 2016). In

addition, we live in times where information – both true and false – is omnipresent and in large supply – the war in Ukraine is a telling example. (Harrington 2022). General officers – like everybody else – can easily be submerged in the sheer mass of data. In order to properly navigate, they will need to be able to properly engage with their intelligence counterparts. A lack of mutual understanding between the operations and intelligence sections can lead to intelligence failure. Interestingly enough, a large number of intelligence failures happen to be failures not in the intelligence itself, but that the intelligence has not been properly understood or interpreted due to cognitive biases and discourse failure. (Hatlebrekke, 2010, Gomez, 2025) This poster presentation will attempt to offer suggestions of how one can teach general officers about military intelligence. Examples will be intelligence introductions lectures at every level of officers training, practical exercises between the academies and suggested literature which can help both sides – operations as well as intelligence – to better understand each other's needs. This poster will also touch upon examples of which topics and tools general officers need to properly understand what the possibilities and limits of military intelligence are. In this way, the synchronization between intelligence and operations can reduce time spent on time-critical decisions and keep a higher operational tempo than the adversary. In a time where technological development further compresses the time available, this poster will argue that not bridging the discourse gap could have dire consequences for our forces in battle.

**Lieutenant-Colonel Kyrre Tromm Lindvig** is an active-duty Norwegian Army officer. He has served in a variety of positions on tactical and operational level and has extensive experience from international operations. He is currently teaching at the Staff College of the Norwegian Defence University College. He defended his Ph.D in cultural studies at the University of Oslo in 2008. In addition, he was visiting research student at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem 2011–2013 and he is an alumnus of the Senior SOF leadership course at the NATO Special Operations University in Belgium.

## **RAVINDRA BABU UMMANENI: ADOPTION AND REFLECTION OF ACTIVE LEARNING METHODOLOGIES IN PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION**

How we can improve the student engagement and learning environment in professional education by adopting the active learning methodologies? Active learning in teaching and learning process is to motivate and engage the students in different activities like discussions, quizzes, Group work, Project based learning and Integration of theory and practical. Teaching through real life examples will give students interest and motivation towards the subject. In this paper, I am adopting an active learning methodology in electronics subject. Nowadays electronics are an integral part of human life. Explaining and teaching the functionality of those electronics components will always trigger student enthusiasm. In this subject student are doing real time projects to relate the theory with practical. Pedagogical strategies used in the course are Adoptive learning, blending learning and Project based learning.

- **Adoptive learning:** Understanding the common student misconceptions early and integrating the present subject topic with early learnings and foreshadowing future learning. This learning is mainly based on understanding the individual needs with effective feedback and providing custom teaching with different groups. Mentimeter tool is used for effective feedback system.
- **Blending learning:** Providing useful information through pictures and videos and animations to convey key knowledge and use interaction-based learning in the classroom like discussions, group activity and student centric activities instead of teacher centric activities. This blending learning is the kind of flipped class room methodology with more student centric activities.
- **Project based learning:** Encourage the students to select and develop real time projects in electronics. Application areas for the projects are Sensor systems (Alarm circuits, Robot drive circuits), Electronic warfare related (EMP generators, Jammers), Communication systems (Receivers, Transmitters and amplifiers), Power conversion circuits (Solar cell-based chargers, Rectifiers and inverters). This learning methodology involves several steps. Students will select the project based on their interest, afterwards they analyze, develop and simulate electronic circuits with Proteus software tool then they will develop the Printed circuit board and assemble the components. Finally, they will test and verify the produced electronic circuit for real-time applications.

The active learning methodology with real time projects will provide Critical thinking, Multidisciplinary environment, Teamwork, Self-management learning activity and Satisfaction of learning to the students. The subject results and student satisfaction levels are increased after adopting the active learning methodology.

**Ravindra Babu Ummaneni** is an associate professor in cyber academy, Norwegian Defence University College (NDUC). He completed PhD in electrical power engineering from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU). His main work focus is on the development of projects based on electronic sensor systems and adoption of new teaching methodologies and technologies in military education. His main research interests are design and development of electrical machines for unmanned aerial vehicles and sensor systems.

## **PETER SJØSTEDT AND HENRIK WILLAUME-JANTZEN: THE “NEED FOR SPEED” IN MILITARY INSTRUCTION AND LEARNING**

As the security environment for the Nordic countries currently develops, the Nordic governments emphasize the need for speed in armament to deter aggression, and to support friends and allies. Furthermore - in general - the Nordic governments have increased, or decided on increasing, the number of conscripts available for active duty. Based on the security environment defined by increased build-up of forces and rapid armament, we put forward the need to discuss how the curriculum for military instruction and learning in the Nordic countries reflects this sense of urgency. Additionally, how the military professionals can develop the curriculum to ensure that it reflects the urgency of rapid military build-up and potential boots on the ground. Military professionals have a central role and duty as teachers and instructors to carry out military training and education. To prepare for this the professional receives training and education within the field of instructional design and learning. Specifically within the overall subject of didactics and pedagogy (Beredskabstyrelsen 2024, Forsvarsakademiet 2021, 2023, Försvarsmagten 2022, Sjøstedt & Grønlund 2016, Willaume-Jantzen 2019). With these merits, they plan and conduct military training that prepares the forces available for deterrence and military operations. We propose the need for all professionals engaged in military education and training in the Nordic countries to answer one simple question. Can we complete the education and training faster? Furthermore – just as important – to discuss what are the consequences of an increased speed on education and training, and how the potential risk as well as opportunities can be understood and operationalized for the benefit of military professionals. In addition, we suggest that practitioners and leadership within military education and training debates how to reflect the need for speed in the educational theory of instructional design and learning. This paper proposes a starting point for discussion and further development. This through asking questions and drawing a theory-based outline based on three dimensions of learning (Illeris 2015). This constitutes a method for exploring and discussing the subject at hand in an environment of rapid military buildup where urgency is of utmost importance. The discussion relates to the overall scholarly subject of curriculum design. Here literature within the use of simulation (Steehouver 2005, Van der Hulst 2008) and experiential learning (Ulriksen 2014, Kolb 1984) contributions to the subject of fast learning. However, as the paper will discuss, it seems that in general the literature does not prioritize the subject of speed within education and training.

**Peter Sjøstedt** holds an MA in adult education from Roskilde University. He is senior learning consultant at the Danish Ministry of Defence Acquisition and Logistics Organization (DALO) and a lecturer at the Royal Danish Defence College, and at the University of Copenhagen.

**Henrik Willaume-Jantzen** holds an MA in Education and Learning from Roskilde University. He is a navy commander and branch head for military training at the Danish Home Gard. He is currently chairperson of the Danish Military Network Group for Pedagogy.

# 18: CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN A TOTAL DEFENCE SETTING

**Thursday September 18: 10:45 – 12:00.** Chair: Lotta Victor Tillberg, associate professor at Södertörn university and head of research at CSMS, [lotta.tillberg@csms.se](mailto:lotta.tillberg@csms.se)

## **ISABELLA NEUMANN: THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES**

This paper examines the evolution of civil-military relations in the Nordic countries, where civilian control is not a contested principle but an embedded norm within political and institutional frameworks. Unlike states with authoritarian or military rule histories, Nordic armed forces have consistently adhered to democratic structures, making Huntington's (1957) classical theory of civilian control appear almost redundant in this context. However, civil-military relations extend beyond obedience; they involve cooperation, shared responsibilities, and mutual adaptation between civilian and military actors. The Nordic model is distinct for emphasizing transparency, inclusivity, and integrating military structures into broader societal frameworks rather than maintaining a rigid separation between civil and military spheres. This study explores how these relations are influenced by contemporary challenges, particularly the increasing integration of artificial intelligence (AI) and cyber capabilities into defense structures. While AI enhances operational efficiency, intelligence analysis, and decision-making (Onderco, 2025), it also introduces new dynamics in civil-military cooperation. Cyber threats blur the lines between civilian and military responsibilities, requiring joint crisis response strategies and flexible governance mechanisms. Additionally, AI-driven automation alters traditional military routines, reshaping how military professionals perceive their roles and interact with civilian counterparts. The increasing reliance on advanced technologies in defense prompts greater interdependence between military and civilian institutions, particularly in hybrid threat response, crisis management, and strategic communication (Harig, 2024). The study employs a qualitative methodology, combining document analysis of Nordic defense policies, strategic white papers, and official reports with expert military and civilian leadership interviews. It assesses how institutional frameworks adjust to these transformations, the extent to which AI and cyber developments influence training and professional identity, and how civil-military cooperation is evolving to meet emerging security challenges. The study also examines case studies of Nordic-led joint operations, civil preparedness initiatives, and AI-enhanced military applications to evaluate how these shifts materialize in practice. Findings suggest that while civilian oversight fundamentals remain stable, civil-military cooperation's nature changes (Ghinca & Zulean, 2024). AI and cyber developments introduce new areas of collaboration, requiring increased information-sharing, joint training programs, and updated legal frameworks to delineate responsibilities. Additionally, the perception of military roles is shifting; rather than being seen solely as a force of last resort, the military in the Nordic context is increasingly viewed as an integrated security partner in domestic and international operations. This paper contributes to the academic debate by shifting the focus from control and obedience to complementarity and institutional adaptation. By analyzing how AI and cyber technologies reshape routines, decision-making, and role perceptions, this study underscores the need to move beyond static models of civil-military relations toward a more dynamic understanding of evolving responsibilities and cross-sector collaboration.

**Isabella Neumann** is a Ph.D. candidate in International Politics and Conflict Resolution at the University of Coimbra. She is a visiting Scholar at the University of Oslo (Centre for European Studies) from May 1 to October 31, 2025.

## ØRJAN KARLSSON AT AL.: FROM NATIONAL TO REGIONAL TOTAL DEFENSE? CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN FINLAND, NORWAY, AND SWEDEN

In November 2024, the Nordic Ministerial Meeting on Civil Preparedness and Resilience called for strengthened Nordic civil-military cooperation (Ministerial Meeting, 2024), signaling a revitalization –and potential regionalization – of the total defence concept. This study examines whether and how Finland’s comprehensive security framework (Finnish Government, 2025), Norway’s total defence model (Norwegian FD/JD, 2018; Totalberedskapsmeldingen, 2025), and Sweden’s total defence approach (Regeringens proposition, 2024) could enhance such cooperation in transboundary crisis management. At first glance, Nordic total defence models appear similar, emphasizing multilevel governance. Finland’s Security Committee with its regional arrangements, Norway’s subsidiarity principle, and Sweden’s county-level civil defence boards all reflect a shift from hierarchical state control to decentralized crisis management. Each model integrates regional and local authorities, businesses, civil society, the Military, and academia, fostering preparedness through multi-stakeholder mechanisms. While Sweden divides total defence into six geographic areas, Norway’s Total Defence Forum and Finland’s regional security clusters play similar roles in awareness-building and coordination. All models share the primary goal of ensuring the resilience of vital societal functions and enhancing civil-military cooperation. These frameworks were not originally designed for transboundary crisis management. Nonetheless, beyond functional needs – such as critical infrastructure cross-border interdependencies – cultural understanding and a shared Nordic identity also contribute to resilience. Finland, Norway, and Sweden have long-standing cross-border civilian crisis management procedures, including Nordic cooperation and Barents Rescue exercises. As NATO members, their total defence efforts align with NATO’s Article 3 on resilience, which extends beyond military preparedness to national resilience (NATO, n.d.), as well as with the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, which facilitates cross-border assistance (EC, n.d.). Although Norway is not an EU member, it participates alongside Finland and Sweden in this framework. This study explores how Nordic total defence models could facilitate cooperation in transboundary crises by addressing key questions: a) Do existing legal and regulatory frameworks, institutional designs, capabilities, situational awareness, decision-making, and communication mechanisms support cross-border civil-military collaboration? b) What challenges and opportunities arise in the current threat landscape, including hybrid threats and outright military aggression? c) How is the resilience of vital societal functions affected in transboundary crises, and how could total defence systems cooperate? d) To what degree does total defence models facilitate civil sector involvement in Host Nation Support and joint civil-military exercises/Regional HNS? e) Where does NATO and EU align with regards to transboundary civilian cooperation? The study is informed by research on transboundary resilience (e.g., Adrot et al., 2022, 2024; Prokkola, 2019; Ringsmuth et al., 2022) and transboundary crisis management (e.g., Boin and Rhinard, 2008; Boin and Lodge, 2016; Ansell et al., 2010; Olsson, 2015). It examines the Nordic total defence systems through a literature review, document analysis, interviews, an online survey of key stakeholders, and participatory observation. Findings will contribute to academic debates on crisis response and national security, illustrating how cultural, structural and residual elements may shape civil-military cooperation. The study provides evidence-based recommendations for optimizing total defence systems, cross-border crisis preparedness, and NATO-EU coordination.

**Ørjan Karlsson** is a PhD-candidate at Nord University, and Specialist Director in the field of comprehensive security and transboundary threats at the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB). He has worked on policy level at the Norwegian Ministry of Defense and has a military background from the Army. As a crisis manager and specialist on propaganda and disinformation, he has been involved in missions for both NATO and EU within and outside Europe.

**Christer Henrik Pursiainen (not presenting)** works since 2014 as Professor of Societal Security at the Department of Technology and Safety, Faculty of Science and Technology, Arctic University of Norway (UiT) in Tromsø, Norway. Previously, he has worked in leading management and research positions in such institutions as the European Commission, Council of the Baltic Sea States, Nordregio – the Nordic Centre for Spatial Development, Russian-European Centre for Economic Policy, University of Helsinki, and Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

**Johan Johansson (not presenting)** is Associate Professor at the Division of Risk Management and Societal Safety, Faculty of Engineering, Lund University, Sweden. He is specialized in resilience engineering, risk analysis, and critical infrastructure, and has worked as Director at the Centre for Critical Infrastructure Protection Research (CenCIP) at Lund University as well as Expert Advisor for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB).

## TONJE GRUNNAN: ENHANCING CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

This article explores the interaction between civil and military actors in large-scale crisis management exercises at the strategic-operational level. Specifically, it examines the role of civil liaisons as facilitators of civil-military cooperation. The study focuses on three predominantly military exercises with civil participation, particularly the 2018 NATO exercise, Trident Juncture. During this exercise, the Norwegian Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) integrated numerous civil liaisons from national agencies and authorities, representing their civil counterparts at the strategic-operational level. The research question is: How do civil liaisons facilitate civil-military cooperation in large-scale crisis management exercises, and what are the implications for organizational learning? The study employs a qualitative approach, utilizing participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and document analysis to gather data from three crisis management exercises. The role of civil liaisons is analyzed through the lenses of the Community of Practice framework (Wenger, 1998) and boundary-spanning theory (Kalkman, 2020). The findings suggest that civil liaisons form a learning community throughout the exercise phases—planning, execution, and evaluation—while also acting as boundary spanners who bridge organizational divides to promote effective cooperation. The study reveals the dynamics of civil-military interaction and highlights the critical role of liaisons in encouraging collaboration. It also problematizes the concept of the liaison as an individual versus a functional role, questioning whether the learning process benefits the individual liaison or the organization they represent. The analysis indicates that civil liaisons, by participating in these exercises, not only enhance their understanding and skills but also contribute to the overall preparedness and resilience of their respective organizations. This dual role of liaisons as both learners and facilitators underscores the importance of their presence in such exercises. Furthermore, the study highlights the challenges faced by liaisons in balancing their individual responsibilities with their organizational roles, suggesting that more structured support and training could enhance their effectiveness. This article provides empirical evidence on the dual role of civil liaisons as both members of a Community of Practice and boundary spanners. It offers insights into the mechanisms of civil-military cooperation and organizational learning in crisis management exercises, thereby enhancing our understanding of how to improve collaborative efforts in complex emergency scenarios. The findings also suggest potential areas for future research, such as the impact of different types of training on the effectiveness of civil liaisons and the long-term benefits of their participation in such exercises. By examining the role of civil liaisons in detail, this study provides valuable insights into the processes that underpin successful civil-military cooperation. It emphasizes the need for ongoing dialogue and collaboration between civil and military actors to ensure that both groups can effectively respond to crises. The study's conclusions have practical implications for policymakers and practitioners involved in crisis management, highlighting the importance of integrating civil liaisons into military exercises and providing them with the necessary resources and support to fulfill their roles effectively.

**Tonje Grunnan** is a senior researcher at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), specializing in crisis management, civil-military relations, and organizational learning. She holds a Master's degree in Political Science from the University of Oslo and has worked at FFI since 2008. Her research activities focus on enhancing total defense capabilities through studies of civil protection measures, lessons learned from crisis management exercises, scenario analyses, and assessments of the roles of liaisons, voluntary organizations, and the private sector.

# 19: THE SOCIETAL TURN IN INTELLIGENCE STUDIES: THE CASE OF SCANDINAVIA (WG)

**Thursday September 18: 10:45 – 12:00.** Chair of the panel and coordinator of the SJMS working group: Kira Vrist Rønn, associate professor at SDU, [kroenn@sam.sdu.dk](mailto:kroenn@sam.sdu.dk)

Description of the panel: *Intelligence studies* has long been dominated by Anglo-American perspectives while studies from other regions and societies are rare. By focusing on Scandinavian intelligence practices, this panel contributes to what could be called a *contextual* or *societal turn* in intelligence studies, in which intelligence practices are seen as influenced – or even determined – by each society’s history, culture and organisation. A gathering element of all contributions is the emphasis on identifying unique, contextual aspects to better understand each society’s intelligence practices. This enables a comparison of the unique, or shared, characteristics of the Scandinavian countries and a broadening of the field beyond the Anglo-American region. The Scandinavian countries are often associated with a high level of public trust, a well-functioning welfare state, and a focus on societal security. The societal turn entails a renewed emphasis on the legitimacy of intelligence practices since societal characteristics fundamentally shape the strategies pursued to legitimise intelligence practices. This panel brings together scholars from Norway, Sweden, and Denmark to address various Scandinavian intelligence practices i.e., accountability practices, contextual understandings and practices of intelligence-led communication, of intelligence warning, and of intelligence professionalism. In so doing, the panel speaks to broader debates in critical military studies about the conditions for military power across different sites.

## TOM RØSETH: THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE WARNING FOR SCANDINAVIAN AND SMALLER HIGH-TRUST SOCIETIES

Intelligence services continue to find intelligence warning challenging. Warning is an essential task of every intelligence service to reduce uncertainty and enable decision making. How can such states compensate for resource deficits and still be able to properly warn? What differentiates warning in small high trust societies versus warning in large states? Large states have resourceful intelligence services with material and technological superiority. This article seeks to develop intelligence warning theory for smaller intelligence services. Advantages could be proximity, focus areas, relational aspects, and organisational or strategic culture. This article therefore argues that small states can mitigate the resource gap. The principles of warning theory for large states’ services stand, such as intelligence being relevant, timely and efficient. Small state services can set conditions that give advantages through the warning process, and this should be reflected in warning theory.

**Tom Røseth** is an associate professor in Intelligence Studies at the Norwegian Defence University College (NDUC), Command and Staff College (CSC). He heads the NDUC Ukraine-Programme established in 2020. His research interests include developments in Ukraine and the war with Russia – implications for Europe, Russia-China relations, Intelligence studies and Arctic security.

## KIRA VRIST RØNN AND MELANIE HARTVIGSEN: INTELLIGENCE-LED COMMUNICATION ON FOREIGN ESPIONAGE IN DENMARK: THREE CONCEPTS OF CO- PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE

In the wake of the Russian war in Ukraine, strategic disclosures of intelligence have increasingly been considered important means for Western intelligence services in order to feed into the public narrative on the prelude to and on the course of the war. Especially, American, and British intelligence services have publicly shared intelligence with the main purpose of raising public awareness. On a domestic level, other European intelligence services, such as the French, have contributed to the debunking of Russian disinformation campaigns when attributing specific information to Russian actors. In this article we analyze how strategic intelligence disclosures and intelligence-led communication are practiced by the Danish intelligence services with a focus on communication with the public on the threats from foreign espionage. Subsequently, we discuss how and why such practices of intelligence communication in small, Scandinavian societies may differ from the American and British approach. Hence, by emphasizing the contextual and cultural aspects related to the role and public expectations of the services, we aim at identifying a Scandinavian approach to intelligence disclosure and intelligence-led communication as a part of the “whole-of-society” approach to current security threats in Scandinavia – with Denmark as the primary case.

**Kira Vrist Rønn** is an associate professor and head of section at Department of Political Science and Public Management at University of Southern Denmark. Her research interests cover intelligence, policing, ethics, and national and international security. She is PI of the research project, IntelHub seeking to voice Scandinavian scholars in intelligence studies and she and her colleagues recently edited the collected volume “Intelligence Practices in High-Trust Societies” (2025) Routledge’s book series, *New Studies in Intelligence*.

**Melanie Hartvigsen (not presenting)** is a postdoctoral researcher at the VINO project (ERC) anchored at Aalborg University, Denmark. As part of the VINO project, she studies democratic accountability of police organisations. Her research interests also cover the logics and practices of accountability in the intelligence field, societal security, and ‘conduct after capture’ practices.

## HEDVIG ÔRDÉN: CHANGING CONDITIONS FOR INFORMAL ACTORS IN INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT? THE CASE OF SWEDISH JOURNALISTS

Recent scholarship in critical intelligence studies emphasizes the role of informal actors in democratic oversight, encouraging increased attention to practices and struggles of accountability. Less probed are the fundamental conditions enabling the work of informal oversight actors, and current struggles over such conditions. This article turns to the case of Sweden, a top-ranking state in the press freedom index, to examine contemporary struggles surrounding the conditions for one informal actor in oversight: the media. Independent journalists can both scrutinize and legitimize intelligence work, thereby mediating between the intelligence services and the public. Journalists are however dependent on press freedom, source protection and epistemic trust to perform this key democratic function. Although Sweden represents a ‘least likely’ case for declining conditions for journalistic work, the article pinpoints three core points of tension between journalists and lawmakers: press freedom vs. national security; source protection vs. surveillance and elite delegitimization of journalists vs. epistemic trust. By examining public debates and legislation affecting journalistic scrutiny of

intelligence, the article speaks to broader debates on the current struggles of informal actors in democratic intelligence oversight – such as NGOs, civil society activists, academics, and journalists – in a context of rising geopolitical tensions and global democratic backsliding, generating increased external and internal pressures on liberal democratic states.

**Hedvig Ördén** is a researcher at the Psychological Defence Research Institute, Lund University. She is also an affiliated researcher at the Europe Programme at the Swedish Institute for International Affairs. Her work is situated within critical security studies and critical intelligence studies. She publishes on topics related to security and foreign information influence, intelligence and security expertise, and intelligence and democracy.

## HANNA EMILIE MOEN LÜTHE: HYBRID THREATS IN NORTHERN NORWAY AND HOW A LOCAL COMMUNITY RESPONDS

Hybrid threats have dominated the European security landscape in recent years. The speed, scale, and intensity, enabled by rapid technological change and global interconnectivity, has made hybrid threats a serious concern for policymakers across Europe. In Norway, hybrid threats are expected to characterize the security landscape in 2025. The Norwegian Police Security Service considers it likely that Russian intelligence will carry out sabotage operations in Norway in order to prevent deliveries, or to negatively influence public opinion in support of Ukraine. Moreover, local communities in democratic states are exposed to hybrid threats, especially those located in areas of high tension and impacted by centre-periphery dimensions that could be exploited and further polarise existing social and political cleavages. Therefore, the paper's research question is "*how does a local community in Finnmark respond to hybrid threats?*". Effective response to the threats from hybrid threats will ensure societal resilience and contribute to the preservation of democratic societies and institutions, making it an important topic to explore. The paper will use the Hybrid Threat Response Model developed by Heier & Borch (2024). They emphasize three elements *strategic planning, operational execution, and knowledge development* when responding effectively to hybrid threats. This paper seeks to identify how this response model corresponds to the ways in which responses to hybrid threats are organised and practiced on an everyday basis by a chosen local community in Finnmark. The paper's method will be qualitative, using interviews to answer the research question. Relevant respondents include the police, the home guard, a municipality, and the civil defence. The paper aims to identify how a local community in a high-tension region responds to hybrid threats and operationalise the elements of the Hybrid Threat Response Model in practice. Much of the existing literature is based on what hybrid threats are and why states use them. It is therefore essential to explore how not only states, but also how communities and municipalities, as the first line of defence against hybrid tactics, can respond and mitigate the threat they pose. Additionally, the paper will try out and test the Hybrid Threat Response Model by reviewing its application to actual cases, hereby offering new important insights within the field.

**Hanna Emilie Moen Lüthe** is a research assistant at the Royal Danish Defence College. She is a MA in International Security and Law from The University of Southern Denmark, and a BA in International Studies from University of Oslo. She has a background from the Combat Service Support division in the Norwegian Army. This paper is based on her MA-thesis defended in the spring 2025.

## 20: CHALLENGES AND CAPABILITIES IN THE HIGH NORTH

**Thursday September 18: 13:15 – 14:30.** Chair: Håkon Lunde Saxi, professor at NDUC, [hsaxi@mil.no](mailto:hsaxi@mil.no)

### **FLORIAN BAYER: ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE, AND THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW – NAVIGATING LEGAL GREY ZONES BELOW THE THRESHOLD OF ARMED CONFLICT**

Activities such as espionage, cyber intrusions, signal jamming, and the physical sabotage of critical infrastructure have become prominent tools for achieving strategic objectives while avoiding openly hostile action. These acts are typically not carried out by conventional armies in uniform, but rather covertly and secretly, with no visible formal ties. This reflects a broader shift in modern warfare towards deniability and disruption rather than outright confrontation, sabre-rattling and arms races. Crucially, as these activities exist in the liminal space between peace and armed conflict, they often operate beyond the scope of traditional international law. This law is based on the distinction between peace and armed conflict, as well as on the concept of conventional wars waged by military force alone. Consequently, these activities frequently remain ambiguous in relation to the traditional regime of *ius ad bellum* and below the threshold of *ius in bello*. The use of proxies exacerbates this issue by hindering clear attribution and allowing for deniability, which hinders direct and effective responses under the law of state responsibility. This raises the question of how states can legally defend themselves against such acts, both individually and collectively. This analysis therefore aims to explore the legal challenges posed by low intensity yet strategically disruptive operations, drawing on instances often associated with Russian activity in Europe, which have been particularly evident in countries bordering the northern or eastern periphery of NATO. It considers how such acts, which fall below the threshold of armed force, can nonetheless be assessed under international law. Most importantly, it explores the possibilities that states and collective security alliances, such as NATO, have to legally deter, detect and defend against such acts.

**Florian Bayer** is a PhD-Candidate in international law at Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Germany, researching the role of international law in the governance of post-conflict transitions in the context of non-international armed conflicts. His dissertation examines whether and how legal norms may emerge from state and institutional practice in the absence of comprehensive regulation under international law. His wider research interests include international humanitarian law, the law of international organisations, and international legal theory and philosophy.”

### **KYRRE TROMM LINDVIG: THE RISE OF THE ARCTIC RANGERS**

This paper presentation will argue for the need to establish a transnational Nordic light infantry unit dedicated and permanently deployed in the high North. Drawing on recent developments in Ukraine and other contemporary conflicts, this paper will argue that a light, highly mobile infantry unit will be the most suited both to avoid detection by enemy forces, as will be able to utilize small groups with low profile and the ability to utilize the terrain also outside the main avenues of approach against

a full-scale attack (Diesen et al, 2024; Anderson et al, 2024). This will enable the units to perform both disrupt and delay operations against an advancing enemy, by posing multiple dilemmas as their mobility will enable unpredictable manoeuvre operations. In addition, the unit will be permanently operating in the area, making it a suitable force also to counter a wide range of hybrid and grey zone activities. As seen in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, low-profile and low signature will be the main success factors for their survival, as light forces are very vulnerable when detected (Childers & Stewart, 2024). Hence, the integration of uncrewed systems will be a cornerstone of the arctic ranger regiment: UAVs and UGVs will be used extensively both for ISR as well as logistical support, limiting the exposure of personnel. Use of artificial intelligence will be vital for both navigation and planning, constantly exploring untraditional routes in order to be as unpredictable as possible against an enemy. As large-scale military conflicts tend to persist, nations will need to have plans for replenishing troops in case of losses or overwear. The Nordic ranger regiment will be a mix of professional and conscript soldiers from Norway, Sweden and Finland, ensuring both a reserve pool of forces in case of conflict as well as a sufficiently large standing force to avoid Russia establishing a “fait accompli” (Osflaten, 2023). In addition, conscripts having served will be reserves to the unit they served in, enabling superior understanding of terrain and the harsh climatic environment, ensuring higher survivability as well as a superior operational tempo, exploiting adverse conditions against an enemy. The regiment will be established across the Northern areas of Norway; Sweden and Finland, enabling both manoeuvre as well as logistical support across inner operational lines perpendicular to the avenues of approach that a mechanized enemy will have to use. The units will have limited organic fire power for raids and ambushes as well as self-defense including- but not limited to- hand held anti-tank and anti-air weapons. In addition, they will be set up for guiding fires from operational level resources for high value targets. Some of these concepts are well-known in all three countries. The difference lies in the combination of new technology and a common, standing C-2 structure across the three nations, fully exploiting the new possibilities the inclusion of Sweden and Finland into NATO will give. The unit can in case of war time be set up to be deployed in front of the planned Arctic Brigade, thereby being able to perform ISTAR operations both for brigade as well as operational level assets. As Russia will likely continue its hybrid and grey zone activities, the unit will be given limited policing authority (such as is today used by the Norwegian border guards) to be able to detect and decisively counter enemy sabotage, infiltration and other measures. The unit will – even if it will employ methods derived from Special Forces – not be a full spectrum SOF -force (Rjaanes & Kristiansen, 2024). Rather, it will attempt to fill a gap between SOF, which in case of full-scale conflict will be in very high demand to influence operational and strategic level effects (Mattingsdal et al, 2024) and the conventional forces in the High North such as Norway’s planned brigade in Finmark or the planned NATO land command in Finland (Regjeringen, 2024; Reuters, 2024).

**Lieutenant-Colonel Kyrre Tromm Lindvig** is an active-duty Norwegian Army officer. He has served in a variety of positions on tactical and operational level and has extensive experience from international operations. He is currently teaching at the Staff College of the Norwegian Defence University College. He defended his Ph.D in cultural studies at the University of Oslo in 2008. In addition, he was visiting research student at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem 2011–2013 and he is an alumnus of the Senior SOF leadership course at the Nato Special Operations University in Belgium.

## **IAN BOWERS AND ØYSTEIN TUNSJØ: DEFENDING EUROPE – THE NORDICS, SEA LIFT AND THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF SMALL STATES**

The election of Donald Trump has prompted a new round of soul-searching in Europe about its reliance on the United States for defence and security. Important discussions in NATO, the EU and nationally are now being taken to boost indigenous defence spending and by extension military

capabilities across Europe. However, it remains unlikely that Europe will be able to take primary responsibility for its own security over the short to medium term due its continued reliance on the United States for key enablers such as satellites, its nuclear deterrent and the critical knowledge and experience its personnel bring to NATO headquarters. Given these realities Europe requires the United States to continue its commitment to NATO's and the continent's security. This paper argues that European increased military spending is not sufficient. Statements devoting increasing percentages of GDP may help convince the Trump and following US administrations as to Europe's interest in its own defence. But Europe needs to further leverage their own unique capacities to support US security interests and thereby ensure a US commitment to Europe. Hence, the paper's primary research question is how Nordic countries can better leverage their own capabilities to support US military interests. Using a qualitative approach supported by interviews with key stakeholders the paper argues that one area that the Nordics enjoy significant levels of superiority over the United States is the possession of a substantial commercial merchant fleet. Through this capability, the Nordic countries, primarily Norway and Denmark, can provide key sealift capabilities that the United States currently lacks. The Nordics can provide the logistical backbone that would allow a forward-deployed United States to sustain military operations in any contingency in the Euro-Atlantic area and importantly the Indo-Pacific. Not only would this solve a persistent problem for the United States military it would also show that European nations are able and willing to provide capabilities that are essential not only for their security, but for the strategic and operational goals of their primary ally. This paper adds to the literature on European strategic interactions with the United States, sea lift and the role of sea power and military logistics.

**Ian Bowers** is a Senior Researcher at Centre for International Security at NDUC. His research focuses on sea power, the future operational environment, deterrence and the Korean Peninsula. He holds a PhD in War Studies from King's College London. He has published a monograph on the South Korean Navy and has edited several volumes including his most recent on combined naval operations during the Korean War. His work has also appeared in journals such as *International Security*, the *Journal of Strategic Studies*, the *Naval War College Review* and the *Washington Quarterly*.

**Øystein Tunsjø** is Professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS), which is part of the Norwegian Defence University College. Tunsjø is head of the Asia programme at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, and specializes in US-China relations, geopolitics and how global power shifts shape Europe and Norway's defence and security. Tunsjø was a member of the government appointed Norwegian Defence Commission of 2021, which submitted the NOU "Forsvar for fred og sikkerhet" to the Norwegian Government in 2023.

## 21: PUBLIC OPINION ON THE MILITARY

**Thursday September 18: 13:15 – 14:30.** Chair: Christoph Harig, chief editor of SJMS, [chha@fak.dk](mailto:chha@fak.dk)

### **MARKUS STEINBRECHER: WITH OR WITHOUT ME? GERMAN WILLINGNESS TO DEFEND ONE'S COUNTRY AND ITS CORRELATES**

With the War in Ukraine being in its fourth year and the deteriorating security situation in the Baltic Sea as well as Central and Eastern Europe, alliance and national defense have become (again) the core tasks of the German Armed Forces. Two prime examples for this strategic shift are the deployment of an armoured German brigade to Lithuania which has started in 2024 and the ongoing debate about the reactivation of conscription or the introduction of other forms of compulsory and voluntary military service. The contribution will look at the willingness to defend one's country in

Germany and its correlates. My analysis is based on data from the annual public opinion surveys of the Bundeswehr Center for Military History and Social Sciences, a representative CAPI-survey with about 2,000 respondents per year. The results show that the willingness to defend Germany is higher than expected and has even increased after the beginning of the Ukraine-War (2021: 33 percent; 2022: 41 percent, 2023: 38 percent, 2024: 42 percent, among the population between 16 and 50 years). With respect to covariates and explanatory variables, the contribution uses the civic voluntarism-model from political participation research to explain the individual willingness to defend in Germany. The willingness to defend is driven by a variety of socio demographic characteristics (gender, own military experience) and political attitudes (interest in politics, voting intentions, attitude towards the use of military force as well as towards the armed forces). Threat perceptions only have a minor impact on the willingness to defend Germany. The submission provides the first comprehensive analysis on this topic for the German context for a long time. Thus, the contribution is a great addition to the already broad research on this topic in the Nordic countries, particularly in Sweden. The results provide insights into the readiness of the German population to follow the political and rhetorical “Zeitenwende” proclaimed by Chancellor Olaf Scholz in 2022 and to shoulder the burden imposed by a more dangerous security environment as well as a stronger German role in the defense of NATO and the EU.

**Markus Steinbrecher** (PhD) is a Senior Researcher at the Bundeswehr Center of Military History and Social Sciences in Potsdam, Germany. He held positions at the University of Bamberg, the University of Mannheim, and Northwestern University. His research focuses on political behavior, political attitudes and public opinion, political psychology, as well as military sociology (civil-military relations, political attitudes of armed forces personnel). The abstract is still good and does not need any changes.

## JOAKIM BERNDTSSON: SWEDISH PUBLIC OPINION ON NATO

Triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Sweden applied for NATO membership in 2022, and the country formally joined the Alliance on 7 March 2024. The membership has been described both as a break with a 200-year tradition of neutrality and military non-alignment, and as a natural next step for a “Gold Card” Partner Country. At the same time, the recent decade has seen the reinstatement of conscription, a restart of “total defence” planning and organising in Sweden, along with a substantial increase in defence spending, projected to reach 2.4 percent in 2025. Previous research has pointed to an increasing agreement – or “concordance” to borrow Schiff’s term – between the government and the population on defence policy and practice. After less than a year as NATO members, is this trend continuing, or are there new signs of dissent and opposition, and are the legitimacy of Swedish defence and security policy and practice, and thus the stability of civil-military relations, being questioned? And are Swedes ready to support civilian and military defence efforts in case of severe crisis or war? Drawing on data from annual national surveys, this paper provides an overview of trends in public opinion on defence policy and practice, with special attention to issues of confidence/trust and personal engagement.

**Joakim Berndtsson** is a Professor at the School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, and a researcher at the Swedish Centre for Studies of Armed Forces and Society (CSMS). Berndtsson’s research interests include civilian-military collaboration, Swedish and Nordic total defence, and public opinion on Swedish defence and security policies and organisation.

## CHRISTIAN LEUPRECHT: OFFICERS AND CIVILIANS: A CIVIL-MILITARY GAP AND CANADIAN NATIONAL SECURITY?

This paper measures the political attitudes held by Canadian Military Colleges (CMC) graduates, as compared to the general population on issues related to Canadian democratic life. It employs survey data from a sample of over one thousand alumni of CMCs, complemented by data on the general population from the 2021 Canadian Election Study. The results show that CMC graduates tend to be more interested in politics and have higher levels of political efficacy than a comparable sample of civilians. However, they are no more satisfied with democracy in Canada. They tend to favour personal, rather than institutional responsibility, and tend to be slightly more right-leaning than their peers. These results show some differences between the military population and the Canadian population, although the differential is insufficient for it to have a material bearing on civil-military relations in Canada. CMC graduates are neither alienated from nor dismissive of Canadian society.

**Christian Leuprecht** is Class of 1965 Distinguished Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada and Editor-in-Chief of the Canadian Military Journal. He also directs the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations in the School of Policy Studies and is an Adjunct Research Professor in the Australian Graduate School of Policing and Security at Charles Sturt University. A former Bicentennial Professor in Canadian Studies at Yale University, Eisenhower Fellow at the NATO Defense College, and Fulbright Research Chair in Canada–US Relations at John Hopkins University’s School for Advanced International Studies, he is an elected member of the College of New Scholars of the Royal Society of Canada and recipient of the Cowan Prize for Excellence in Research at the Royal Military College of Canada.

## 22: RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION

**Thursday September 18: 13:15 – 14:30.** Chair: Peter Tillberg, Director of CSMS, [peter.tillberg@csms.se](mailto:peter.tillberg@csms.se)

### **GREGOR RICHTER AND TIMO GRAF: LIMITING FACTORS TO WOMEN’S INTEREST IN PROFESSIONAL MILITARY SERVICE: NEW FINDINGS FROM REPRESENTATIVE POPULATION SURVEYS IN GERMANY**

To meet current and future security challenges, European armed forces need to increase their military personnel. Women present a largely untapped personnel resource, especially when it comes to professional military service. On average, only 13 percent of NATO’s soldiers are women. Which factors hinder women to take a greater interest in professional military service? This question has been addressed by numerous small N studies, but less so on the basis of representative large N population surveys. The present study seeks to fill that gap in an effort to produce findings that can be generalized to the female (youth) population. The present paper explores various psychological and sociological factors to explain women’s interest in professional military service in the German armed forces. The analysis is based on two separate surveys, which were both conducted in 2023: a representative survey of the general population (N = 2,211) and a representative survey specifically of the youth population (N = 2,106). Women’s interest in professional military service constitutes the dependent variable in all analyses. The explanatory factors differ slightly between the two surveys. The analysis of the general population survey considers as explanatory factors the respondents’ sociodemographic background, social environment, level of exposure to the military via the media, a wide-ranging set of defense policy attitudes and threat perceptions (e.g., war with Russia), pacifist attitude, general attitude towards the armed forces, assessment of the level of gender (in)equality in the military, and stereotypical characterization of soldiers. The analysis of the youth survey considers as explanatory factors the respondents’ sociodemographic background, social environment, previous contact with or exposure to the military, general attitude towards the military, pacifist attitude,

assessment of person-organization fit, and differences between the characterization of self and the stereotypical characterization of soldiers. The analyses of both datasets are based on multivariate OLS regression models. The results indicate that a pacifist attitude, a general aversion towards the military, a negative assessment of the level of gender (in)equality in the military, a lack of P-O fit, and a negative stereotype of soldiers are key obstacles to women taking a greater interest in professional military service in the German armed forces. Importantly, the impact of many of these factors on the respondents' interest in professional military service differ between men and women. Taken together the findings produced by the present study go a long way towards explaining the gender gap in military recruitment. The implications of these findings are discussed with reference to the extant research literature, current recruitment policies and the present and future security challenges in Europe.

**Gregor Richter** (PhD) is a sociologist and researcher in the Military Sociology Research Department at the Bundeswehr Center for Military History and Social Sciences in Potsdam, Germany. He specializes in empirical personnel and organizational research on various topics. His clients include the German Federal Ministry of Defense, the Bundeswehr, and NATO research institutions. He currently is member in a NATO-STO (Science & Technology Organization) research group on personnel retention in the Armed Forces.

**Timo Graf** (not presenting, PhD) is a military sociologist at the Bundeswehr Center of Military History and Social Sciences (ZMSBw) in Potsdam, Germany. He is the head of the annual population survey, which is conducted on behalf of the German Ministry of Defense. His research focuses on the empirical analysis of public opinion on foreign, security, and defense policy as well as civil-military relations. In addition, he lectures at the University of Potsdam on European Security Policy and Military Sociology.

## **RASA SMALIUKIENE AND VIDA ČESNUIYTĖ: RETENTION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE LITHUANIAN ARMED FORCES: THE IMPACT OF BURNOUT AT SERVICE**

Small states, such as those in the Baltic and Scandinavian regions, face constraints in their socio-demographic resources for adequately staffing their national armed forces. As such, the retention of military personnel becomes a matter of particular importance. This research aims to examine the relationship between burnout and retention in military service. The main research question is how much burnout influence intentions of military personal concerning staying military service? Burnout among military personnel is a critical issue that impacts operational readiness, psychological resilience, and long-term retention. Factors such as frequent relocations, extended deployments, inadequate recovery periods, separation from family, and the physical demands of military life deplete both personal and social resources, thereby increasing burnout (Demerouti et al., 2001; Hobfoll, 1989). High-stress environments, characterized by limited autonomy, bureaucratic constraints, and rigid hierarchical structures, further exacerbate burnout (Maslach & Leiter, 1997). The theory of Moral Injury and Burnout (Litz et al., 2009) posits that exposure to combat, ethical dilemmas, and witnessing suffering can lead to emotional exhaustion and psychological distress. Military personnel who experience a misalignment between their personal values, expectations, and military culture are at a heightened risk of burnout (Kristof, 1996). According to Self-Determination Theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985), burnout may be mitigated through strong unit cohesion, team support, mentorship, and leadership styles, as corroborated by Demerouti et al. (2001) and Maslach & Leiter (1997). The study is part of the NATO Science and Technology Organization's research program on Recruitment and Retention (NATO STO HFM RTG-318). The research methodology and survey instrument were developed in collaboration with an international team of scholars from eight NATO member states: Canada, the United States, Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, Estonia, and Lithuania. The standardized questionnaire consists of 68 items of various types, organized into four main thematic categories: organizational culture and leadership, nature of work, rewards and motivation, and work-life balance. Empirical data were collected in Lithuania between October and November 2024 through an online survey administered by military divisions. A total of 2,603 professional service members of the Lithuanian Armed Forces participated in the survey. This research contributes to the

academic discourse on how burnout within military service influences personnel's intentions to either remain in the service or leave before the completion of their contract. The empirical findings identified key burnout indicators that significantly influence military personnel's considerations about leaving the armed forces. The first major sign is when individuals feel fatigued before even beginning their duties. Additionally, after work, they often require more time than previously to relax and recover, or usually feel worn out and weary. Conversely, certain other signs of burnout do not appear to directly compel personnel to leave the service. For instance, while personnel may increasingly speak negatively about their service or become more disconnected from the concept of military service over time, these factors do not consistently result in decisions to quit.

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# Working Groups in SJMS

As part of its biannual NATO in the Nordics conference, SJMS has initiated a number of working groups, covering the broad field of military studies in Scandinavia.

The working groups have two functions:

1. The working groups contribute with panel proposals to the biannual SJMS conference program NATO in the Nordics (next conference will be held in Copenhagen in 2027).
2. The working groups are encouraged to submit relevant and qualified proposals for special collections to the journal (information on special collections can be found [here](#).)

**List of active working groups:**

- Leadership in the Military (chair: Ann-Louise Holten and Anders Klitmøller)
- Veteran care and politics (chair: Lene Ekhaugen)
- Military Politics (chair: Thomas Crosbie)
- Scandinavian Intelligence Culture (chair: Kira Vrist Rønn)
- Future of Professional Military Education (chair: Carsten Rønnfeldt)
- Violence in a new security landscape (chair: Lotta Tillberg)
- Military Logistics (chair: Per Skoglund)
- Military Ethics in Education and Practice (Thomas Randrup and Cornelia Vikan)

If you want to initiate a working group, contact the journal manager of SJMS, Ragnild Lome at FAK-SJMS-01@mil.dk

# Want to Guest Edit a Special Collection in SJMS?

**To guest edit a special collection in SJMS, submit a special collection proposal to the journal within our [deadlines](#) in February and October each year.**

[A special collection](#) (SC) is a special issue in a journal which is not volume-based. Concretely, a SC is a page which groups together articles with a common theme of relevance for the military studies community, introduced, selected and edited by one or more guest editors. The peer review process is the same as any other article in the journal (double blind) and is managed by the journal. The editing process is run by the journal manager and the guest editors, but is overseen by the journal's chief editors, who have a last saying regarding the acceptance or rejection of articles.

## **A special collection proposal is 1-2 pages and should include:**

Timeframe, information about guest editors, and a description of the background and research contribution for the special collection. Also, preliminary abstracts of the introduction and articles (between 5-12) are to be included. Please note: The introduction to the special collection should offer a substantial research contribution in itself, and will be sent to peer review. Make sure you read the [journal's scope](#) and most recent [Editor's Note](#) before you submit.

## **Guidelines for the process of editing a special collection as a guest editor(s):**

1. If your proposal is approved by the editorial team, the special collection is given a category on the submission page of the journal. Authors thereafter submit their articles individually to the journal within a deadline set by the guest editors.
2. Before submitting the articles to the journal, the guest editors are encouraged to invite the authors to an authors' workshop, where the guest editors and authors give feedback on each other's work. If the guest editors wish, the journal manager of SJMS could be present at this seminar.
3. After the articles are submitted to the journal, the guest editors assess the individual submissions together with the journal manager of SJMS, and decide which articles are ready for peer review, and which articles needs additional revisions (articles can also be rejected at this point). Thereafter, suitable articles are sent to peer review.
4. The guest editors are obliged to send suggestions of three reviewers for each article to the journal manager, so that the journal manager has relevant reviewers to contact.
5. During the peer review process, the guest editors are kept in the loop by the journal manager, and are expected to contribute to qualifying feedback to the authors, by summarizing the reviewer's comments. To avoid delays in the process, guest editors should respond to the journal's request for feedback within 1-2 weeks.
6. At any point in the process, and at least once toward the end, the journal manager will contact the chief editors of SJMS to get their assessment of the submission.
7. After all articles have been through at least one round of peer review, the introduction to the special collection should be sent to peer review as well.
8. When the peer review process is over, and the guest editors and chief editors have approved the submissions, the articles are sent to copyediting by the journal manager, and a tracked-changes version is sent to the authors.
9. The article is sent to typesetting. The typesetters send a pdf for approval to the authors.
10. The articles are published a) continuously, or b) after all the articles are ready (choice of guest editors)



### [SJMS Author Survey](#)

The editorial team of *Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies* is interested in best practices regarding revision processes, and would like to ask our current and future authors to answer some questions about receiving peer reviews and working with revisions. We would be grateful if you would spend ten minutes answering this survey. Responses will be anonymized and will be used to inform a future editorial article.



### [SJMS Reviewer Survey](#)

We are also interested in knowing more about the working processes of our reviewers and would be grateful if you would spend ten minutes answering this survey for us. Responses will be anonymized and used both to improve internal processes and as the basis of an editorial article in the journal, sharing experiences from our reviewers.

