Land operations and Combined Arms – Lessons Identified from the War in Ukraine

0:02  Welcome and a short introduction of R&D at Norwegian Defence University College
Lieutenant Colonel Trygve J Smidt, Norwegian Military Academy and Dr Jonas Bjørnebye, Vice Dean, Norwegian Defence University College
10:15  A Theory of Land Warfare
Dr Jim Storr, Lieutenant Colonel (r), independent defence consultant and author
1:00:51 Pacing Ourselves – How both US and Russian doctrine evolved since the mid-1970s and its impact on current operations
Major Ben Griffin, assistant professor, Chief Military History Division, United States Military Academy, Department of History
1:44:24 Intelligence Observations & Lessons Learned in Ukraine
Major Michael D. Greenberg, Instructor United States Military Academy, Department of History
2:31:20  Official Opening of the Seminar
General Eirik Kristoffersen Norwegian Chief of Defence
3:11:50  Missiles, Rockets and UAVs in the Battle of Ukraine
Dr Uzi Rubin, BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University
3:53:48 Concentration and Asymmetry in Defensive Air Power
Niall MacKay, Professor of Mathematics, Department of Mathematics University of York
4:35:25 Attrition versus Maneuver: Implications for Today's Wars. (Virtual present.)
Lieutenant Colonel (r) Shawn Callahan, Course Director College of Distance Education and Training, US Marine Corps University

Lieutenant Colonel (r), Dr Jim Storr, Independent Defence Consultant

A Theory of Land Warfare
Man has engaged in warfare for at least 4,000 years yet, surprisingly, there is no overt theory as to how war should be waged.  This presentation will describe early work towards developing such a theory.
A theory of land warfare is a part of a theory of warfare. However, other dimensions than land will not be discussed in this presentation. It will cover the following issues:
A brief introduction addressing the relation to doctrine and tactics as well as ‘proof’ and ‘falsifiability’
The Need for Theory.  An overview of existing military thought; the role of history and historians; doctrine; bad ideas and their impact; shortcomings of existing military thought; the need for explicit theory; proof, evidence and falsifiability.  (Historical Analysis will be discussed within ‘evidence’)
The Nature of Conflict.  War as, broadly, collective armed conflict for political purposes; variations relating to sub-state conflict; fighting and warfare (the conduct of war). 
The Role of Purpose in Warfare.  Relevance of politics; strategy, the operational level and tactics; the golden thread of purpose. 
Land Warfare.  Key characteristics; amphibious and air-land operations. 
The Nature of Combat.  Complex, violent and, particularly, human.  The role of personal choice, and hence decision-making.  Dominated by shock, surprise and exploitation.  The need for decentralisation in planning and execution. 
Weapons Effects and Movement.  The threat of damage and destruction is compelling (it forces the opponent to respond); thus leading to unpredictability, and increasing complexity.  It also emphasizes the seizure and retention of the initiative, hence tempo.  Manoeuvre and manoeuvre theory. 
Alternative Tactical Approaches.  ‘Persistent’ versus ‘raiding’ methods. The appeal and shortcomings of raiding. 
Summary and Conclusions.

Biography
Jim Storr is a former British Army officer. He is now an independent defence consultant. He studied Civil Engineering before joining the Army and serving in the British Army of the Rhine for much of the 1980s.  During a series of staff and regimental appointments in the Falkland Islands, Northern Ireland and Cyprus, he studied at the Royal Military College of Science and the Army Staff College at Camberley. In the 1990s he worked on policy for the introduction of battlefield computing and was then a military adviser to operational research teams. He then spent five years writing and teaching high-level military doctrine.

In 2002 he was awarded a doctorate for a thesis on the nature of military thought.  He retired, after 25 years’ service, as a lieutenant colonel in 2006. In his second career his main activities are consultancy, research, writing and teaching.  He has spoken at several staff colleges and dozens of national and international conferences. His clients include defense industrial corporations, government research agencies and universities. He was professor of war studies, a part-time appointment, at the Norwegian Military Academy from 2013 to 2017.  He has published five books and is currently working on a sixth.

Major Ben Griffin Assistant Professor Chief Military History Division Department of History

Pacing Ourselves - How both US and Russian doctrine evolved since the mid-1970s and its impact on current operations
In 1982, the US Army officially shifted from the doctrine of Active Defense to AirLand Battle. The new concept’s focus on the operational level of war, emphasis on technological superiority, and need for rapid movement of personnel and materiel sparked considerable debate within NATO and necessitated changes to force structures and tactics. Though never employed in Europe, the success of Operation Desert Storm validated the doctrine in the eyes of many and prompted Russia to adjust its own doctrine and force structure to counter. Unable to spend to the same levels or develop equivalent technology, the Russians instead sought to bolster their traditional strength of indirect fires and greatly enhance their ability to deny NATO access to their formations at depth. This new force design and doctrinal approach became the pacing threat for the US Army as it refocused on large scale combat operations in the mid-2010s and the OpFor model for NATO exercises during the same period. However, the Donovian Army from these exercises looks and fights far differently than the Russian one struggling in Ukraine. This presentation will combine historical research and operational experience to describe the evolution of both the US and Russian approach to war from the late 1970s to the present day and how assumptions about what the “next war” would be drove that evolution. It will also examine the performance of both forces in their recent operations and identify where assumptions did and did not prove valid and relate that to the successes and failures of the armies in achieving operational aims.

Biography
Major Ben Griffin is the Chief of the Military History Division in the History Department at the United States Military Academy. He is the author of the recently published Reagan’s War Stories which examines how the Reagan Administration used fiction to think about the military balance of power in Europe and throughout the world.
A Military Intelligence officer, Ben’s most recent assignment was with the 1st Infantry Division. There he served as the S2 of the Division Artillery, the Division Collection Manager, and the Division’s Deputy Chief of Staff. In these roles, he worked extensively on targeting, improving sensor to shooter linkage, and participated in numerous large-scale exercises both in Europe and in the U.S. with a variety of partner and allied forces.

Major Michael D. Greenberg Instructor, Dept. of History, United States Military Academy

Intelligence Observations & Lessons Learned in Ukraine
This presentation will address both Russian and Ukrainian intelligence capabilities and their utilization. It will follow the outline:
Russian and Ukrainian Organic Capabilities
Russian and Ukrainian Intelligence Preparations & Assumptions
American and NATO Intelligence Sharing with Ukraine
Integration of Shared Intelligence into the Ukrainian Targeting Process
Integration of Shared Intelligence into the Ukrainian Targeting Process
The Way Forward: A Blueprint

Biography
MAJ Michael Greenberg is from Larchmont, New York and earned a BSc in Communications from Northwestern University in 2008 and a MA in Terrorism, Security & Terrorism from King’s College London in 2010. He enlisted in the Army in 2011 and commissioned in 2012 as a Military Intelligence (MI) Officer. He has served in various assignments with the 10th Mountain Division, I Corps, and 1-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team. His military experiences include time in command, senior intelligence staff, and a combat deployment to Afghanistan.
MAJ Greenberg started his studies for the Army Advanced Civil Schooling track at New York University in 2019 and graduated in 2021 with a MA in History. He currently instructs in the American History Division at the United States Military Academy at West Point with specializations in United States 20th Century, Foreign Relations, and National Security. The Army recently designated him for strategic intelligence accession upon completion of his teaching assignment.

Dr Uzi Rubin BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University  

Missiles, Rockets and UAVs in the Battle of Ukraine
The Battle of Ukraine is featuring, for the first time, cutting edge 21st century weapon systems in a high intensity conflict. Among them are precision stand-off weapons such as the US HIMAR guided rocket system, accurate cruise missile such as the Russian CALIBER, hypersonic weapons such as the KINZHAL, precision attack UAVs such as the Turkish BAYRAKTAR TB2 and the ingeniously simple yet deadly Iranian suicide UAV SHAHAD 136.  This array of modern precision stand-off weapons is sidelining traditional air power based on manned aircraft, which – apart from the opening phase of the conflict - have been making rarer and rarer forays into hostile airspaces.
The presentation will evaluate the impact of surface and air launched precision stand-off weapons in the Battle of Ukraine, arguing that by all indications to date, legacy air power seems to be destined to become largely redundant in future battlefields. This in turn will require fundamental changes in the force structure of Western armed forces. 

Biography
Dr. Rubin has a BS in aerospace engineering, Israel Institute of technology 1962, and an ME in aerospace engineering, from the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy New York, 1969.  He also holds a PhD in Political Science, 2019, from Bar Ilan University, Israel.
Dr. Rubin was the founder and first Director of the Israel Missile Defense organization within Israel's Ministry of Defense, in charge of Israel's missile defense programs. He is currently a senior researcher in the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies and the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security. 

Professor Niall MacKay Department of Mathematics, University of York

Concentration and Asymmetry in Defensive Air Power
To deploy and distribute limited air forces optimally was equally important during the Battle of Britain in 1940 as it is in the war in Ukraine today. Professor MacKay will present his analysis of this topic for the Air Campaign of 1940 which has bearing on the Air Campaign we see unfold today in Ukraine.

Biography
Niall MacKay is Professor of Mathematics at the University of York, UK. After a first degree from Cambridge, a PhD at Durham and a postdoctoral fellowship in Japan he returned to Cambridge, first to Queen's College and then to the Stokes Fellowship at Pembroke College. He moved to Sheffield as lecturer in 1998, and to York in 2000.
He is primarily a theoretical physicist, working on algebraic structures related to quantum field theory and string theory. Over the last 15 years he has developed wide-ranging interests in military operations research and history, working with colleagues at the US Naval Postgraduate School on combat modelling and on historical problems with colleagues at York and York St John Universities, founding and leading the York Historical Warfare Analysis Group (YHWAG, https://www-users.york.ac.uk/~nm15/YHWAG/YHWAG.html ).

General Eirik Kristoffersen, Norwegian Chief of Defence

Official opening of the seminar

0:03 Operational Insights from a UK Perspective
Warrent Officer 2 Paul Barnes, Warfare Branch, Royal Army Land Warfare Centre
51:23 Developing the Domain Level of Warfare to Generate Land Domain Freedom of Manoeuvre
Lieutenant Colonel James A. Farrer, SO 1 Warfare Branch, Royal Army Land Warfare Centre
1:34:49 Armored and Alone: The Shortcomings of a Russian BTG
Major Jacob Henry, Instructor United States Military Academy, Department of History
2:09:06 The Linch Pin – Logistics as an Operational Necessity in Global Land Warfare
Major Jessica Rudo and Major Charlotte Stutz, United States Military Academy, Department of History
2:54:13 Some Observations from the War in Ukraine
Mr Christopher A. Lawrence, Executive Director and President Trevor Dupuy Institute
3:42:42 Courses of Action of the Ukrainian Army Military Formations During Counteraction to Russian Aggression
Colonel Vasyl Shvaliuchynskyi, Ukranian Armed Forces
4:22:30 Ukranian Tactics and the Relative Advantage
Erik Elden, Lieutenant Colonel School of Tactics and Operations, Norwegian Land Warfare Centre
5:04:16 Equipping and Training the Ukrainian Army with 155mm Artillery
OR-6 Erik Bøe Wethal, Artillery School, Norwegian Land Warfare Centre

Lieutenant Colonel James Farrer SO 1 Warfare Branch Royal Army Land Warfare Centre

Developing the Domain Level of warfare to generate Land Domain Freedom of Manoeuvre

Freedom of manoeuvre in the application of land power.
HQ LWC’s Warfare Branch conducted a threat assessment in the Summer of 2022, the purpose of which was to assure the efficacy of current British Army tactical doctrine and to identify potential vulnerabilities in military thought. As a result, a Doctrine Note 22/02 ‘Freedom of manoeuvre in the application of land power’ was published internally in November 2022 which sought to close the gap between strategy and tactics and ensure freedom of manoeuvre.

The doctrine note expanded on the threat assessment, looking at the role of fighting power in the creation, maintenance, and exploitation of advantage from a historical perspective, using contemporary examples to confirm or reject assumptions. The doctrine note also challenged the current understanding of the domains of war and offered a new definition and concept which would improve the development and execution of military land power. The doctrine note offers a fresh way of thinking about the operational function in the 21st century while remaining firmly grounded in the understanding of the operational level of war.

This presentation is an unclassified interpretation of Warfare branch’s doctrine note and so does not reflect the British Army’s current position. All references to developing thinking are endorsed neither by the British Army or His Majesty’s Government. 

Biography:

Lt Col James Farrer commissioned into the 9th/12th Royal Lancers (Prince of Wales’s), a Formation Reconnaissance Regiment, in May 1995. He subsequently became part of the Royal Lancers on amalgamation in 2015. The initial part of his service career was spent at Regimental Duty in the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany, before engaging in command and staff appointments in the UK and abroad, of note; Capability Development at the United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence in Fort Benning, Georgia, USA; Army Concept Development in the Directorate of Strategy, Army Headquarters, UK and recently as the Chief Instructor at the Canadian Army Command and Staff College at Fort Frontenac, Kingston, Canada.  He has fulfilled Operational Tours in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Iraq, Saudi Arabia/Yemen and exercised in North America, Europe, Africa and the Far East.

In his current job he has recently been responsible for enhancing British Army doctrine and warfare development from Corps to Sub Unit utilising Combined Arms Manoeuvre. He is currently engaged in developing Domain-level Warfighting and Operational Art. He is the Deputy Chair of the NATO Land Operations Working Group and Chair of the NATO Senior Land Doctrine Panel.

He is a graduate of both the Indian Defence Services Staff College (Wellington, Tamil Nadu, India) and the Indian Higher Defence Course (Mhow, Indore, Madhya Pradesh, India). He holds a Degree from Oxford Brookes University (UK) and Masters from both Cranfield University (UK) and the University of Madras (India).

WO2 Paul Barnes, Warfare Branch, Royal Army Land Warfare Centre 

Operational Insights from a UK Perspective

Warfare Branch’s Threat-Focussed Assessment

The expansion of the Russo-Ukrainian War from February 2022 resulted in a re-assessment by the British Army of its ability to counter the Russian threat to freedom and democracy on the continent of Europe – Op MOBILISE. As part of that project, Warfare Branch at the UK’s Land Warfare Centre began an assessment of Russia’s military strengths and weaknesses to both assure land doctrine and to identify gaps in British Army doctrine which might constitute vulnerabilities.

The assessment identified three areas for research: a historical analysis of Soviet and Russian doctrine and combat performance over the last century or so, an examination of observations from the current conflict, gleaned from a wide range of sources, including from classified intelligence, and a cross-reference with the lessons extracted from the Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020. WO2 Barnes’ presentation is an unclassified extract of the results of the project which highlights Russian vulnerabilities and assesses the efficacy of British Army tactical doctrine. The presentation ends with a recommendation for development which forms Warfare branch’s current main effort.

This presentation is an interpretation of Warfare branch’s Assessment and so may not reflect the British Army’s official position. All references to developing thinking are not endorsed by either the British Army or His Majesty’s Government.

Biography

WO2 Paul Barnes joined the British Army in May 1992 and has seen operational service in the Former Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland, Iraq, and Afghanistan. He is currently the SO2 Warfare B at HQ Land Warfare Centre in Warminster, England and the Secretary of the NATO Land Operations Working Group.

WO2 Barnes holds a MA in Military History from the University of Birmingham and is uniquely a Chief of the General Staff’s Fellow and a Chief of the Air Staff’s Fellow and was a Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in Whitehall in 2018-19. He remains a member of the Military Sciences Advisory Board at RUSI. From 2020-21 he was a fellow of the Modern War Institute at West Point. He has written articles and been published in Australia, USA, and UK and is writing his first book of the Principles of War.

Major Jacob Henry, Instructor, Dept. of History, United States Military Academy

Armored and Alone: The Shortcomings of a Russian BTG

The Russian Battalion Tactical Group, or “BTG,” is the basic fighting unit of the Russian Armed Forces. Designed to deploy independently or alongside other like units, the BTG can deliver direct and indirect fires with mobility and survivability paramount. However, the BTG is not without significant limitations. Chief among its many problems is a fatal shortage of trained and integrated dismounted personnel. Without infantryman, the BTG lacks the ability to clear the dead space, congested areas, or subterrain critical to holding terrain or providing wide area security. Furthermore, the plethora of vehicle systems, combined with aging propulsion and drivetrains, requires a robust maintenance capability that is severely lacking within an organic BTG. Finally, the basic structure of the BTG makes the entire organization unwieldly and inflexible.

The BTG, while modeled after an American Army Brigade Combat Team and of a comparable size to a Combined Arms Battalion, lacks an organized command structure with a manageable span of control. Even a well-trained officer corps with experience in combined arms maneuver and wide area security would struggle to command the 8-9 independent company-sized elements that directly report to the BTG commander. The key takeaway for allied and partner nations facing a BTG-equivalent in future conflict is that while it is unwieldy, hollow, and dependent on inorganic support, it requires only slight shifts in manning and staff organization to become a lethal offensive weapon.

Biography

MAJ Jacob Henry is an Armor Officer serving at the United States Military Academy as an instructor in American History. MAJ Henry graduated from the United States Military Academy in 2012 and commissioned into the Armor Branch. He served as a M1A2 Abrams Tank Platoon Leader with the 4th Infantry Division, deploying in support of Operation Spartan Shield in 2013. He then transitioned into the role of an M2A3 Bradley Company XO and deployed again in support of Operation Spartan Shield in 2015. Upon graduation from Maneuver Captains Career Course, MAJ Henry served as an Assistant Operations Officer in a Stryker Cavalry Squadron. He commanded a Reconnaissance Troop and Headquarters Troop from 2018-20 in the same formation.

After command, MAJ Henry attended the George Washington University in Washington D.C., where he studied under notable Cold War policy experts Hope Harrison and James Hershberg. In 2022, MAJ Henry graduated with a Master of Arts degree in History from George Washington University and produced a prize-winning thesis titled “Polar Bears and Bolsheviks: The American Expedition to North Russia and the Impact of Military Operations on National Policy.

The Linch Pin- Logistics as an Operational Necessity in Global Land Warfare

Major Jessica Rudo, Military Intelligence International History Instructor, Department of History, USMA Faculty Advisor Phi Alpha Theta West Point Chapter

Major Charlotte Stutz, Logistics, AMDIV DAC Instructor at USMA History Department
Black History Project OIC

Abstract
Historically, the success or failure of warfare can be analyzed through the implementation of logistical operations and supply-chain management. Currently, Russia’s strategy in the ongoing conflict with Ukraine showcases the effects of poor logistical planning and implementation in combined arms warfare. The Russian return to an industrial war relied heavily on outdated and undersupplied weapons and vehicle systems that no longer had trained sustainers or production line infrastructure in place. Furthermore, civil military relationships complicate operational efficiency in war torn landscapes. Food security is a massive concern both socially and economically, especially in the face of warfare. The military conflict caused Ukraine to halt exports of food, which, according to USAID, has caused the world’s worst food crisis. The political environment surrounding Russian aggression in Ukraine further strain the economic market through implementation of trade sanctions and exportation limitations. The defense industry and economic sustainment of Russia and Ukraine further effects the efficacy of logistical supply and sustainment. Using historical events from World War II to emphasize some of the current land operations happening in Ukraine, this paper will show how Ukraine’s past and present agricultural power is pivotal to global food security and Russia’s historical and present oversight of fundamental logistical operations has dictated their ability to conduct combined arms warfare today.

Biographies
Major Jessica Rudo graduated from Ramapo College of New Jersey with a BA in International Relations.  She enlisted in the Army as a Civil Affairs Specialist with the 404th Civil Affairs Battalion out of Fort Dix, New Jersey. She attended Defense Language Institute for French and was the honor graduate, earning an Associates in French. Soon after, MAJ Rudo deployed to Samarra, Iraq, with 2-327th “No Slack,” 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 101st Airborne Division.

Major Rudo commissioned via Officer Candidate School, branching Military Intelligence, and reported back to 1BCT, 101st to serve as a platoon leader. MAJ Rudo was pulled over to 4BCT, 101st to participate in the Women in the Army (WITA) program, serving as one of the first female intelligence officers in a field artillery battalion, and later deployed to Afghanistan. After serving as the Brigade S2 for DIVARTY and 101CAB on Ft. Campbell, Kentucky, MAJ Rudo attended the University of West Florida and graduated with an MA in Traditional History in 2021. She currently instructs in the International History Division at the United States Military Academy.

Major Charlotte Stutz serves as an American History Instructor at United States Military Academy at West Point, she is a Logistics Officer by trade.  She was previously enlisted as a light-wheeled mechanic in the Indiana National Guard. She studied English Literature at Purdue University for her undergraduate degree and was commissioned in the United States Army as a Transportation Officer. She completed her Master of Arts in American History at the University of Oklahoma. Her historical field of study is American democratic capitalism and consumer culture, institutional branding and advertising, and the American western frontier.

Her most recent positions were Battalion Operations Officer for 8th STB, Hawaii; Company Commander for JMC HHC, Fort Bliss, Texas, Aide De Camp for the DCG-O at Fort Bliss and 1-41 Infantry Forward Echo Forward Support Company Executive Officer in Afghanistan.

Mr Christopher A. Lawrence, Executive Director and President Trevor Dupuy Institute

​​​Some Observations from the War in Ukraine

Abstract
There has been several discussions about the war in Ukraine based on unverifiable data and debatable assumptions. This presentation will assess and discuss some important factors based on previous relevant studies. These factors will be discussed:

Losses
Wounded-to-killed ratios
Combat Effectiveness
Urban Warfare
U.S. Intelligence advantage
Duration of War

Biography

Christopher A. Lawrence is a professional historian and military analyst. He is the Executive Director and President of The Dupuy Institute, an organization dedicated to scholarly research and objective analysis of historical data related to armed conflict and the resolution of armed conflict. The Dupuy Institute provides independent, historically-based analysis of lessons learned from modern military campaigns.

Mr. Lawrence was the program manager for the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base, the Kursk Data Base, the Modern Insurgency Spread Sheets and for a number of other smaller combat data bases. He participated in studies on casualty estimates (including estimates for Bosnia and Iraq) and studies of air campaign modeling, enemy prisoner of war capture rates, medium weight armor, urban warfare, situational awareness, counterinsurgencies and other subjects for the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, the Joint Staff and the U.S. Air Force. He has also directed a number of studies related to the military impact of banning antipersonnel mines for the Joint Staff, the Los Alamos National Laboratories and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. Mr. Lawrence has written five books and made numerous analytical reports for the Department of Defense.

Colonel Vasyl Shvaliuchynskyi, Ukranian Armed Forces

Courses of Action of the Ukrainian Army Military Formations During Counteraction to Russian Aggression

TBA

Lieutenant Colonel Erik Elden, School of Tactics and Operations, Norwegian Land Warfare Centre

Ukrainian Tactics and The Relative Advantage

Abstract
Since the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have shown an impressive ability to predict and counter Russian tactics. Both in defensive and offensive operations, the Ukrainians have demonstrated superior adaptability, and have utilized effective tactics, techniques and procedures in order to win battles and to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Two methods, which both have contributed to success, are the mobile defense, and the penetration attack.

Some of the reasons why the Ukrainians have been able to utilize these methods and to succeed with them can be found under the headlines organization, intelligence, and mission command. In each of these three areas, we have seen that the Ukrainians have had a relative advantage. Ukrainian strengths correspond with Russian weaknesses, and we find the reasons for success in the ability to understand one’s opponent and to adapt accordingly.

Biography
Lieutenant Colonel Erik Elden is a Senior Staff Officer at the Norwegian Army School of Tactics and Operations at the Army Land Warfare Centre in Rena. His military background is mainly from the Army, as a mechanized infantry officer, but he has also served in the Norwegian Navy, Home Guard, and at the Norwegian Joint Headquarters. He has several deployments to international operations, including Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.

Elden has his military education from the Norwegian Military Academy, where he holds a bachelor’s degree in military studies, and from the Norwegian Defence University College.
Lieutenant Colonel Elden has published two books Krig og Kjærlighet (2012) and Veteraner (2017).

OR-6 Erik Bøe Wethal, Artillery School, Norwegian Land Warfare Centre

Equipping and Training the Ukrainian Army with 155mm Artillery

This presentation will present lessons identified from the work by the Norwegian Land Warfare Centre to train personnel from the Ukrainian Army on Norwegian equipped artillery howitzers. The perspective will be from the instructor level.

Biography

Tba

0:02 The Russian Ukraine War: The View from the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)
Professor Eitan Shamir, Director BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University
53:48 Ukrainian Lessons Learnt from the 2008 Russo-Georgian War
Colonel (r) Lasha Beridze, Board Member and Senior Defense and Security Consultant, Georgian Strategic Analysis Center (GSAC)
1:41:12 Russian IO and Cyber from Georgia 2008 to Ukraine 2014 to Ukraine 2022
Dr Kirklin Bateman, Chief Academic Officer, Expeditionary Warfare School, US Marine Corps University
2:29:00 A study on Lessons Drawn from the Conflict in Ukraine
Professor Antulio J. Echevarria II, General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research, Editor in Chief, US Army War College Press
3:12:27 Wrong-footed, out of Balance, and in the Wrong Direction. Strategic and Operational Perspectives on the Russian 2022 Invasion of Ukraine
Lieutenant Colonel Palle Ydstebø, Norwegian Military Academy, Norwegian Defence University College
3:57:26 Russian Information Paradigm Shift: Strategic Communications Context
Colonel Iryna Izhutova, Ukrainian Armed Forces
4:39:19 Closing remarks
Lieutenant Colonel Trygve J. Smidt, Project Leader/Land Operations Book Project Norwegian Military Academy, Norwegian Defence University College

Professor Eitan Shamir, Director BESA Center for Strategic Studies Political Studies Department, Bar Ilan University 

The Russian Ukraine War: The View from the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)

The Russian Ukraine war presents an opportunity for military establishments around the world to observe a high intensity state against state war between two relatively sophisticated and advanced societies and militaries using some of the state-of-the-art military technology and at the same time simple but effective dual-use technologies.

The IDF is probably only one of the many militaries around the world who is monitoring the war closely in order to derive lessons on various levels: strategic operational and tactical, and in specific areas, such as: the use of armor, drones and loitering munitions, artillery, airpower, civil defense, home front, cyber and more. While there is no IDF official position or paper (at least yet) on the IDF lessons learned, there have been a number of IDF units and individuals whose job was to follow and synthesizes the war's main lessons. The lecture is based on interviews with some of these analysts and the unclassified documents they wrote. It will present both the areas of agreements and areas of debates. As often the case, the main point of contention is the balance between continuity and change and between old lessons that need to be relearned and new lessons that have never been seen before.

Biography

Professor Shamir is the Director of the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA Center) and the head of the MA program in Security and Strategy at Bar-Ilan University, Political Studies Department. Prior to his academic position, he was in charge of the National Security Doctrine Department at the Ministry of Strategic Affairs, Prime Minister Office. Before joining the Ministry, he was a Senior Research Fellow at the Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies (CIMS) at the IDF General Headquarters.

His research interests and publications focus on topics such as strategy, command, and military innovation. He is the author of Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the US, UK and Israeli Armies, Stanford UP, 2011 as well as the editor, of: Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and Strategic Cultures, Cambridge UP, 2017 (With Beatrice Heuser). His forthcoming books (2023) are The Art of Military Innovation: Lessons from the IDF, Harvard University Press (with Edward Luttwak) and Moshe Dayan: The Making of a Strategist, Ministry of Defense (Hebrew) and in English at Cambridge University Press. Shamir published articles in leading journals and various book chapters and is frequently interviewed in the Israeli and international media outlets. Dr. Shamir holds a PhD from the Department of War Studies, King's College London.

Colonel(r) Lasha Beridze, Board Member and Senior Defense and Security Consultant,
Georgian Strategic Analysis Center (GSAC)

Ukrainian lessons learnt from the 2008 Russo-Georgian War

The presentation will focus on more detailed information about 2008 Russia Georgian War. There should have been a significant number of studies and lessons learned drawn from this war by both Western allies and the Georgian Government. The 2008 war was the first demonstration of Vladimir Putin’s willingness to stop what he views as Western expansion into post- Soviet republics and his willingness to challenge and degrade the Western led global order by military means.

The 2008 Russian-Georgian War provides valuable lessons about Russian ways and means to secure “victory” both politically and on the battlefield. It can be seen to set a future precedent for further invasions of its neighbours which eventually led to the 2022 Russian attack on Ukraine.

I will conduct assessment of political developments before war, diplomatic developments, economic developments, war assessment itself takes important part of my presentation, aftermath of the war and valuable lessons must have been learnt from this war.

Biography
Senior Defense and Security Consultant with 20 years’ experience in Georgian military which includes: broad range of appointments at command, staff, and education, and training, transformation of the armed forces, international relationship, strategic liaison, international military operations and management positions as well as defense industries development and military procurement. After retirement 4 years’ experience with UAE Armed Forces GHQ as a consultant for National Service and Reserve Authority with strategy building and performance management, as well as organizational development and National Service development.

Dr Kirklin Bateman, Chief Academic Officer Expeditionary Warfare School, Marine Corps University

Russian Cyberspace, Electronic Warfare, and Information Operations in Ukraine: Comparing 2014-2018 to 2022.

Russia has long been a malign actor in the cyberspace, electronic warfare (EW), and information operations (IO) arenas either through direct action from its military or government agencies or through enabling various non-state and sub-state actors. Russia’s effectiveness in these areas reached its zenith during its illegal annexation of Crimea and occupation of the Donbas Region in eastern Ukraine. Leveraging multidomain operations combining cyberspace, EW, and IO with fires and maneuver, Russia achieved significant success at the tactical and operational levels. Further, Russia also leveraged cyber-attacks against supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, for example national power grids, to further achieve operational and strategic objectives. Indeed, Russia was so successful in leveraging these kinds of combined arms attacks that many analysts posited that when Russia expanded its invasion, cyber, EW, and IO would play a significant role in Russian operations.

Since the full invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has struggled to recreate the success it achieved since 2014. Indeed, beyond failing to produce substantive effects in the cyberspace and information domains at any level of war, Russia has proven mostly ineffective at combining any of the warfighting functions to achieve mission objectives and strategic goals. This is particularly the case when Russian forces have tried basic combined arms maneuver. Repeatedly, Russian forces have become bogged down, unable to logistically support ground forces or conduct command and control beyond rudimentary levels. Subsequently, Russia has seemingly all but abandoned executing the complex cyber, IO, and EW operations that it used with such success in the 2014-2018 timeframe. Nevertheless, Ukrainian infrastructure and military forces remain vulnerable, and it is unclear whether Russia will try and replicate its earlier success in these areas. Indeed, in recent months, as Russian air and ground forces have become bogged down across Ukraine and particularly in the east, it has resorted to widespread and indiscriminate use of rockets and other aerial delivered munitions to terrorize the civilian population. The resulting destruction has only served to harden the resolve of the Ukrainian people and government.

This paper examines Russian use of cyberspace, IO, and EW from the two separate periods of its illegal wars and annexation of Ukrainian territory. It will explore Russia’s failure to achieve the effects it did in the earlier period and whether it will seek to leverage these domains going forward. Further, this paper will offer recommendations for how the Ukrainian government and military can prepare for any eventual attacks in these areas.

Biography

Ph.D., George Mason University: History (2014)
M.A., George Mason University: History (2002)
B.A., University of Kansas: History (1988)

Research Interests
Military and Strategic Studies
Irregular Warfare
The Vietnam War
Citizen Soldiers

KIRKLIN J. BATEMAN is Chief Academic Officer, Expeditionary Warfare School, Marine Corps University. Previously, he was Associate Professor and Chair, Department of War and Conflict Studies (WACS), College of International Security Affairs (CISA) of the National Defense University (NDU) in Washington, DC. He was commissioned through the Army Reserve Officer Training Corps at the University of Kansas as an infantry officer and served throughout the United States and Southwest Asia in air assault and mechanized infantry units. He career-field designated as a strategist and completed assignments with the Joint Staff, Army Staff, and Army Cyber Command. He was principal author of the 2004 and 2005 CJCS Risk Assessment of the National Military Strategy and on the writing team of the 2004 National Military Strategy and 2005 National Defense Strategy. He was also the principal author of the 2007 Army Strategic Planning Guidance. He has fifteen years of experience in teaching, curriculum development, and academic leadership in PME and JPME programs at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. In addition to CISA, he has also served on the faculty at the Army Infantry Officer Advanced Course and the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School. He is also a 2002 graduate of the USMC School of Advanced Warfighting. He retired as a colonel in 2013 after twenty-five years of commissioned service. He also serves as a member of the Marine Corps University Press Editorial Board.

Professor Antulio J. Echevarria II, General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research, Editor in Chief, US Army War College Press

A study on lessons drawn from the conflict in Ukraine

This presentation considers the extent to which offensive maneuver remains viable on the modern battlefield.  Certainly, the successful Ukrainian counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson regions demonstrate offensive maneuver is far from dead.  However, based on what we are able to glean from open sources, the heightened lethality of the modern battlefield may be turning the “condition-setting” phase of combat operations (as defined by US FM 3-0) into the decisive phase.  If true, what are the implications for offensive maneuver?

Biography
Professor Antulio J. Echevarria II is the General MacArthur Chair of Research at the US Army War College and a Visiting Research Fellow at Oxford University’s Changing Character of War Program.  He holds a doctorate in modern history from Princeton University and has authored six books on strategic thinking: War’s Logic: Strategic Thought and the American Way of War (Cambridge 2021), Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford 2017), Imagining Future War (2007), Clausewitz and Contemporary War (Oxford 2007), Reconsidering the American Way of War (Georgetown 2014), and After Clausewitz (Kansas 2001). 

He is a graduate of the US Military Academy, the US Army Command and General Staff College, and the US Army War College.  He also completed a NATO Fulbright Fellowship (2000-01), a Senior Research Fellowship at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (2017-2019), and an Adjunct Fellowship at the Modern War Institute at West Point (2018-2019).  He serves as the Editor-in-Chief of the US Army War College Press, which includes the US Army’s quarterly strategy journal Parameters. 

Lieutenant Colonel (r) Palle Ydstebø, Head Instructor Land Power Section for Land Power, Norwegian Military Academy, Norwegian Defence University College

Wrong-footed, out of balance, and in the wrong direction. Strategic and operational perspectives on the Russian 2022 invasion of Ukraine

This paper will analyse the developments of strategic directions and operations following the Russian expansion of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022. The primary analytical approach is Alexandr A. Svechin’s analysis of modern war, and his revised understanding of both strategy and the new military discipline of operational art. The paper will also explore the tension between strategies of annihilation and exhaustion to explain and assess the operations since the Russian deployment on Ukraine’s border the past winter.

Biography

Palle Ydstebø is a retired Lieutenant Colonel in the Norwegian Army and serves as senior faculty advisor at the Norwegian Military Academy at the Norwegian Defence University College. He holds a PhD in War Studies at the University of Glasgow, and has co-edited several anthologies on Norwegian, German and Russian military thinking and operations. Ydstebø has served in the Norwegian Air Force, the Corps of Engineers, Army Headquarters, the Intelligence Service and the Staff College. He has deployments in Afghanistan and South Sudan, and staff assignments in Germany and UK.

Colonel Iryna Izhutova, Ukrainian Army

Russian Information Paradigm Shift: Strategic Communications Context

Abstract

TBA

Biography

Colonel, Dr. Iryna Izhutova is the Chief of the Training Section at the Strategic Communications Centre/National Defence University of Ukraine. She has previous experience from the Press Office of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

Colonel Izhutova has a PhD in Public Administration from the Kyiv Taras Shevchenko National University. Her areas of interest are: strategic communications, media literacy, information age and public affairs.

Trygve J. Smidt, Lieutenant Colonel Project Leader/Land Operations Book Project Norwegian Military Academy, Norwegian Defence University College

Closing remarks